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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER
1943

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Datum Point . . . . . *Hamilton Fish Armstrong* 1
Airways for Peace . . . . . *Edward Warner* 11
British Policy: A Conservative Forecast . . . . . *Quintin Hogg* 28
Why Japan's Fleet Avoids Action . . . . . *Alexander Kiralfy* 45
America at War: Summer 1943 . . . . . *Hanson W. Baldwin* 59
Canada's Split Personality . . . . . *Judith Robinson* 70
India's Mineral Wealth and Political Future *Charles H. Behre, Jr.* 78
The Evolution of the Red Army . . . . . *Leland Stowe* 94
Italy and Her Neighbors After the War . . . *Count Carlo Sforza* 106
The Reconstruction of France . . . . . *André Istel* 114
Enemy-Owned Property: Restitution or Confiscation? *John Dickinson* 126
German Rule in Ostland . . . . . *Joachim Joesten* 143
Notes on Arab Unity . . . . . *Joel Carmichael* 148
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Robert Gale Woolbert* 154
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 169

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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DATUM POINT

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

OUR aim in this war is the complete material and psychological defeat of our enemies. We have rejected the idea of an armistice or negotiated peace and have pledged ourselves not to accept either at any stage or in any guise. When we have beaten Germany, Japan, Italy and their satellites, together or seriatim, into unconditional surrender, and while we are making sure that our accomplishment cannot be evaded or undone, we shall not recognize any limitations on our action except those imposed by our own consciences or any commitments except those which have been arrived at openly among the United Nations.

The outlines of the postwar world which we and our allies have already sketched constitute a pledge to and among ourselves alone. We may bungle the attempt to turn it into living reality. If so, we shall again suffer the lamentable consequences of our failure. But this time we are making our enemies no promises and shall not count on them to fulfill any part of a bargain. We on our side rely on ourselves alone — our own physical strength, our own strength of will. If we fail to keep the promises which we have made to ourselves and between ourselves we shall complete the destruction of our civilization by our own sole negligence and frivolity.

We hope to be able eventually to accept the peoples now our enemies as partners, and we are prepared to go as fast and as far as we safely can in making such a relationship with us seem reasonable and even attractive. But we fear that "eventually" is a long way off. In the interim, the one standard by which we shall measure every step will be whether it increases or diminishes our security. We shall try this time to remember how close we came to destruction and the grim sacrifices by which at the last moment we saved ourselves from it. Without vindictiveness but

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without apology or compunction we shall assign each of our beaten enemies his necessary rôle; and, provided we can match our perseverance to our present determination, we shall see that he carries that rôle through precisely, until such time as we may deliberately decide to modify it.

What does this mean, country by country?

It means that we intend to teach the German people beyond any chance of misunderstanding or later denial that they are not a race of supermen designated by some primordial decree to rule the world but instead a quite ordinary conglomeration of several racial stocks, without preternatural origins, with a number of unlovely traits as well as talents of a high order, and with a completely wrong belief that you can pound your neighbors into loving you as an apache pounds his woman into dazed rapture. We intend to see that the methods by which Germany regenerates herself confirm the lessons of her defeat. We hope that as a result of the dual demonstration Germans will understand that they are not unlike other nations and realize that in future they must cultivate something which they have always discounted in their attempts to wring satisfaction from an obscure destiny — the spontaneous esteem and collaboration of the rest of the world.

We are not so careless or unfair as to indict the whole German people for the specific crimes of some Germans. We do, however, indict them as a whole for having allowed arrogant thought and regardless action to secure a dominant place in their organized national life. We have only an academic interest in discussing whether the abdication of individual judgment which is responsible derives from a German inferiority complex or a German superiority complex, supposing the two are really different. We know that whichever it is, it has dogged the German people from the Valhalla of perpetual fights and feasts to the military councils of Potsdam, the beer halls of Munich, the frozen Volga and the grey village square where the French priest and postman are shot as a routine reprisal for some act of sabotage committed by persons unknown either to them or to the German officer who gives the command.

Some day, we must hope, the German nation will break loose from the ancient spell and cease to quiver between elation and despair, with acts of violence always the compensating outlet from either intolerable strain. Some day, we must hope, Wotan will yield to Apollo. Until we are sure that day has come we mean

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to curb at the source every manifestation of the traditional German spirit which can possibly bring ruin again to the quiet homes of peaceful peoples, near or far.

We do not underrate German culture, whether it comes to flower in German science or the glories of Goethe and Beethoven. Similarly, we think Germans should not underrate other cultures, and certainly not to the point where they feel entitled to tear them up by the roots and sow salt in the fields where they flourished. We cannot require Germans to think highly of Comenius or Chopin, Hus or Dvořak, Racine or Pasteur, Tolstoy or Tchaikovsky, Van Dyck or Erasmus; but we can require that they leave peoples which have produced men of genius like these to continue the peaceful enjoyment of their works and to continue adding diversifications and special beauties to our common civilization. We intend to do this. We recognize that we cannot reorient the German mentality from without by force or effect a lasting change in the political and social organization of German society against the will of the effective majority of Germans. But we can create conditions in the world which are likely to make the majority of Germans decide in favor of letting other nations continue to live well as a condition precedent to themselves living better. We have various plans whereby in the course of time and with sufficient good will we hope that all nations may be enabled to live better. So far as the Germans are concerned, we think we are likely to make permanent progress only if we address them at the start wholly in their own familiar categorical imperative:

"Conquered lands — leave them! Armies — disband them! Stolen goods — return them! Prisoners — free them! Discriminations — repeal them! War factories — dismantle them! Nazi heroes — hang them! Food? After we have fed those you have starved! Forgiveness? When you have repudiated the conception of German destiny which leads you to act detestably. Respect and confidence? When new German professors teach new lessons from new textbooks to new generations of German children, new German philosophers expound a new anti-mystic in new treatises, new editorial writers use a new language of tolerance in new German newspapers, new German statesmen seek a new German destiny in a new conception of coöperation and mutual accommodation, new German legislators embody that new conception in a new policy, new German judges ratify it, new German diplomats practise it and the German people in their hearts approve it!"

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We intend to teach the Japanese, who have not been defeated in modern history, that they can be defeated. We intend to drive out of their heads the same fixed notion of superiority which makes the Germans feel thwarted and restless in any world not yet conquered. We intend to demonstrate to them that their Emperor is not a god but a man of most fallible judgment; that his policies are not evolved in the remote stillnesses of Heaven but in the councils of palace sycophants and ambitious generals; and that they are founded on error and bring disaster.

As with the Germans, we think the most hopeful way of giving the Japanese their new and necessary sense of proportion is by practical demonstration. No matter how long it takes, we shall reconquer from Japan bit by bit all the territories which she has seized in this and previous wars and return them to their inhabitants, either at once or so soon as they can develop, with our help, the necessary capacities for self-rule. We shall disarm Japan immediately and completely. Her neighbors will admit her to a share in the co-prosperity sphere of the Far East when they feel she no longer interprets that phrase as meaning prosperity for herself and slavery for others. She will be allowed to share in the discussions and decisions of civilized international society when the nations which have preserved that society from Axis depredations are convinced that she has definitely abandoned force as a national policy and will seek a proportioned destiny through negotiation and collaboration.

The lesson which the Italians must take to heart is simpler because they are intrinsically weaker. It is that a second-class Power cannot be built into a master race by rhetoric, grimaces, blackmail and castor oil, and that attempts to ride to conquest on the coat-tails of others will end in humiliation and disaster no matter which of the major contestants wins.

When we call Italians to account for their merciless conduct in Ethiopia, Spain, Greece and Jugoslavia we shall not forget that Leonardo and Dante enriched the whole human race or that a generous idealism burned, not for Italians alone, in the hearts of Mazzini and Garibaldi. Nor, on the other hand, shall we forget that the Italian sovereign acquiesced in the coup d'état of 1922 and in Mussolini's countless subsequent illegalities and that the Italian people, with a painfully small number of honorable exceptions, stood negligently by for 20 years while the Fascisti destroyed one after another of the liberties which Mazzini and Garibaldi had won them. We shall not forget how many Italians

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of ancient name and large fortune wore the Fascist badge lightly in their buttonholes while Black Shirt gunmen were murdering in the streets and Mussolini was defiling the monuments of antiquity with puerile scribblings. We have seen pictures of the Italian Army goose-stepping in imitation of the enemies their fathers expelled from Lombardy and Venetia. We still remember, now that Mussolini's conquests have been wiped from the map, how pleased most Italians were with them while they were being won easily and cheaply.

The record seems to require that we do more than welcome the Italian people's eleventh-hour repentance. Their pride in having established the first totalitarian state in modern Europe and their support or tolerance of its violence at home and aggression abroad through two decades constitute something more than a juvenile escapade. When the Nazis have been pushed beyond the Alps we must examine with great care to see whether the new spokesmen who come to us in Italy's name have clean hands and whether their past records confirm their professions of devotion to constitutional methods of government. We have no interest in rehabilitating individuals who gambled wrong and now would like to recoup their losses out of the supposedly abundant funds of American generosity and naïveté. Only Mussolini and the chiefs of his jackal pack will require bodily punishment. But many more must be excluded forever from all share in the direction of Italian affairs and any Italian government must remain for a time on probation.

We shall not forget the lesser culprits. Hungarians, Bulgars, Rumanians and others have sold their services and reputations to the Nazis and Fascists, in some cases in return for parcels of territory stolen from neighbors with whom they had just signed treaties of faithful friendship and mutual aid. To these also we intend to make a memorable demonstration on behalf of international law, order and good faith. They will, of course, disgorge their stolen goods completely. But it will not be sufficient for them to do that, to dismiss their puppet dictators, to hang the officials who have joined the invaders in committing so many atrocities, and to profess repentance. They must give evidence, through acts, that in future it will be much harder than it has been in the past for some great neighbor to bribe them, or for new leaders of their own to manœuvre them, into wasting the savings of their simple and hardworking populations in foreign wars. We hope through general security measures to forestall small as well as

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large breaches of the peace. Even so, we think that before the nations of Eastern Europe can collaborate peacefully several of them will have to modernize the present feudal structure of their society and that living conditions in that neighborhood will have to be improved and equalized both as between classes and between nations. Perhaps this can be achieved more easily if the nations in question come together in one or more confederations. We shall not impede any such development and we shall be ready to give what material aid we can in the execution of these nec essary changes and improvements.

Presumably this statement of general intentions will be acceptable to most Americans. The differences of opinion crop out when one tries to particularize from the general, and especially when one begins to detail the lessons America must learn as well as those she must teach. Some people even feel quite sincerely that to think about those lessons or to outline the kind of world we are fighting for diverts energy from the fight itself and so constitutes a sort of sabotage.

There is, of course, a time for everything and first things come first. The American engineer dispatching a string of trucks northward from Zahidan, the marine landing at dawn on a beach on Guadalcanal, the pilot settling into the seat of his bomber for an attack on Düsseldorf, cannot be asked in that moment to think beyond the delivery into Russian hands of the tanks loaded on those trucks, the mopping up of the Japanese in the jungle behind that glimmering stretch of beach, the dropping of those bombs on the German factories. Nor can their colleagues back along the lines of communication to Washington, and the officers there where operational directives are issued, spend time, while the day's work is still to be done, thinking about things outside their own spheres of responsibility. But there is nothing incompatible between doing the day's work and having a clear idea as to why it is necessary. In fact, people who are not professional soldiers are apt to do the day's work better if they understand clearly the reasons which make it necessary and the results which will be its justification. The definitions must be made for them, however, by their political leaders. This falls in *their* sphere of responsibility. They must see that the war is conducted not simply so that it is won in the quickest time and with the least loss of lives but also so that it secures the fullest possible achievement of our broadest national objectives.

The objectives of a nation are not marked by a dot in time;

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they are continuous and developing. Nobody can suppose that consideration of any temporary factors of numbers, technics or logistics kept England erect when Nazi bombs rocked Westminster and Buckingham Palace and turned Coventry and Bristol to rubble; or decided de Gaulle to quit his country, family and army and continue France's war against Germany; or sent Mihailovitch and his Serb guerrillas into the mountains to fight planes and cannon with knives and rifles; or made the Czech nation ignore threats and punishments and continue to strike as individuals against the soldiers and police of their conquerors; or collected a Polish army from Russian prisons to take up the war again in the Middle East; or informed the Russians that at Stalingrad they would be impregnable. In each of these peoples there was a conviction that in the substrata of its national being runs a vital current which is not finite and perishable but continuous and self-renewing and that it will supply future generations with the substance of a better life long after the fragments of enemy shells have rusted away in the ground. Each of them has imagination; but none could imagine a time when it would cease to exist or, existing, cease to grow.

The United States has inherited wellsprings of that same national confidence from the days of Plymouth Rock and Lewis and Clark and Ellis Island. The country then was not abashed by the unknown, could look at its lengthening shadow and say boldly: "I change because I grow." Today those springs are riled. Contradictions and uncertainties attend the convulsive efforts of a giant nation which has been sprawling at ease on the floor to send the right message to its unaccustomed muscles, to draw itself erect, to substitute disciplined action for uncontrolled reflexes, and to strike coördinated blows at the enemies who had assembled unnoticed to destroy it.

The springs must and can be cleared. They must be cleared, both because we need confidence that we can create a secure and at the same time growing society if we are to set about planning it with sufficient intelligence and energy, and because unless that confidence exists we shall find the purely military victory harder to win. They can be cleared, by defining aims which are reasonable and possible and by taking, in company with our allies, the preliminary steps which will permit giving those aims eventual realization. Doubts are being sown by pessimists and traitors. Fundamental American principles are being misinterpreted by those too timid to hold them intact. Monstrous world structures

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are being blueprinted by amateur engineers who seem to know everything except that nations are obstinately diverse. Milky illusions are being propagated by those who think of the war mainly as it seems to offer a lovely opportunity to transform the world into a neighborhood settlement house. And vague dreads and animosities are being inspired by those to whom it is only the opening phase of a new era of destructive social conflict and revolution. To such distortions the answer which will inspire confidence is not abuse, ridicule or violence but the presentation of a more detailed picture of our national destiny drawn on a larger canvas than any used yet.

The false prophets can be blanketed and the struggle in which we are engaged given more hopeful meaning if we will act imaginatively, yet soberly and with a sense of history, on the truth which Wendell Willkie uttered at Chungking: "The war is not simply a technical problem for tank forces; it is a war for men's minds." Since men's minds are not fettered by any limits of space or time our military strategy cannot accept such limits. When we repeat the current phrase that war is total, we mean — or ought to mean — that it is not merely total in its extent over the entire surface of the globe but total also in the inter-relation of what men remember from the past, what they do in the present and what they hope for the future.

It is a platitude of political discussion to say that a country should bring its responsibilities into balance with its physical powers. History furnishes plenty of horrifying examples of what happens, or might easily have happened, when it does not. But has the cardinal error of the United States been that it did not attempt to bring the two into balance? Does not history teach that the cardinal error of the United States was that it did not know where the line of its interests could be drawn?

The United States would be safe and respected, though hardly loved, if the whole area of its interests coincided with the zone of its power and if it remained constantly ready to use that power. But wishing will not make it so, and our adoption of a cautious policy of withdrawing our commitments to the outer limits of the range of our direct power will not protect those of our interests which lie beyond. It is beyond those limits, then, that foresight and the exercise of skill in the conduct of our foreign relations are most required. For it is in this outer zone that disputes which often do not *seem* to touch our interests originate and may grow into wars in which we may later be

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forced involuntarily to intervene. That outer zone, the writer believes, has no limits in the whole world.

If this thesis is true, we need urgently to arrange for our influence to be felt everywhere in the world, continuously and hence *in time*, despite the fact that in many parts of it we are unable to exercise power directly. And for this purpose we must accept partnership in a system of give and take, called by President Beneš "live and help live," not on a limited basis calculated by the limited range of our own individual power but on a universal basis calculated by the unlimited range of our national interest.

With whom shall we deal? With the nations that happen to live in our neighborhood, and as the leader of this bloc with other regional blocs? Or with one or two or three other Great Powers which in turn can exercise control over large areas of the world, so that together we can in fact control it all? Or with all like-minded Powers, the more the better? The writer believes that in the long run the United States will be stronger and safer in the larger group than in a bloc or a limited alliance. He believes that the general acceptance of a general relationship, with general though graduated responsibilities, offers the only basis for organizing world peace under the conditions produced by the development of science, communication and education, and that nothing but world peace is good enough for a World Power like the United States.

The cautious will say that half a loaf is better than no bread. But if the half loaf is not enough to support life, it is not worth risking much to gain. The American people will not find sufficient reward for their present sacrifices in being enabled to escape responsibility for helping prevent several small wars and then either perish or lose their way of life in another great war.

Neville Chamberlain said that the British people were not concerned with what was happening in a faraway land. As a result of that misapprehension Britain came as near to perishing as a nation can come and still manage to survive; and if Britain had perished we also should have perished, in one sense or another of the word. There is no faraway land. Our struggle to fix that fact in the public consciousness must not cease or falter. We must not proffer the American people half loaves or plan to accept half loaves on their behalf. On a half loaf they can subsist temporarily; they cannot live securely, nor develop as a nation the collective characteristics which in an individual we recognize give proportion, harmony and lasting satisfaction.

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These pages are written in the conviction that our national future is bound up with the future of the whole world and not any single part of it; that it is possible at one time to learn from the past, work in the present and look to the future; and that it is necessary for our salvation that we do these three things together, do them on the scale indicated, and do them now.

Without a military victory there is no chance of a worthy peace. Without a worthy peace victory will have been worth winning in only a very limited sense. Whether or not the peace is worthy will depend on the coördinated action and common will of the United Nations — all of them — now and later. Unless we can reach clear understandings among ourselves now we are most unlikely to get them later. For the pattern of any future organization of the world will derive from the habits and instruments we create to deal with our present common peril, and if we cannot agree when the peril is instant and concrete how shall we agree when it has resumed the appearance of an abstraction?

These ideas are throbbing in the minds of millions of Americans, military and civilian alike, even as they concentrate on the day-by-day problems of the war. They crave to be told what it is they will get out of victory besides temporary survival. To let them see what they will get if they will assume the risks of peace as firmly as they have assumed the risks of war is not to divert their energies from the fearful tasks in hand — to give them, as one commentator naïvely put it, an opiate. On the contrary, it is to throw idle dynamos into action.

"From a high hill near the airdrome," wrote Byron Darnton from New Guinea in a last dispatch to the *New York Times* before his death there on October 18, 1942, "a man can see his countrymen building with blood, sweat and toil the firm resolution that their sons shall not die under bombs but shall have peace, because they will know how to preserve peace." Let the resolution of men at desks match the resolution of men under bombs. And let it be a resolution informed by the failures of the past and measuring without either foolish optimism or needless despair the difficulties and hazards of the future.

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AIRWAYS FOR PEACE

By Edward Warner

THE first international air services were inaugurated in 1919. Twenty years later the independent states or major colonial possessions which did not have regular air connections with their neighbors could be numbered on the fingers of one hand. A large part of that service is still in active operation, especially in the Western Hemisphere. But it will be enormously expanded and much of it will be remade in the years immediately following the present war. If there is ever to be a fundamental change in the legal and political framework which had gradually developed in the last twenty years the time for it will be when we shift from war to postwar conditions. We must decide now whether change is really desirable and, if so, consider what new forms might be substituted for the old ones.

The basic political features of the air transport situation before the war were as follows:

(1) Each state maintained full sovereign rights in the air space above its territory.

(2) Most states (though by no means all) had adhered to one of the two major international conventions governing air transportation, that of Paris (1919) and that of Havana (1928).

(3) The parties to these conventions undertook to give certain general privileges to the aircraft of other ratifying states; and those which ratified the Paris convention undertook to observe uniform practice in such matters as traffic rules and standards for licensing pilots and aircraft.

(4) In practical application, the conventions created no rights to operate international air transport services.

(5) Such international services were established either as a result of bilateral agreements between governments, or when interested airlines themselves secured concessions to operate into and within foreign territories.

Since 1918 little has been heard of the argument that the air should be free above a certain altitude, in the sense in which the seas are free beyond territorial limits. No one now seriously questions the fact that the full sovereignty of every state extends to the air space above its territory. All international agreements have taken it for granted. No one is likely to question it in future, unless as part of a general review of the privileges of sovereignty

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and of the possibility of abridging them by general agreement or of surrendering some of them into the keeping of an international organization. "Freedom of the air" as now conceived would be merely an agreement among sovereign states to restrict the exercise of their recognized sovereign rights.

The International Convention for Air Navigation, signed at Paris on October 13, 1919, had an effective membership in 1938 of 33 states.[1] The Pan American Convention, concluded at Havana in 1928, was ratified by the United States, Mexico, Chile and Ecuador, all the States of Central America except Salvador and all the Caribbean states (excluding the colonies of European Powers) except Cuba. Few of the larger South American countries and none of those bordering the Caribbean on the south ever adhered to either convention.

Both of these conventions have been interpreted and applied in the sense most unfavorable to the free expansion of international air services. Both permitted a reasonably free movement of privately-owned aircraft in the territories of member states, as well as of commercial aircraft not engaged in a regular scheduled service; but both have been interpreted so as to deny a corresponding freedom to the operators of regular transport services, thereby making the inauguration of regular services dependent upon special agreement. In the case of the Paris convention, a certain ambiguity in the text was resolved so as to limit the freedom of air transport. The Havana convention was less ambiguous. To most readers it seemed to say clearly that air transport should be free within the territories of the ratifying states. But it was not so applied.

Efforts were made from time to time to secure a more liberal interpretation of the Paris convention or to modify it into a more liberal form. From the first, the British had favored a large degree of freedom in the operation of air services into and through all countries. So had the Dutch, who were like the British in possessing a small home territory, distant colonial territories and an established tradition as carriers. Whenever the Government of the United States had occasion to make a declaration it supported freedom of operation.

In June 1929 a conference was held in Paris to consider revising the Paris convention so as to permit greater freedom of opera-

[1] This included seven of the members of the British Commonwealth. Of the remaining 26 members, 20 were in Europe. In the Western Hemisphere, Canada, Peru, Uruguay and Argentina ratified (some others did also but withdrew subsequently).

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tions. It was attended by representatives of the United States, Germany and certain other states which had not ratified the convention, as well, of course, as by representatives of the adherent states. Only the United States, the British Empire, the Netherlands and Sweden favored the change. In opposition were 27 states (including Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Haiti, Uruguay and Venezuela from the Western Hemisphere). Even the modest proposition that the ratifying states bind themselves not to prohibit the establishment of international transport services except on "reasonable grounds" (they themselves presumably being their own judges of reasonableness) mustered only 11 out of 30 votes.

Since no general privilege of international operation was recognized, there remained two procedures by which international services might be established — by bilateral agreement and by unilateral concession. The former has been the prevailing rule in Europe, the latter in the Western Hemisphere south of the Canadian border. Bilateral agreements varied widely in their provisions. In the case of two major Powers they customarily provided for complete equality of privilege with respect to a particular route, which would then be operated by airlines of both states. Where a major and a minor Power were concerned, the commoner practice was for the more powerful to receive the privilege of operating a through service between the principal centers of the two countries while the smaller received the privilege of operating certain international services of a more local character.

Sometimes the agreements fixed the maximum number of schedules to be operated daily or weekly by each carrier (as in the case of the transatlantic services between the United States and the United Kingdom and the United States and France), but more often that was left for the carriers themselves. In fact, one can hardly appraise the significance of the inter-governmental agreements without at the same time allowing for the effect of the inter-company agreements, which usually were secret. Since most European airlines were in effect the agents of their governments, it was by agreements between them that rate and service wars were avoided. The extreme form of such inter-company arrangements was the "pool," which involved the distribution of total traffic revenues in accordance with some agreed ratio. Pools were particularly favored by the Germans, the French and the Swedes. The British shunned them.

Most of the international services to which American airlines have been a party have been authorized by concessions obtained

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directly by the carrier [2] from the government concerned, but there were exceptions. The United States Government has had agreements with Great Britain (1935) and France (1939) covering transatlantic air services, and with Canada (1939 and 1940) covering all air transport services across the border. Under the agreement with Britain, which remains in force until 1950, a designated carrier of each country may operate two schedules per week between the United States and the United Kingdom.

By 1939 the process of reciprocal exchange through bilateral agreement had developed so far in Europe that there was a close approximation to general freedom of passage. Although Germany was generally recognized to be holding the Damoclean sword of war over all her neighbors, German aircraft were being welcomed on daily services to the airports of the United Kingdom and most countries on the Continent. If it was considered dangerous to let the transport aircraft of potential enemies fly over your territory, and if it was that presumed danger which had brought about the defeat of a general agreement conceding the natural right of passage, the course taken failed to accomplish its purpose. The aircraft of potential enemies, and of all other states, were overhead at all hours.

On this side of the Atlantic, Pan American Airways or Pan American-Grace Airways had concessions to operate into every one of the American Republics and into most of the South American and Caribbean colonies of the European states. The case of the United States and Canada is exceptional in that the length of the border and the grouping of many large cities close to it on either side make necessary a number of distinct international services. By an agreement entered into December 3, 1940, these were so allocated as to avoid any direct duplication.[3]

For the future, the following new alternative procedures appear possible:

(1) Air transport might be operated internationally, either through a world monopoly or through a number of companies representing groups of nations interested in particular areas.

(2) There might be general agreement on a body of principles defining in general terms the air transport privileges to be enjoyed

[2] Pan American Airways, or its subsidiaries or affiliates, in practically every instance.

[3] The airlines of the United States traverse the border at seven points (not counting a landing in Windsor, only a few minutes by bus from Detroit); while Trans-Canada Airlines secured a privilege in which both it and the Canadian Government were particularly interested, namely to operate non-stop between New York and Toronto so as to make connection with the Canadian trans-continental line to Vancouver.

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by all countries. (They might go so far as to convey to every country the right to carry passengers and goods between any two points in the world; or the privileges conveyed might be much less extensive.)

(3) Air transport might be conducted by privately or governmentally owned airlines, bearing national flags but operating subject to an international control and receiving from an international agency the certificate that gave them the right to conduct international services.

Alternatively, of course, bilateral bargaining might continue as in the past.

II

Proposals for the international operation of airlines first received serious attention in 1932 when the French delegation to the Disarmament Conference proposed the internationalization of civil aviation as a measure of security against the possible misuse of civil air fleets. Specifically, the French proposal was that international civil air transport services should be entrusted to continental, inter-continental or inter-colonial organizations which would operate them under the auspices of the League of Nations. Orders for the necessary equipment would be allocated among the aircraft-building states in proportion to their industrial capacity rather than with a view to securing the equipment, regardless of its source, which would permit the most economical and efficient operation. A few of the Continental European delegations favored the scheme but it received little support from people actively connected with air transport. These denounced it with vehemence, perhaps less because it would remove national characteristics from the airlines than because it might entail governmental direction and the restriction or elimination of private enterprise.[4]

Now that there has been another war and the world has seen what the bomber can do, the aims which the French proclaimed a dozen years ago, often to deaf ears or impatient audiences, will find new advocates. Looking back on the years from 1931 to 1939, many will proclaim the indivisibility of peace. Already the proposal to deprive civil aviation of all national quality has been revived, and it has found a surprising measure of support in Britain. Journals of such importance as the *Times* and the *Economist*

[4] There have been a few cases of actual international operation, *e.g.* by the Russo-German company, Deruluft.

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have favored as much internationalization as can be obtained in the face of anticipated American opposition. Labour Party spokesmen are also favorable. In general, Conservatives are opposed, seeing in the development of air transport under British control an influence for the unification of the Empire. The opposition of those professionally engaged in aeronautics is (with isolated individual exceptions) vigorous. The British Government has taken no position, but seems likely at least to give the possibilities of internationalization serious and respectful study. Even those who dismiss it as impossible on a world-wide scale often hope that some consolidation of interests in Europe may avert the rival operation of 15 or 20 companies with the active backing of as many governments.

In the United States the proposal has not aroused any such interest. Vice-President Wallace has sponsored it, but without attracting much response. American operators and the manufacturers of aircraft would certainly oppose it, as they would any scheme that was likely to bring air operations more directly into the hands of government, whether national or international.

III

If we intend establishing any general principles defining a natural right to participate in air commerce we shall do this most easily as a part of a world convention on air navigation. After the war there will be a plain need for machinery to insure uniformity in aerial rules of the road and some other matters. Either the Paris convention of 1919 will be extensively recast or it will be replaced by a new instrument taking account of experience on both sides of the Atlantic. Some specification as to the degree of freedom of transport operation that is to be generally conceded could be included. This would be easier than to try to build an air navigation convention on technical considerations alone and subsequently to attempt to secure general adhesion to a separate agreement outlining the right to participate in air commerce.

One general principle would establish the right of transport aircraft to make non-stop flights across the territory of foreign nations. Thus an airline that wished to operate from Sweden to Greece would have the right to cross the territory of the intervening states without special sanction.[6] A next step would be to

[6] The right of non-stop passage was contained in the United States-Canada agreement of 1939. It was stated in general terms and without reference to particular routes, although an exception was made as to non-stop services between the United States and Alaska across Canada.

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extend the universally recognized right of non-stop passage to include stops of foreign aircraft for refueling. Such a concession, of course, would not in itself convey any right to pick up or discharge a single passenger or package.

That much, at least, should be hoped for. No country ought to claim the right to bar the passage of aircraft handling only through traffic and therefore in no way affecting its own commerce. To do so, and to refuse to let them use available ground facilities and purchase supplies, would be an outrageous exploitation of geography for purely negative and destructive purposes It would be particularly outrageous in view of the rapid contraction of the earth's surface through the development of aviation. That sort of obstructionism by countries which occupied strategic positions along important inter-continental routes was the greatest barrier to the development of international air transport between 1920 and 1938. Its recurrence should be discouraged.

If the decision were made to go still further, the next step might be a general agreement which allowed the aircraft of a member nation to discharge traffic which had originated in the metropolitan territory of that nation and to pick up traffic which would be delivered there. For example, a Canadian airline could then operate across the United States and on to the countries to the south, dropping off traffic of Canadian origin at the various points touched on the outward-bound journey and picking up Canada-bound traffic at the various points on the return. It would not be privileged, however, to handle traffic between the United States and the countries beyond. If it wished to handle traffic originating in any one of those other countries and terminating in another it would have to secure the right to do so by special agreements with the governments immediately concerned.

A likely limitation will be the reservation of cabotage rights. National companies thus will have the sole right to handle traffic which both originates and terminates within the national territory. The United States insists on this in its coastwise shipping laws and in analogous provisions in the Air Commerce Act of 1926. Many other countries have taken the same position, and the practice is likely to become even more general in the future. Before the war, Continental airlines operating into England were allowed to carry passengers between British points. This seems likely to be changed, and, in addition, cabotage may be reserved not only for traffic in the United Kingdom but for traffic throughout the British Commonwealth as a whole, which would mean

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that all traffic both originating and terminating within the Commonwealth would be transported by airlines of the Commonwealth. Some British critics challenge the wisdom of such a policy, but it has two obvious appeals — the economic one that it would provide a substantial "home market" for British air transport, and the political one that it would draw the parts of the Commonwealth together into a single self-sustaining air bloc.

Much talk has been heard about "spheres of influence" as a basis for distributing postwar air traffic so as to avoid destructive competition. Generally the term implies that the globe should be divided into economic zones, and that traffic taking place entirely within one zone should be reserved for the airlines domiciled therein. Interzone traffic would be open to the enterprises of the zones involved, on terms to be determined. This device would bar American airlines from competing for traffic which both originated and terminated overseas, and might be expected similarly to bar European companies from handling traffic originating and terminating in the Americas. Complications would be presented, from our point of view, by the fact that several European states have wide-flung colonies, some of them in the Western Hemisphere. Britain, France and the Netherlands might have a claim to a domicile in every zone.

Whatever rights of entry and passage a nation may concede to foreign airlines, it will impose certain restrictions in the interest of safety. The world's ports are open to peaceful maritime commerce, but a European vessel cannot enter New York harbor without picking up a local pilot. Since it is impracticable for an airplane to pick up a pilot the captain will have to possess the qualifications of a local pilot for all the airports which he enters. He will have to know the local traffic rules, the radio procedures, the obstructions around the field, and the miscellany of detail which an airline captain must master before he is allowed to command even on a purely domestic flight. Language will often be a problem, for there must be some means of direct oral communication between the officers of an incoming aircraft and the traffic controllers in the airport tower. Such matters will be even more important in the postwar period than they have been in the past, for increasing traffic congestion will increase the necessity that every pilot shall understand local control methods and cooperate with them. The methods should be standardized to the greatest possible degree, but variations in the local terrain will always require some special local procedures.

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Another proposal is sometimes heard — that the Great Powers assume leadership in the development of international air lines either by regions or on a world-wide basis, using their economic and political power to obtain unique privileges. Occasionally it goes so far as to assume that only a small number of states will be "allowed" to participate in international air transport. Our own consciences would hardly accept such a denial of opportunity to our weaker neighbors. The fact is, however, that large expenditures and great technical ability are required to develop airlines, and that this fact by itself will limit the number of countries which operate anything except short local routes.

In one respect at least leadership will be indispensable. Safe and efficient operation will demand that air traffic rules and regulations as to air-worthiness and other matters be standardized. The necessary agreements will be secured more easily in discussions between a limited number of nations having wide experience in aircraft manufacture and operation than in an assembly of all the sovereign states of the world. No question of appreciable national advantage is likely to arise in this connection. If a limited group will frame competent technical proposals they should receive universal and grateful acceptance.

IV

A strong motive among those who advocate the internationalization of airlines is their fear of what may happen if one of the alternative courses is adopted. British observers in particular foresee possible "cutthroat competition," with extravagant or excessive operations maintained for prestige or indirectly for military purposes and often supported by government subsidies. They fear a subsidy race, with new international jealousies and dangerous tension as the result.

Many persons have put forward substantial arguments for the complete elimination of subsidies in air transport after the war, but there is little reason to expect that this can be achieved. Many states are likely to wish to maintain air communications on certain routes which would not produce sufficient commercial revenues to cover the cost of operation. In the general interest, too, air transportation should be made available to parts of the world where commercial advantage alone would not ensure its maintenance. Countries where costs are high may also find it necessary, if they wish to serve as international air carriers, to

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provide subsidies to cover the cost differentials. The United States has done this for its merchant marine.

The economic effects of a real race in subsidies would be direct and immediate.[6] The political effects would be indirect. Nations will hardly be brought to the point of war by their efforts to maintain supremacy in the field of air transport at government expense. However, the spectacle of the United Nations engaged in such efforts would be a disheartening augury of their inability to coöperate in matters more directly connected with the preservation of peace. Both the economic and political consequences ought to be averted.

Publicity would help. The very full financial reports that each American airline submits to the Civil Aeronautics Board each month have aroused astonishment and admiration in other parts of the world. The British aircraft industry has suggested that all nations agree not to allow lines to engage in international operations unless they make regular public reports as to the sources of their revenue and their expenditures.[7] This excellent proposal might be supplemented by a universal undertaking to make public the terms of agreements between airlines and governments.

A direct limitation of subsidies by international agreement is often proposed but seems impracticable because of national differences in cost levels and because indirect subsidies may take an infinite variety of forms. Control might be applied more easily to the uneconomic consequences of subsidies, such as: (a) rate cutting; (b) maintenance of luxury services at normal rates; (c) maintenance of a volume of service beyond what the traffic actually warrants.

One way to prevent rate-cutting and other extravagant and uneconomic practices would be to create an international air commission having powers over international services analogous to those exercised by the Civil Aeronautics Board in the United States. Its functions could include the approval of tariffs, the setting of maximum limits on volume of service and the hearing of complaints regarding unethical or uneconomic competitive practices. It might even be given the power to certificate routes and determine which services should be operated by which carriers and how much competition there should be on particular

[6] It was a desire to guard against the consequences of unrestricted intra-national competition that produced the Civil Aeronautics Act in this country and analogous statutes in some others.

[7] "The Future of British Air Transport," a memorandum by the Society of British Aircraft Constructors, June 1943, p. 6. Similar proposals had previously been made by Sir Frederick Handley-Page, long known as a builder of large aircraft.

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routes. It might be a continuous or frequently recurrent session of representatives of the governments concerned in a particular area; or it might be a genuinely international agency, the members of which were chosen individually by some process designed to minimize the likelihood that they would turn out to be merely national advocates.

The two ideas are far apart. An agency of the first type would function through diplomatic adjustments; every issue would be resolved by compromise. If an agency of the second type lived up to its expectations, it would be a judicial body and behave as such, like the quasi-judicial agencies of national government now possessing similar powers within their respective territories. An agency whose members had no commitment or responsibility to any particular national interest would be clearly superior in theory; but to endow such a body with actual powers, as opposed to merely advisory functions, would mean a very sharp break with tradition, and any proposal of the sort would have to overcome a strong feeling against entrusting national interests to an agency composed largely of "foreigners."

Unless an international air commission of the judicial type is created there certainly will be need for frequent meetings among the aeronautical officials of states having common problems. Disputes over subsidy arrangements for competing lines can be reduced, if not averted, by frequent and frank exchanges of views among the governments concerned. Rates will have to be harmonized with conditions of service either by governmental regulation or by agreement among the carriers themselves. The need for governmental controls should not often arise. Commercial enterprises would be slow to start rate wars, for reprisals would be easy. But how the controls are to be supplied when they are needed ought to be planned in advance.

V

For aircraft operators, all the problems of law and diplomacy are less important than those of ground organization. They do not need a continuous right of way on the surface, but they do need bases and communication facilities on a much more elaborate scale than the layman often appreciates.

Where practicable, for example, it is advisable that there be well-equipped bases at intervals of some 500 miles along all major routes. They must have not only adequate landing surface and hangars and stores of supplies but also radio installations to give

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assistance in navigation and weather information directly to aircraft in flight. Additional radio stations, either off the course or at closer intervals along it, may be needed to supply supplementary aid. There must be a network of weather stations, in constant communication by wire or radio with a central point; and there must be the necessary organization to receive, map and interpret the weather reports and to distribute them.

The war has created many bases in places the very names of which were almost unknown a few years ago. Some are on mid-ocean islands which until the builders came were virtually uninhabited. Many of them have been built entirely or in part with American funds and with American material and labor in territories under the sovereignty of other nations.

Bases have been constructed during the war without reference to their postwar status. Considerations of sovereignty have not come in. Nothing, however, could be more certain to embitter the postwar relationships of nations now allied than recourse to the privileges of sovereignty to prevent civil aircraft from passing freely from one part of the globe to another. All question of wartime contributions aside, the selfishness of a state which refused to allow the aircraft of its friendly neighbors to stop and refuel at an established base — perhaps the only one available — would create a source of endless irritation in international relations.

Universal recognition of the general right of a civilian airplane to enter all territories, colonial or metropolitan, for refueling or other technical purposes, would eliminate all friction of that sort. This is the writer's strongest reason for hoping that a convention establishing such a right may be made and that it will receive unanimous approval. Above all, it should be approved by the United States and all the members of the British Commonwealth, thus forestalling the development of what might otherwise become a very sore spot in Anglo-American relations. The advantages would be mutual. Americans desire to use bases in British territory for intermediate stops along various American routes; and the British and Canadians desire to have free right of passage, including the right to stop for fuel, over Alaska and in the American island territories of the Pacific.

Air bases must be kept up. Radio stations must be operated; weather observations must be made; and equipment must be modernized or supplemented from time to time. Great bases have been built for wartime purposes in territories where the local government may lack the inclination or the resources to assume

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the upkeep and where the local population may not be technically competent to carry on the necessary services. In such cases some form of outside assistance and supervision must be assured. This may create another occasion for joint action by the major aircraft-operating countries.

Bases should be open to the traffic of all countries on equal terms and their radio and other facilities should be available to all comers, of course within the limits of the safety provisions already described. The suggestion is sometimes heard that the time is ripe to go much farther and to put the operation of air bases on a truly international footing. Unless we envisage the development of a much more centralized world organization than the League of Nations ever was, there would be no authority competent to undertake the operation of air bases in all parts of the globe. Much more restricted international associations, however, can be helpful. Already the South Pacific islands of Canton and Enderbury, which are important only as air bases, are under joint British-American control. In the course of developing air bases, the United Nations (to paraphrase Winston Churchill) have become pretty thoroughly mixed up with one another; and when the use of these bases is extended, either for international transport or international policing, or both, occasions may arise for transforming existing associations into permanent relationships.

VI

When the present war ends, security will be the paramount consideration just as it was in 1919. It will color all the talk about the future of civil aviation and dictate many of the decisions made in that connection.

The apprehensions which a nation feels regarding the civil air fleet of a neighbor generally spring from the possibility that it can be used for espionage from the air, or that it can be converted into combat aircraft, or that it can be used to carry an airborne invasion.

The possibility of espionage will probably occasion less alarm after this war than it did 25 years ago. The arts of concealing and protecting military installations from air observation have been improved. Airlines can be required to avoid limited areas of particularly vital military significance. And the experience at Pearl Harbor, in an area which no Japanese airline had ever been allowed to approach, will remain as a reminder that there are

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likely to be more effective means of gathering military information than by operating a scheduled air transport service.

The fear of direct conversion of transport aircraft to combat types also belongs largely to the past. Although they have many parts in common, both types are too specialized for it to be possible to transform a transport fleet overnight into an efficient bombing unit. Operating crews are more readily interchangeable; and the closest approach to a real hazard may lie in a potential enemy's use of an air route to make pilots acquainted with targets they might later be called on to attack.

The possibility of surprise airborne attacks by civil transport airplanes cannot be entirely excluded, at least in a close-packed area like Europe. This risk will have to be taken into account by those who plan security measures for the future. But even a very limited national defense force or a comparatively weak machinery of collective security should be able to isolate and destroy the largest body of troops that any civil air fleet could convey.

There remains the possibility that an air transport fleet might be a military air force in disguise. The disguise could not be long maintained. In any case, the problem of how to deal with an aggressive air force is a main security problem of the future. Armaments must be brought into balance and made available for the use of some collective security system, so that the present United Nations may be relieved of the fear of sudden attack by the regular forces either of their present enemies or of each other. The problem of how to prevent the misuse of transport equipment or the concealment of combat aircraft under a transport guise would be solved almost incidentally.

VII

The United States and Great Britain are likely to be the leaders in the development of international air transportation. Russia and China have great tasks ahead in building up air communications within their own vast territories. So do most of the British Dominions and the principal nations of South America. But while all these states will be conducting international operations to some extent, and sundry European states also, a very large proportion of the world's long-range international airline operations will be carried on under the American or British flag.

For that and other reasons, the relations of Great Britain and the United States in this field need special consideration. What are the interests of each? And where may they conflict?

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Both countries have a tradition of advocating the free use of the air. Whenever there has been an occasion for a formal declaration of principle, both have stood for removing restrictions and enlarging opportunities. With that background, they ought to agree easily to extend to each other on a reciprocal basis the right of innocent passage and the right to stop for refueling. Both will gain more by such an agreement than by a policy of mutual exclusion. Both peoples are travellers by temperament, and in both countries many persons look forward eagerly to opportunities for swifter and more convenient movement by air.

Each nation has great ambitions in the air. Aside from the general intangibles of national pride, and from the bearing which the possession of air transport facilities has on security and trade, the mainspring of American interest in this connection is the eagerness of American youth to find a place in aviation. The same situation obviously exists in Britain. There it is supplemented by considerations of imperial unity, however, and by the necessity of depending upon the revenues of carrier services, both sea and air, to adjust the British balance of payments.

When British and American ambitions encounter one another in the air, the result may be either direct competition or the invention of some device to avoid it.

Competition might be avoided by an allocation of traffic or by an allocation of territory. The first alternative, which is the pool, has never been popular in Britain and certainly would not be in America. The idea of allocating territory, *i.e.*, recognizing "spheres of influence," runs into difficulty along the borderlines of the proposed zones. It also runs up against the psychological difficulty that the peoples of both countries have been learning to think in global terms. They will not be patient, either in Britain or in the United States, of proposals that they be fenced off from any part of the world.

Competition may make conflict, but it need not do so. Competition between British and American airlines should be as keen, but at the same time as friendly and as coöperative in matters where coöperation is mutually advantageous, as the competition between any two of the airlines within the United States. There will be no occasion for Britain and America to parallel each other's routes throughout. But the writer believes that a substantial amount of competition will be healthful to trade and beneficial to the traveller, and further that it will cause less friction than the measures that might be devised to avoid it.

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Across the North Atlantic, at any rate, parallel American and British services may be expected between New York and London. If the situation causes any more friction than arose out of the three parallel non-stop services maintained by American airlines between New York and Chicago before the war, it will be evidence of a quite needless inability of the British and American Governments to coöperate in finding fair solutions for whatever problems of scheduling, rates or alleged unfair competitive methods may arise. Most of the problems involved in the use of each other's bases would be solved by acceptance of the fundamental right of any transport aircraft to stop for refueling at any base, whatever the nationality, and by agreement on standard traffic rules and radio procedures.

An issue between the two countries might arise out of the fact that the United States is producing military transport planes at a great rate at the present time, while British production concentrates on combat types. There has been great anxiety in British aeronautical circles and in Parliament over the possibility that the end of the war will find Britain with no aircraft that could perform creditable transport service. The industry that has produced the Spitfire and the Lancaster can obviously develop transports, and good ones; but development takes time. The Deputy Prime Minister told the House of Commons on June 1, however, that arrangements were being made for the development of four new transport types, to be carried forward as rapidly as their subordination to the priority of military requirements would permit.

American builders have certain advantages. They have had more specialized experience with transports than the British have had, and they have been accustomed to working closely with a number of airlines instead of a single one as in Britain. American factories will be producing transports at the end of the war. However, they will be models built mainly for military purposes and a large surplus of these will have accumulated. It is unlikely that there will be any occasion to continue the production of these models, and as a result American factories, like the British, will be making ready to build newer types. While the newer types are coming through the preparatory stages both countries will operate air routes with existing equipment, which probably will mean largely with surplus military aircraft no longer required by the Air Forces.

There should be nothing in any of these problems to make

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serious trouble between the two countries. If all dreams could be fulfilled, Britain and America would each like to carry the air traffic of the world. Since neither can expect to do the whole job, each must prepare to deal with the other as a friendly and co-operative competitor. The Governments must not be content merely to make a rigid initial agreement. The departments concerned with civil aviation must remain in constant communication to make certain that the agreements are working properly and to expand them or liberalize them where necessary. As in the case of many another problem of British-American relations, the underlying spirit will be more important than the legal form of the solution. The only agreement that can be genuinely satisfactory to either party in the long run will be one which will be genuinely satisfactory to both. It must leave no sting or sense of defeat to either. Both British and American air transport operations can be of benefit to both countries, and to all the rest of the world. Success in handling the air transport problem will make success easier in other fields. And any advantage that either country might seem to gain in placing political handicaps on the air transport opportunities of the other would prove to have been indeed a Pyrrhic victory.

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BRITISH POLICY

A Conservative Forecast

By Quintin Hogg

TO THE British, as to others, this war has been a spiritual as well as a physical experience. For the first time since the turn of the century a creative spirit stirs the national consciousness. Something new is coming to birth: a new spirit of comradeship and national unity, a new conception of society, a new sense of political mission, a renewed belief in our power to master difficulties, a new confidence in one another.

Such confidence implies no facile optimism. We in Britain know that bitter suffering lies ahead. We know that the big battles of the war have yet to be fought and that a dark and difficult time will come when victory has been won. But we have learned faith and courage and unity from our early disasters, and we have the confidence that faith and unity and courage bring. This attitude is common to all British folk, and the Conservatives of whom I write are no less sensitive to it than others.

On March 21, 1943, the leader of the Conservative Party, Mr. Winston Churchill, celebrated his recovery from illness by delivering one of the longest broadcast talks ever heard by the British people. His broadcast was given in his personal capacity, and its value as a forecast of Conservative policy must be read in the light of the fact that both the Party and the Government would be free, if either so desired, to disregard every word that Mr. Churchill said. But as a general indication of the Conservative and the national mind the broadcast must be treated as authoritative.

Conservative policy is always based on a current situation rather than on a fixed political creed. The Conservative Party has a political tradition extending over three hundred years and during these centuries of electoral victory and defeat it has learned to attach itself to political institutions and principles rather than abstract theories of government. Experience has taught us that there is no political theory, including our own, which does not look crude and ridiculous in the light of a succeeding age, and that society is incapable of absolute perfection and certain to change. We are therefore apt to approach a difficult problem without fixed prepossessions, and we sometimes apply the favorite nos-

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trums of our opponents with complete freedom from prejudice.

The first principle of the Conservative statesman is to try and think himself ahead into the concrete situation with which he is likely to be faced. "It is our duty," said Mr. Churchill, "to try our utmost to be prepared by ceaseless effort and forethought for the kind of situations which are likely to occur." The main contrast between this and the left wing approach to the problem is that the Conservative attitude will probably be dictated largely by the "situation that is likely to occur" rather than by any preconceived political formula.

But what is the situation likely to be? This war is not going to end like the last. To appropriate a line from Mr. T. S. Eliot, it will end "not with a bang but a whimper." There will not be an Armistice. There will be no last shots fired at 11.05 A.M. There will not be a certain moment at which we are at war and a subsequent moment at which we are at peace and free to reconstruct the world. There will be a confused period in which the problems of peace and the problems of war are inextricably intertwined — the only "period of reconstruction" we are likely to get. After that it will be too late to reconstruct.

The two immediate factors of the situation in Europe after the defeat of Hitler will be the necessity of military occupation and European relief. We — and I mean the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the British Commonwealth — will not be driven to these acts by vindictiveness or sentimentality but by the sheer logic of events. Some will not like the policy they entail. All will have to accept it.

I think that this was what Mr. Churchill had in mind in his somewhat guarded reference: "It would be our hope that the United Nations, headed by the three great victorious Powers, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States and Soviet Russia, should immediately begin to confer upon the future world organization, which is to be our safeguard against further wars by effectually disarming and keeping disarmed the guilty states. . . . We shall also have a heavy task in trying to avert widespread famine in some, at least, of the ruined regions."

The first purpose will involve the maintenance of a large military force in Germany. The Nazi régime has destroyed every organization that might conceivably have formed the basis for an opposition. Other political parties, trade unions, even fishing clubs, literary societies, Boy Scouts, Rotaries, Elks, Protestant Churches and women's institutes — all have been *gleichgestaltet.*

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When the Nazis fall there will be a void. Pockets of isolated Nazi fanatics will hold out, will be suppressed and from time to time will break out again in fits of hysterical resistance. Droves of expatriated workers will roam far and wide without the means of livelihood. Towns will have been battered. Food supplies will have been disorganized. Epidemic disease will probably appear on an enormous scale.

All Europe, as well as Germany, will be in confusion. Peoples will rise against the remnants of the Nazi occupying power but will not thereby achieve unity. The Giraud-de Gaulle controversy is only a foretaste of factional disputes to come. Some of the Quislings will rat. Others will continue their treachery in varying degrees. Always there will be an insistent cry for food. Homeless people will demand houses. War prisoners and foreign workers from German industries will ask care and lodging on their way home in places which cannot accommodate them. Factories will be closed. Chaos will reign everywhere. The one unifying force will be the armies of the United Nations. The one sure source of food will be the United Nations Relief Organization. The one instrument of political security will be the authority of the victorious Powers.

It is idle to pretend that this period of chaos will prove short. Houses are not built in a day. It will take time to repatriate Hitler's slave labor and years to reorganize industrial production. The agriculture of Europe is not going to recover for fifteen years or more. The cattle have been slaughtered. The fields are partly unfertilized. The farmers and their laborers have been scattered. And in Germany itself the disease of Nazism will take at least a generation to eradicate.

Europe as we knew it has disappeared. Possibly it has ceased forever to be the economic or political center of the world. Ruined Europe will have to choose between Balkanization and some form of unity. Our policy will insist on unity with local freedom.

Federation is probably too strong a word for the political instruments which will be forged. We have had enough of covenants and written constitutions. It is clear, however, that in practice, if not in theory, means will be found to limit local sovereignty. Mr. Churchill's own suggestion need not be taken too literally, but it is certainly the most enlightening forecast: "We must try . . . to make the Council of Europe, or whatever it may be called, into a really effective league, with all the strongest forces con-

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cerned woven into its texture, with a high court to adjust disputes, and with forces, armed forces, national or international or both, held ready to enforce decisions." The position of the small nations would be safeguarded, but only within this framework.

It should be stated with special emphasis that although Conservatives outline the steps toward international coöperation in terms of regional groupings they see the primary objective as *world* peace. There is no sympathy with the type of thought that sees in regionalization merely a new escape into isolationism. World peace is an American interest. World peace is an interest of the British Commonwealth. It is a life-and-death interest for which a heavy insurance premium will have to be paid. Neither a Council of Europe nor a Council of Asia would function if either the British Commonwealth or the United States disavowed concern with its activities. Though the premium that each country may have to pay will be heavy, the price of a world system of peace and order is far cheaper than the cost of another Pearl Harbor or another European war. The fundamental requirements for the success of a world system are these: that the British Commonwealth and the United States offer assistance in plans for reconstruction with the same wholeheartedness and generosity that they have shown in coöperating with one another and with other nations in the prosecution of the war; and that the British and American Governments, with those of Russia and China, declare publicly that the maintenance of world peace is a part of British, American, Russian and Chinese policy. Such a declaration would include the plain statement that the forces of these associated Powers will assist the forces of law and order anywhere to repress any major breach of world peace.

Such a statement would have prevented the present war. It could not have involved either Great Britain or the United States more deeply than they have since become involved.

This is only one half of the picture as it will appear when Germany is defeated. We shall still be at war. We shall be at war with Japan — perhaps for years after the conflict in Europe has died down. In the Far East, in Burma, Malaya and China, in the Pacific Islands and Japan itself the picture of Europe drawn above will in some measure be reproduced.

For the British people the war with Japan is at once a national interest and a solemn obligation. We shall fight it together with the United States to the end. Mr. Churchill said: "We shall immediately proceed to transport all the necessary additional forces

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and apparatus to the other side of the world to punish the greedy, cruel empire of Japan. . . . That will be our first and supreme task and nothing must lure us from it."

The result will be a period of peace and war. Part of our industry will be switching to the reconstruction of Europe and Great Britain. Part will still be supplying the armed forces. Part of the armed forces will be transferred to the Far East; part to the European Army of Occupation. But some will return to industry. To quote Mr. Churchill again: "There will certainly be large numbers of men, not only abroad but at home, who will have to be brought back to their families and to their jobs. . . . However vigorously the war against Japan is prosecuted, there will certainly be a partial demobilization following on the defeat of Hitler."

This will raise intricate problems within the armed forces. Who is going back first to get civilian jobs? Veterans of Tunis and Burma will strain to come back to England, only to be told that they are wanted in the European Army of Occupation, or to fight the Japanese. Boys will be sent out from this country to take the places of demobilized men just as they come to think the war is over. Demobilization will become a thorny political problem.

The end of the war with Germany will set up a new series of shortages. It is estimated that bombing, lack of repairs and shifts in population, added to existing slums and overcrowding, will give Britain a shortage of 4,000,000 dwelling houses in 1944 — more than ten years' output at maximum prewar rates. Our clothes are wearing out. Everything is getting shabby and out of repair. We shall be short of timber, short of ships, short of food, short of oil and, above all, short of men.

Certain political conclusions follow from this. Mr. Churchill is one of the few who have had the courage to draw them. If government is not to break down it will have to be strong government. The mere demand for demobilization from within the services will ensure the continuance of conscription to replace those who are demobilized. There will still be rationing, because there will still be shortages; a system of priorities will still govern new production. Some requisitioning of housing accommodation is probable. Rent restriction is certain to continue so long as there is a shortage of houses; and there may be a continuation of billeting and of compulsory labor service. Will these become party issues?

Now the party fight is not a sham fight, and British Parlia-

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mentary institutions are so adjusted as to give it full sway. No party in opposition can afford to ignore grievances, and no government can withstand grievances on the scale which will exist, if they are given organized expression by a powerful Parliamentary opposition. Neither party wants to continue the present coalition. The Labor Party is particularly hostile to it because it regards itself as under-represented in the present Parliament. But the national interest demands a temporary continuance of Coalition Government.

In Mr. Churchill's words: "When this [four years' plan] has been shaped, it will have to be presented to the country, either by a national government formally representative of the three parties in the state or by a national government comprising the best men in all parties who are willing to serve." Anybody who opposes Mr. Churchill's plea for national unity after victory will, I believe, be simply swept off the map. The only chance that I can see of this not happening lies in the possibility of Mr. Churchill's personality being removed by death or resignation. Whatever talk there may be about the desirability of a return to party strife in Great Britain, I feel convinced that the full party quarrel must and will be postponed.

But in the midst of these disturbances it will not be possible to ignore the long-term trends of national policy. For the truth is that this war is neither an interlude, as some suppose, nor, as others claim, a turning point. It is part of a process — a process which began years before we were born, and will continue years after we cease to exist. Some features in the process may have been distorted by the war; other changes may have been accelerated. But the process continues and cannot be checked, and the war itself is part of it.

What are the general trends? First, in international affairs, the most obvious is the change in the political and economic center of gravity of the world away from Europe and toward the other continents. Next, the trend away from the small, self-contained, independent sovereign nation state which was the standard political institution of the last century, toward a larger grouping in continents, areas and groups of states. The third trend is toward increased economic interdependence of the different areas.

We live in the age of the machine. But we are at the beginning and not at the end of the age. In Britain we have not yet even industrialized ourselves. A great number of our people still live in slums. Our school children still mostly leave school at the age of

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fourteen. Our houses in the country have no piped water or electricity. In the town we all do not as yet have refrigerators, machines for washing clothes and dishes, radios or telephones. Civil aviation is still in its infancy. We suffer from periods of industrial depression. Our methods of production often are still primitive.

In many areas of the world industrialization has scarcely begun. In Palestine men live as men lived in the days of Our Lord. In Africa, in Asia, and in South America, men live as they lived before the days of the Pyramids. The machine has scarcely touched their lives. They do not always have enough to eat. The age of the machine is in its infancy, and it will continue to develop until it has revolutionized all life on the planet.

The British were the pioneers of the machine age and enjoyed corresponding advantages. In the nineteenth century Great Britain lived by her supremacy on the sea and in the factory. British naval ascendancy was effective partly because of the absence of a rival navy after Trafalgar, but partly also because of the absence of any first class military force outside Europe and the existence within Europe of a nicely balanced system of land Powers — Russia, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, France, Turkey and a host of smaller states. The continued independence of these states made it impossible for a single Power to dominate the whole land mass. While Europe enjoyed a central position in the world economically and politically the British fleet was able to insulate Europe strategically, and limit European wars in extent, by an adroit combination of diplomacy and sea power. At this time the British fleet was the real instrument enforcing the Monroe Doctrine.

Today these conditions have disappeared. There are several first class Powers outside Europe, including the greatest and richest Power of them all. The British Navy alone makes no pretense to dominate the sea, although it is probably still the most effective naval force. Europe has step by step fallen under the domination of a single Power, and although the nation states of Europe may recover their freedom they will never completely recover the political isolation which they knew before.

Similarly our industrial ascendancy has disappeared. Financially and economically the United States is incomparably the greatest Power in the world. Other centers of industrial production have arisen and have multiplied in Canada, Australia, India and South Africa since the beginning of this war. Europe has long been industrially independent of ourselves.

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The deductions are: first, that we are moving into a world in which the Nation State is no longer the standard political institution. The United States is not just a large-sized Denmark. The U.S.S.R. is not the same thing as Paraguay, only bigger. The British Commonwealth is not just a series of nations like Turkey, Argentina and Czechoslovakia, even if it is not a single unit like the United States. Great Britain is more important as a part than as an independent unit. New political institutions are arising out of the ashes of the old. The Far East is a world area. So is Pan America and so is the U.S.S.R. The British Commonwealth is a world area, based on the sea. Europe is another. Africa has not yet emerged into independence.

Second, economic institutions are inextricably intertwined. What are the economics of lend-lease? Can the United States afford to allow Europe to starve after the war? Can we? But can we feed Europe without American aid? Can we live without our African possessions? Can we develop our African possessions without European manpower or American capital? Can American trade function in Africa and Asia without British political assistance? Can China develop without Russian or American aid? Can Russia recover without assistance from Britain or America? Can Britain or America continue to prosper, or can they reconstruct Western Europe, without Russian coöperation?

The Conservative conclusion to all this was stated by Mr. Eden, the Conservative Foreign Secretary, in a speech on July 1 of this year: "The lesson of the twentieth century . . . is the utter interdependence of nations. We cannot escape it if we would. It has been a hard lesson to learn, both for the people of the British Commonwealth and for the people of the United States. . . . The truth is that we are all now one small world, a world which gets still smaller every day." In the meantime, the Nutrition Conference, the Refugee Conference, the Middle East Supply Center, the committees on food, oil and shipping, and last but not least the Allied Armies under joint command in Tunisia and Sicily and the Far East indicate the shape of things to come.

Before estimating the full effect of this on Conservative policy we might do well to look for a moment at our national politics. The domestic picture is as exciting as the international one. Here, too, a revolution is going on; we believe that you in the United States are yourselves involved in the same revolutionary process. But that is your affair. Let me stick to our own case. The revolution in Britain has had four characteristics. The first is the move-

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ment in industry toward larger units in production and distribution. The second is the growing need to eliminate the chaos created by competition between national centers of industrial production. The third is a tendency in the Government to impose its financial policy on banking and industry. The fourth is the tendency within industrial society toward a more even distribution of wealth and culture. The war is a phase in all these processes; the tendencies themselves will continue long after its cessation.

Each process is deserving of separate study. Take the first. The economy of the nineteenth century was built upon the small firm, and this meant free competition. No one who has seen a modern production plant can ever believe that the small firm can compete with it in its own sphere. It used to be said that precision work could not be done on mass production lines. Experience before and during this war shows that this is wrong; and it seems that the limit to the variety of things which can be made by mass production has not yet been reached.

But the increase in the size of units has not been limited to production. It has extended to all branches of distribution, transport and finance. Look at the chain store. As a rival to this we have in Britain the coöperative society; both are rivals to the small storekeeper. Even where the little man survives, the wares he sells are not the result of old-time higgling in the market, but standardized products packed and sold by the manufacturer or wholesaler at a fixed price and in identical wrappings. In England there are only five banks of consequence, apart from the Bank of England, which is now a Central Bank and little else. Insurance is almost entirely in the hands of a few big companies; smaller companies still struggle on but are in the course of being eliminated. The limit to this centralizing tendency has not yet been reached.

Attempts to reverse these trends by legislation, boycott or industrial means have, on the whole, failed. But the change has brought major problems. The decision of a small board of directors may affect the policy of the nation. It may precipitate a slump. It may influence foreign policy. It may grant prosperity or deal out distress to vast areas. A board of directors is responsible to no one except the amorphous body of holders of the common shares, whose whole individual stake in the enterprise may be limited to a few hundred pounds, and who do not bother to exercise their power but simply sell their shares if they think something is going wrong.

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The tendency in this country has been more and more to place these giant monopolies under control, and although there have been protests in the name of private enterprise, a general control of policy has been demanded more and more insistently by the community. Banking policy is now completely controlled through the hold of the Treasury on the Bank of England, which in turn controls the joint stock banks. Policy can only be determined by the directors within the general assumptions which the Government permits. The broadcasting monopoly is a public utility. Transport in the London area is another, distribution of electricity a third. Even where private enterprise is almost undisturbed, as in the farming industry, semi-public bodies like the Marketing Boards tend to impose compulsory conditions on the industry and the public.

Control of production has become more marked in war. We have found that price limitation is the only cure for labor troubles, and the one safeguard against inflation. What may be produced is a matter of government policy. The supply of materials of which there is a deficiency is rationed in accordance with a system of priorities; of consumption goods in accordance with a system of points. These controls will disappear to some extent when the absence of shortages makes rationing no longer necessary. But price control, and some general policy of production, have probably come to stay.

The tendency toward monopoly does not imply that the Conservative Party, or, we think, the British people, have abandoned the theory of private enterprise. What it does mean is that the theory of private enterprise is undergoing modification, and that the Conservative Party is slowly coming to realize that there is room for both private enterprise and state control in the new society. To quote again from the Churchill radio talk: "There is a broadening field for state ownership and enterprise, especially in relation to monopolies of all kinds. The modern state will increasingly concern itself with the economic well-being of the nation, but it is all the more vital to revive at the earliest moment widespread, healthy and vigorous enterprise . . ."

We Conservatives think that these ancient enemies — private enterprise and state control — are on the verge of reconciliation, and even possibly of becoming partners in a happy marriage. The goods may be ordered by the state. They are produced at a profit — even in war — by private enterprise. Much has been said to indicate the unwisdom of allowing public policy to be governed by

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pure reference to private profit. Nothing has been said to contradict our view that industry on the whole manages its own concerns better without political interference below the level of national policy, or that where there is a risk of a loss it is just that there should also be a chance of a profit.

The next problem of our day has been the growth of competition from other national centers of industrial production than our own. We have travelled far from our unchallenged industrial supremacy of the nineteenth century. Since Conservatives lost the 1906 election the party has striven hard and with some success to educate the public to the importance of this issue. It is vital for us. We have 47 million mouths to feed. Our people have become used and entitled to a high standard of life. We do not produce more than a major part even of the essential foods — wheat, raw milk, meat and sugar. But we also want butter, cheese, eggs, bananas, oranges, tea, cocoa, coffee. We must import wood, oil, ore, wool and tobacco. We must trade in order to live. Unless we can use our own industrial capacity to the full and dispose of our products we shall starve.

No national party in Great Britain can afford to ignore this question. Mr. Churchill's words were: "Abundant food has brought our 47 million Britons into the world. Here they are and they must find their living . . ." Partly this was to be found by home production. But "our own effort must be supported by international arrangements and agreements more neighborlike and more sensible than before. We must strive to secure our fair share of augmented world trade . . ."

On the other hand, experience has taught us the dangers of economic nationalism. Neither tariffs, trading agreements nor home production have produced a satisfactory solution in the past. These have been tried, and in whole or in part have failed. The Conservative solution will undoubtedly lie in the realm of international coöperation, but international coöperation viewed not as a division of existing markets but as a means of increasing the total absorptive capacity of the world. Our own contribution is likely to consist in the construction of goods for the relief of Europe in the years of chaos and in the development of our Colonial Empire in the years which follow.

There will be no unemployment in the first years after the war; there will be vast shortages of labor and materials. We shall expect to put our contribution into the common pool, military and economic. We shall provide armies, and air and sea fleets

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against Japan and for the occupation of Europe. We shall build locomotives, cars, ships and other necessary products to replace the broken stock of Europe. In return we shall expect to receive our fair share of what food and raw materials are going.

But the period of reconstruction and shortages will come to an end. The old trade rivalries will reappear, and, unless a satisfactory solution is found, the old vicious circle will begin again — competition, price wars, slump, unemployment, and eventually bloodshed.

There is only one answer. We must get away from the idea that the world's markets are limited and restricted things to be squabbled over. In our lifetime the world's markets are unlimited. We have barely scratched the surface of the world's absorptive capacity as a market. But markets must be opened to be developed. Railways, telegraphs, landing grounds, ports and roads must be built. Agriculture must be stepped up. These bring trade, and if we build them trade will come and the world will be richer.

Such a policy will require both faith and courage. While we are building we can expect no return. We shall be like the Russians during their five-year plans. In this period we shall look for sympathy and help from the great producers of raw materials in the Dominions and elsewhere. When we have finished we shall have created huge new industrial markets for the benefit not of ourselves alone but for all who have helped us and for the world.

In the meantime both internal and foreign experience has been teaching us some weak spots in our time-honored financial economics. As I have said, Conservatives do not attack the "profit motive." But we recognize that individual profit is not always the true test of public advantage, even from the economic point of view. The provision of houses offers an instance. A good system of planning in blocks may save a community thousands of pounds in water and electric mains, in accident prevention, in the cost of distribution. But there is more profit for the private constructor if he builds along existing roads without a plan. Good housing may save thousands of pounds in reduced doctors' bills and hospital expenses, or in the prevention of industrial or social unrest; but these factors cannot be estimated exactly in any budget. As a rule they are not estimated at all in considering the actual cost of slum clearance. Education is a cost which has to be borne at the public expense. Yet the financial return on a properly educated population is probably very great. The expansion of our industrial plant in the nineteenth century was largely due to the profit from

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private foreign loans, although the individuals who loaned abroad often lost their money. Our failure to expand industrially in the twentieth century was in part due to foreign loans made by individuals, on far better security than in the old days, but at a time when the public advantage recommended spending at home and in the Empire.

The Conservative Party will leave to others the theory that money does not matter or that "pounds, shillings and pence are meaningless symbols" — to quote a Labor leader. But it will be foolish not to recognize that we have much to learn in the technique and study of finance. The orthodoxy of the nineteenth century has proved plain wrong in the twentieth. The new orthodoxy will be based on experience, and even experiment.

The Conservative Party will most probably support the Keynes Plan for currency control. It is not equally attracted by the White Plan, which it regards as somewhat backward-looking and insufficiently expansionist to meet postwar needs. But there is no doubt that some agreement between Britain and the United States is necessary and will be supported.

The most important change in Britain is the one that has taken place in the structure of our society. Our former social distinctions are breaking down. We are developing a common culture. We are moving, said Mr. Churchill, "steadily and steadfastly from a class to a national foundation in the politics and economics of our society and civilization."

A modern Englishman is always puzzled by references in the United States to our monarchial and aristocratic constitution as if it still existed in the form in which it was known in the days of King George III. But we are apt to forget that little more than a generation ago, in the days of the novelist Anthony Trollope, this structure did in fact persist, if not unaltered, at least recognizably the same, with the single exception that the Crown no longer intervened directly in politics in such a way as to disturb the working of the Parliamentary franchise. The huge estates remained and the hereditary aristocracy was still on the land. That was little more than 40 years ago; but the revolution which has taken place since then has been so immense that it is almost impossible to recognize the society of Trollope's novels as our own.

A few figures illustrate this change. Income tax, which had been at less than 1 percent in 1874, was about a shilling in the pound (5 percent) by the turn of the century; the standard rate of today is 10/ — or 50 percent. But that is by no means the whole

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of the story. There are today only 80 people in the United Kingdom whose incomes after taxation amount to more than £6,000 sterling, and this figure includes the Royal Family. There are only 1,170 with incomes of between £4,000 and £6,000. Out of a total of private incomes of some £7,264,000,000 only some £530,000,000 gross is attributable to payers of super tax, and of this less than £214,000,000 is retained in the hands of the 105,000 odd super-tax payers. The combined rate of income and super tax at the top end of the scale amounts to 19/6d. in the pound, or more than 95 percent.

At the other end, wages have not remained stationary. In war factories figures like £15 or £20 a week are probably out of the ordinary but are by no means unheard of. A skilled worker can now earn not much less than some doctors and dons earned before the war. Even the social prejudice against manual labor is rapidly disappearing with the improvement in the laborer's economic position; and the agricultural laborer's wages have come close to those of a skilled workman.

At the same time death duties have prevented the succession to big estates. In cases where these estates are of any considerable size more than 50 percent goes to the Exchequer as the price of succession, and where two or more deaths occur in rapid succession, as unfortunately happens constantly in time of war, a large estate is split up and practically annihilated in the course of two or three years. Parallel with these fiscal changes — which have, in fact, been used as the instrument of a vast social revolution — has been a large body of legislative reforms. Changes in the law, which were unheard of in America before the New Deal and were even then criticized as being slightly socialistic, have been coming into force in England at more or less regular intervals over the past 40 or 50 years. In 1897 the principle was established that where a person was injured at work his employer was bound to compensate him to the extent of half his earnings, irrespective of whether the employer was to blame and irrespective of contributory negligence on the part of the workman. This law of workmen's compensation, under which more than half a million cases are dealt with every year, now extends to all manner of workers, including domestic servants, up to a maximum income limit of £420 a year.

In 1909 the principle was established that elderly people were entitled to a regular income from the state independent of means and independent of any contribution they may have made. This

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state pension is extremely small (10/— a week), but it was followed by a series of measures for the insurance of the working classes, partly at their own, partly at their employers' and partly at state expense, which has largely supplemented the original provision. In 1911 sickness benefit became payable under the National Health Insurance Act, and no worker now goes penniless simply because he is ill. The rate of this benefit is still fairly low, but the principle is one which will obviously be extended. After the last war a series of Unemployment Insurance Acts insured all those who came within their scope for the first 26 weeks of unemployment, and here the level of benefit has never aimed at being far below subsistence. In 1925 a contributory pension scheme was introduced, to give earlier pensions to the elderly and to insure married women in case of widowhood above a certain age.

All these reforms were criticized at the time as being advances towards Socialism. It was said that we were spoonfeeding the people and depriving them of enterprise and thrift. It should be observed, however, that the greater portion of these measures were passed in the first place by Conservative governments and that they have been continually extended by Conservative administrations ever since their inception.

The fact is that what was attempted in America by means of a high wage level has been largely achieved in England by means of a state insurance system, maintained in part by contributions by the workers themselves, in part by a charge on industry in the shape of the employers' contribution, and partly by a redistribution of wealth, which is the effect of the state contribution.

The most enterprising and thrifty class in Great Britain is by common consent the middle class. For years it has attempted successfully to give its own children the benefits of the forms of security offered by the insurance system. It has succeeded in doing so without impairing their vigor. The real effect of the legislation of the past 40 years has been to raise the working class toward the level of the middle class.

In estimating the future of the Conservative Party in Great Britain we must note that these tendencies have not reached their conclusion. "The time is now ripe for another great advance," said Mr. Churchill. And he added: "You must rank me and my colleagues as strong partisans of national compulsory insurance for all classes for all purposes from the cradle to the grave . . . Here is a real opportunity for bringing the magic of

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averages to the rescue of millions." The logical expression of all this was the Beveridge Report, essentially a proposal to bring the state system of insurance up to the level of subsistence in every case, and to unify the different incomes under which such insurance was available into one single system. Whatever may be the steps by which this goal is reached, it is quite clear that the Conservative Party is too far committed to the principles involved ever to reject the Report on principle, and it is quite obvious that if the Party should remain in power it must be the vehicle by which the proposals of the Report are put into operation.

Simultaneously with this great growth of social legislation the standard of education has gradually risen during the last 50 years. It takes more than one generation in which to educate children, since only part of their education is received at school; but it is fair to say now that the graduates of the secondary schools of Great Britain reach an academic level nearly equal to that of the graduates of the average public school and that there is, therefore, no difference in education, though there may be one in outlook, between the products of the two educational systems. It is quite obvious that, committed as we are to democracy, we have to educate our citizens up to a sufficiently high general level to enable them to discharge their responsibilities.

The Conservative Party may boggle at the cost, but it will be unable to resist the inference. And industry is now demanding both a higher level of education and a greater quantity of technically educated children than is at present produced by the state educational system. The terms of Conservative Minister R. A. Butler's new Bill are not yet known, but it is plain that they will provide for the progressive raising of the general school-leaving age from 14 to 15 and even to 16, that thereafter at least part-time education will probably be compulsory, and that secondary and technical education in the Central and Technical Schools will be free for those who are capable of taking it. "The future of the world," said Mr. Churchill, "is left to highly educated races who alone can handle the scientific apparatus necessary for preëminence in peace or survival in war." These developments will obviously take time. It is estimated that we shall have a shortage of at least 60,000 teachers, and these cannot be provided in a moment; but it is perfectly plain that the Conservative Party no less than the Labor Party is irrevocably committed to this line of development.

The above reasoning leads to the conclusion that Conservative

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policy in the postwar years is likely to pursue the following lines:

(1) Since mere nationalism no longer provides national security, we shall seek to bring about international security through the agreement of the four main Powers — the United States, the U.S.S.R., the British Commonwealth and China. On the other hand, we are not likely to press for the adoption of some formal written constitution such as was rejected by the United States last time.

(2) We shall seek to bring about regional systems of security by proposals like Mr. Churchill's for the Council of Europe.

(3) We favor the joint action of armed forces of Great Britain, the United States, Russia and China in assisting the forces of law and order anywhere in the world to repress any major breach of world peace.

(4) We shall regard the United Kingdom more and more as part of the British Commonwealth and less and less as an old-time mother country. We shall regard ourselves as the largest and the most important of the self-governing Dominions. The British Colonial Empire will continue to develop toward self-government, but during this process will be regarded more as the possession of the Commonwealth and less as that of the United Kingdom.

(5) We shall welcome and extend the development of the new society in process of creation by the redistribution of wealth and the development of social legislation.

(6) We believe we can reconcile public control and private enterprise, and that each has its appropriate sphere.

(7) We support the principle that private profit is not the best or the only test of public advantage but insist that the public advantage cannot be secured where there is no private profit.

(8) The sheet anchor of our foreign policy will be coöperation with the United States, the Dominions and the other Powers. That of our colonial policy will be the creation of new markets and the continuance of the development of self-government. That of our home policy will be the levelling up of the standard of life, and the development of a common democratic culture — in other words, social democracy as expressed in the British tradition.

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WHY JAPAN'S FLEET AVOIDS ACTION

By Alexander Kiralfy

JAPANESE ideas of sea power differ radically from those of the western world. But the inquiries made into this subject by foreign observers have adhered to western ideas and formulae and thus the true essence of Japan's strategy and tactics has frequently been misinterpreted or lost.

One error has been to assume that a Japanese fleet would always act in the conventional western manner, for example that it would always seek a decisive engagement at the first opportunity. As often as not, this was the very thing a Japanese admiral might not desire. Had western authorities scrutinized Japanese theory as well as Japanese practice they would have come closer to the truth. Of course, there were good reasons why they did not do this. The British and American peoples were averse to maintaining large armies and had come to rely completely upon their naval establishments. They hoped that their potential enemies could be defeated at sea. Any line of reasoning tending to show that Japan might have to be met in full strength on distant land fronts would have been highly unacceptable. Yet that is the very conclusion which becomes inevitable when we realize the divergency between Japanese theories and those of the West.

Decisive battle and pressure of blockade hold first place in Anglo-American naval doctrine. On first analysis it would seem that both were likewise honored in Japanese theory. In her wars with China in 1894–95 and with Russia in 1904–05, Japan gave evidence of seeking fleet action. On these occasions, and also in her undeclared war against China, Japan showed that she understood the significance of the blockade. Yet in the struggle which began on December 7, 1941, the Japanese not only have avoided fleet action as such, but appear to have done very little either to break the naval blockade of their enemies or to apply a counter-blockade. Their strategy has been in harmony with the fundamental Japanese belief that victory can be won by land forces, if the navy will protect their communications. The Japanese do not believe in risking ships for any other purpose.

II

Japan's position with regard to the Asiatic continent has frequently been compared with Britain's with respect to Europe.

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However, this is a proper parallel mainly from the strictly geographic standpoint. The British possessed an empire, a series of naval bases, and an ocean trade that called for, supported and serviced a mighty navy. Japan had no distant dominions or possessions; and at no time could she have protected her overseas trade, because she lacked far-flung naval stations and sufficiently powerful fleets to station at them. Having no designs on the neighboring continent, modern Britain developed a strategically defensive sea power. She demanded little more of it than the ability to defeat an enemy on the high seas. (This was also true, incidentally, of the United States and the American Navy.)

There were many factors favoring any maritime aggression Japan might choose to undertake. Among them were the military weakness of the other countries of China and the other countries to the south; the immense distances separating that whole region from any important military and naval concentrations of the western Powers; the commanding position which the Japanese islands held as regards the western Pacific littoral; and the way in which closely-spaced islands led from Japan down to the rich areas in the south. The bellicose spirit of the Samurai further dictated that a navy was to be used for the transport or escort of troops rather than that it should itself serve as a fighting force on the high seas.

"Troopships" had in fact brought the Japanese to Japan in the first place. They came by sea to the islands they now occupy and after centuries of bitter fighting exterminated the aborigines or drove them northward. In these operations the newcomers made ample use of their warships, or more properly speaking, of their transports. While the principal invading armies moved by land, important fleets skirted the coasts and landed strong forces on the flanks of the enemy in precisely the way the Japanese squadrons functioned during the early part of the present war.

It was thus that Jimmu-Tenno — who lived from 660 to 585 B.C., and who is referred to as the first emperor of Japan — moved from Kyushu, the most southerly of the main Japanese islands, through the Inland Sea to a point near which Osaka now stands. For hundreds of years the Inland Sea was a Japanese military thoroughfare. In the numerous wars between the leading Japanese clans the ship was the favorite means of locomotion; but land was the element selected for battle.

As a result of this employment of shipping the Japanese became impressed with the concept of a vessel as a means of transport

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rather than for its own fighting capacities. A subsidiary influence was the close relationship perceived between the land and sea. The transports generally coasted, and their principal function otherwise was to embark or disembark land forces. The naval tactics formulated during the medieval days of Japan clearly show this influence. The terms assigned to the various dispositions to be assumed by a fleet frequently included a relationship to land. One such term signified that the fleet was drawn up in a certain order with respect to a nearby mountain, or to a pair of mountain peaks. Another indicated that the fleet was stretched across the mouth of a bay — drawn up either in a line or in crescent formation, depending upon the terminology used.[1]

As fighting at sea then differed little if any from fighting on land, and as the Japanese were customarily on the offensive against land objectives, fleet and squadron formations appear to have been designed with a view to coöperating with and protecting expeditionary forces. A tactical disposition astride a bay would seem to imply that a fleet was protecting an embarkation or disembarkation under way in the sheltered waters of the inlet against hostile naval interference. To the basic theory of the "transport-fleet" would be added the important theory of the "protective squadron." These theories were put to successful use about the year 200 when the Japanese crossed over to Korea and conquered that land.

In the years 1274 and 1281 the attempted invasions of Japan by the Mongol Kublai Khan profoundly affected Japanese naval thought. The enemy seized the Tsushima Islands and landed many troops on Kyushu. While battles were taking place on the beaches, the Japanese ships, smaller and in a minority, were repeatedly defeated despite their reckless attacks.[2] Their nimbleness, however, brought them some success and impressed upon the Japanese the value of speed. The enemy, on the other hand, contrived to protect himself by lashing his vessels together in fortress-like groups, a defensive improvization which was not lost on the Nipponese mind. Eventually, Kublai Khan's armada was destroyed by a violent typhoon.

The Japanese then turned to piracy on a large scale. In the period 1400–1600 they ravaged the coasts of the Far East from Korea (whence they had been driven many years previously) to

[1] Captain Viscount Ogasawara, "Historical Essay on the Japanese Navy." Translated in *Revue Maritime*, Paris, v. 200, January–March 1914, p. 96–97.

[2] Nakaba Yamada, "Ghenko, The Mongol Invasion of Japan." New York: Dutton, 1916, p. 185.

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Singapore, Sumatra, Borneo and the Philippines. At a number of points the pirates — organized under the control of Japanese feudal chieftains — established beachheads. These were the forerunners of those established by the Japan of today.

In the year 1592 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, hailed by the Japanese as the founder of their navy, set out to reconquer Korea. After organizing an army of 300,000 men he called upon the princes whose dominions were on the seaboard to prepare a large fleet. Hideyoshi himself supervised the construction of some of the larger ships, including the *kikan*, or flagship, *Nihon Maru*. This vessel and its attendant craft again were transports rather than fighting ships. The mind that built these "square-enders" was thinking more in terms of a military headquarters on the coast of Korea than of a battle squadron intended for action in the Straits of Tsushima or the Yellow Sea.

In the campaign against Korea the two main Japanese armies landed in the south and quickly seized the capital. Cruising squadrons, protecting the communications, met and drove off a number of enemy squadrons attempting to interfere with the operations. A third Japanese expeditionary force was dispatched to outflank the Koreans from a point on the west coast, and another movement, through the Yellow Sea and against China herself, was contemplated. At this critical moment a Korean admiral, Yi-sun, appeared aboard an armor-plated *kopukson* or "turtle-back" dreadnaught, leading a vast concourse of ships which may have included other units of the same novel type. The invading warships and transports moving up the west coast were annihilated; the protective squadrons were shattered. Cut off from Japan, Hideyoshi's armies fell back to the coast. But for intrigues in the Korean court, which possibly had been instigated by the invaders and which resulted in the dismissal of Yi-sun, the Japanese would have been driven out of the country altogether.

In this campaign the Japanese had made no attempt to secure command of the seas as a preliminary to invasion. And, judging from their future actions, the lesson which they derived from this bitter experience was not that they should secure command of the sea, but simply that their transports and warships should be assured better protection from a material as well as from an organizational standpoint. Hideyoshi's admirals might have attempted to destroy the Korean fleets at the start of the war. But this would have meant long delays, during which Korea and China could prepare to repel the invaders.

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In a few years the essential soundness of the Japanese theories was to be proved. In 1597 Hideyoshi repeated his attempt against Korea. He had contrived to maintain beachheads there and the reduced Korean fleet had almost rotted away at its anchorages. Hideyoshi, on the other hand, had constructed a new fleet. A naval battle occurred which was a complete victory for the Japanese, yet it was fruitless. Since the first invasion, the Koreans (now ably assisted by the Chinese) had so fortified their country that Hideyoshi's forces, which on the previous occasion had advanced easily and rapidly, were slowed down and finally brought to a stop at the capital, Seoul. The Japanese military position rapidly deteriorated and became hopeless when Yi-sun, recalled to command the Korean fleet, inflicted a defeat of secondary importance upon the invading armada. The Nipponese land forces promptly evacuated the country. During the withdrawal Yi-sun fell upon the troopships and inflicted heavy losses on them.

Hideyoshi was primarily a landsman, and while he attributed this disaster to the discomfiture of his fleet rather than of his armies, he revealed the amphibious nature of Japanese strategy by stating that his land and sea forces had not properly supported *each other*. The conclusion drawn was not that Japanese naval theories should be revised but that no time should be wasted or measures overlooked to guarantee success on land.

III

Japan retired from international society at a time when galleys were plying the Mediterranean and before the clumsy galleon had developed into the ship-of-the-line and frigate that were to hold sway during the seventeenth, eighteenth and part of the nineteenth centuries. Japan awoke to find herself in an era of steam and of iron ships. She lost little time adapting the new instruments to her special needs. She considered that old, dormant naval theories had been strengthened rather than weakened by the new developments. She realized that any costly victory would leave her at the mercy of Powers with larger reserves.

While the modern Japanese Navy adhered to the old principles, it adopted special means to avail itself of the latest weapons as well as to adjust itself to new conditions. The vital dependence of overseas expeditionary forces on their communications made it necessary for Japanese admirals to watch hostile naval forces more closely than Hideyoshi had done. On the other hand, the factor of speed was eagerly adopted by Tokyo because it fitted so

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perfectly into a set of theories that had become traditional. In the British Navy, engine speed meant ability to force an enemy to accept battle. While American technical opinion long favored armor rather than speed in capital ships, the doctrine of speed as well as armor gradually found favor in the United States also. To the Japanese, however, speed was so admirable because it meant an ability to fight at long range or to break off action at will. It also spelled an ability to force an enemy to conform to Nipponese "flanking" movements — a favorite Nipponese stratagem in all elements, including, in a sense, the air. Fast ships were also particularly well adapted to rapid fire, a method of gunnery at which the Japanese have always been adept.

Speed made it possible for the Japanese to translate their strategic thinking into the domain of tactics, of battle practice. It meant that the Japanese could strike fast, retire if hard pressed, and limit their risks as the occasion required. In the field of strategy it had been deemed necessary to inflict only that amount of damage which could be counted upon to keep an enemy away from "troopship" waters. Tactically, the Japanese aim was so to injure a portion of a hostile fleet as to compel it to turn away from these waters. Greater damage was to be inflicted only at a considerable reduction in accepted risk.

The amount of naval pressure employed by the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895 was not much more than was necessary to guarantee the unimpeded progress of their land forces. To attempt more appeared unnecessary and hazardous, because a ship lost in an unnecessary battle or prolongation of a battle would not be on hand in the course of a necessary battle, one upon which the fate of the troopships might depend.

The essential differences between this thinking and the orthodox theories of the West could hardly be better shown than by comparing the practices of Admiral Nelson with Japan's "minimum-risk" sea fights against even the weak Chinese fleet in this war, and her employment of naval forces against land objectives. In 1796 Nelson wrote that he could not "help being more than commonly displeased" at the plan to use British ships to coöperate with land forces. He stated that his task was to "hunt" for enemy ships, and added "if I find them in *any* place where there is a *probability* of attacking them, you may depend they shall be either taken or *destroyed* at the *risk of my Squadron*." [3]

[3] Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, "The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson." London: 1846, v. 7, p. lx, lviii.

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IV

The outbreak of war with Russia in 1904 found Admiral Ito in full charge of all Japanese operations, with the sea forces under the command of Admiral Togo. Six years previously an American army had not been allowed to proceed to Cuba until the Spanish fleet had been located and destroyed. The Japanese, however, lost no time in dispatching transports to the enemy coast. The American delay eliminated risk to the American transports without affording any benefit to the enemy. Admiral Ito, however, could not allow the Russians time in which to grow stronger. A strong but poorly indoctrinated Russian battleship force was at Port Arthur and a small cruiser squadron rode at anchor in Vladivostok waters. In time the Tsar would be able to send his Baltic Squadron to the Far East. The Japanese could not afford to beat the Port Arthur fleet at the risk of being left too weak to deal with the Russian reinforcements. On the other hand, the seizure of the Russian-dominated coasts in the Far East would automatically eliminate any naval threat to Japan.

Admiral Togo acted defensively in order to protect the Japanese armies rather than offensively in order to dispose of the enemy's naval forces. This conclusion is substantiated by the opening sentences of the official Japanese report dealing with the early naval activities of the war: "The Japanese combined fleet had successfully made a threatening movement against the enemy's fleet, causing them to abandon their departure from Port Arthur . . . . Commander-in-Chief Togo, in order to aid the army's operations . . . issued orders . . . to the Saien divisions . . . to divert and threaten the enemy in order to aid the third army."[4] In other words, by causing the enemy to "abandon their departure from Port Arthur" a naval battle was avoided; and the transports leaving Japan with troops were safeguarded. No such report would or could have been written about the actions of a Nelson or a Perry, a Drake or a Paul Jones.

Before Port Arthur fell the Russian fleet attempted to escape to Vladivostok. Tokyo could not look upon a siege of Vladivostok without grave misgivings; the region was highly defensible and had little intrinsic value to Japan — the rich prizes lay to the west. In the battle of the Yellow Sea, August 10, 1904, which followed the sortie of the Russian fleet, Admiral Togo showed himself more interested in thwarting the Russian *plan* than in

[4] *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, September–October 1914, p. 1283.

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destroying the Russian *fleet*. He fought at long rather than at short range, and although the Russian line was thrown into confusion he took little advantage of this result. The approach of night and the presence of Russian destroyers led him to break off the action. One Russian battleship, badly damaged and much confused, reached Kiaochau safely, while the others reëntered Port Arthur. British official historians have criticized Togo for breaking the "cardinal rule of warfare that once battle is accepted no effort should be spared to make the result decisive." They did not realize that it was *not* a cardinal rule in the Japanese system of naval warfare.

When the Russian ships had been driven back to their harbors the Japanese Army proceeded against Port Arthur with great energy. The key to the whole situation was 203-Metre Hill, which permitted the forces occupying it to observe the shelling of the fleet sheltered in the harbor. After a series of furious infantry assaults costing some ten thousand men, the hill was captured and equipped with an observation post. Now that the Japanese siege guns could be accurately directed against the Russian ships it was only a matter of hours before they destroyed them.

After the fall of Port Arthur the Japanese overhauled their navy, mined Vladivostok against the egress of the few ships it contained, and awaited the arrival of the Russian Baltic fleet — officially known as the Second Pacific Squadron — which was commanded by Admiral Rojdestvensky. The Port Arthur fleet no longer existed, a decisive land campaign had been fought and won, and the journey-worn Baltic fleet could not constitute a serious menace as regards the final outcome of the war. Nelson had pursued the French fleet of Villeneuve across the Atlantic to the West Indies and thence back to Trafalgar. Admiral Togo showed not the slightest inclination to anticipate the Russians by steaming into the Indian Ocean, and there is little doubt that, had Admiral Rojdestvensky changed his mind when in the vicinity of Shanghai, no attempt would have been made to prevent his return to Europe. The Japanese fleet was a dynamic barrier rather than a javelin. In prior operations the enemy fleet had been driven back to its base, and the base had been captured. This time the enemy was to be kept away from his base rather than engaged in formal combat. This is borne out by Togo's actual tactics. As much damage was to be inflicted upon the enemy as would frustrate his plan without weakening the attackers. That this damage resulted in annihilation was due far more to Russian

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mistakes than to Japanese planning. The plan, which had correctly appraised the true strength of the Russians and had provided an economical means of defeating them, was essentially sound — in the eastern rather than in the western sense.

V

Between the close of the Russo-Japanese War and the beginning of the First World War the Japanese gave expression to their naval theories in the design of their warships. They emphasized speed rather than armor and took care to construct ships which could withstand the impact of torpedoes. Rapid firing was insisted upon, and director control was introduced so as to permit the instantaneous discharge of all turret guns. The turrets themselves were fitted with both hydraulic and electric power to reduce the risk of their being immobilized.[5] In later years the Japanese were to be much criticized for overgunning their warships, notably their cruisers and destroyers. As the rapidity of fire of the individual gun reached its limit, they evidently tried to increase the rapidity and volume of fire by adding more guns to their ships. Their strategic and tactical thinking also remained unchanged, and, as ever, the general political plan was all-important.

Japan's war against Germany in 1914 brought fresh evidence of the nature of Japanese naval strategy. At the time the war began a western thinker would have conjectured that Japan, as a major Pacific sea Power, would grasp at the opportunity to seek out and destroy the German Far Eastern squadron under Graf von Spee. But it was in line with Japanese theory for the high command to pay only scanty attention to the German warships provided they did not interfere with Japanese land operations. The capture of the German base at Tsingtau by land assault, supported by naval bombardment, and the seizure of the numerous German islands in the Pacific Ocean, were in accord with Japanese naval precedent rather than with prevailing western concepts of sea power.

The mandate which Japan acquired over the former German islands in the Pacific provided the Japanese Navy with a considerable number of natural "aircraft carriers." Despite Japan's contrary obligation to the League of Nations and to her late allies, these "carriers" were promptly and efficiently incorporated into the Imperial naval establishment.

The Washington Treaty was the equivalent of a major naval victory for Japan. It guaranteed that the susceptibility of enemy

[5] *Revue Maritime*, Paris, July–September 1913.

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ships in regard to torpedo and mine damage could not be reduced; and it gave assurance that any enemy fleet approaching Japanese "troopship waters" would do so at extreme peril in view of the prospective development of air power. Indeed, the airplane accorded perfectly with the Japanese ideal of rapidity of fire and minimum of risk.

In the undeclared war with China proper which began in 1937 the Japanese made considerable use of the troopship and occasional use of the new naval weapon, the aircraft carrier. They did not risk modern warships but employed antiquated craft to cover landings. Principal reliance was upon the army and land-based aircraft. Some of the Nipponese statements at this time might have given a hint of things to come, *e.g.* one reported by the Associated Press, February 27, 1937, from Vice Admiral Yonai, Minister of the Navy, who pointed out that "the policy of the Navy is to destroy enemy air bases before enemy planes can reach the Japanese mainland." It will be recalled that Hideyoshi had contrived by diplomatic means to maintain valuable beachheads in Korea, and that the Japanese had always made it a point to remove any threat of naval attack by seizing the bases whence it might spring. Now by securing Chinese ports and coastal airfields they not only denied the possible use of them to the western Powers but secured for themselves bases close to intended areas of action. This involved hostilities with China; but they remained steps "short of war" so far as the other nations were concerned. On the plea of wartime necessity Japan also entered French Indo-China. Then by intrigue in Thailand she advanced her positions to the frontier of Malaya.

The theories pursued by Premier Tojo differed in no essential respect from those followed by his predecessors. Fleet action was generally to be avoided, certainly under circumstances involving that appreciable risk which American and British admirals had always willingly accepted. In 1893 a Japanese emperor had warned that "if one mistake is made in matters of national defense, its consequences may be felt for a century."[6] This thought was as fresh in 1941 as it had been half a century or centuries earlier. More expendable means — troopships, armies and air squadrons — were to bear the brunt of attack. Some portion of the fleet was to be used, as usual, against land objectives. But the main battle force was to be withheld as a last reliance, and then to engage only under highly favorable circumstances. The only es-

[6] Ogasawara, *op cit.*, p. 123.

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sential change was geographic. In the past Japan had faced west. Once established along the western littoral of the Pacific, she directed her attention to the east and south, to the islands of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya.

VI

The general war began in the Pacific on December 7, 1941, with a repetition of the Port Arthur type of peacetime raid. The Japanese assailants failed to press their attack home by actually invading Hawaii. They may have feared that United States aircraft carriers would cut them off from Japan, or elected to husband their own vessels of this type for employment elsewhere.

Just as the principal Japanese objective in Port Arthur had been the Russian fleet, so the United States Pacific fleet was the objective in Hawaii. To the extent that Tokyo believed the latter had been put out of action, the desirability of the actual seizure of the islands was diminished. Midway Island was, in a sense, and from an aerial viewpoint, the modern counterpart of 203-Meter Hill at Port Arthur. From safe bases in the mandated groups the Japanese could send bombers to a forward and almost equally safe victualing point at Wake Island, whence Pearl Harbor via Midway could be subjected to repeated attack (the bomb replacing the 11-inch howitzer shell used against the Russians). The Japanese therefore seem to have felt justified in sending a powerful maritime force against Midway Island in that shattering type of attack which has characterized Nipponese operations in the past. The attempt was frustrated by the timely arrival of United States aircraft carriers, which presumably evaded or silenced Japanese scouting submarines. The Japanese suffered the rudest shock they had ever experienced since the days of Yi-sun — a greater shock, in fact, because this time no novel weapon was employed by their opponent. They furthermore discovered that they could not break off action in the naval sense so long as their enemy had land or carrier based planes with which to undertake a pursuit.

In the meantime Japan was developing other maritime moves in the Far East rapidly. It was generally assumed by western theorists that the Japanese would first land in Lingayen Gulf in the Philippines and thence march upon Manila. Instead, they directed their early efforts against northern and eastern Luzon. Within two weeks they were at Davao, on the south coast of that island. By seizing such positions they evidently hoped that the passage of United States vessels through or around the Philippine

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group could be prevented by means of air and submarine attack.

In strict keeping with established theory was Japan's withdrawal of a small naval force before the guns of the United States Far Eastern fleet off Luzon. So was the successful aerial attack on H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* off Malaya. Tokyo still valued its ships in terms of beachheads they could seize, not of the hostile ships they could subject to shellfire. A destroyer heavily laden with marines might take a strategic airfield site which would be more desirable than to sink an enemy destroyer — especially as such a sinking involved some risk of being in turn sunk.

In Malaya the Japanese operations were but an enlarged version of the ancient attacks upon the aborigines of Japan proper and of the operations against Korea, Manchuria and the peninsula upon which Port Arthur stands. After having escorted the Japanese troopships to the initial beachheads the Japanese Navy proceeded to protect the landing of forces which would outflank the defenders already under frontal attack. Naval and air positions were established around the perimeter of the Philippines, in Malaya and western Borneo. The invaders then fanned out into the Netherlands Indies from the north, closing all waters against the arrival of enemy reinforcements. Considerable use was made of aerial scouting to determine whether or not such reinforcements were approaching. The Japanese did not hesitate to hurl their troopships against all these various objectives, oblivious to losses and disregarding theories which would call for the preliminary establishment of an absolute command, by air and sea, of the beachhead under assault.

A number of changes were evidently called for in Japan's naval planning because of the fact that this time the enemy was not intrinsically weak. For the distinctly inferior warships of Admiral Rojdestvensky were substituted the highly efficient vessels of the United States and Great Britain. For the ineffective destroyers of old China and Tsarist Russia were substituted aircraft which early established their decided qualitative superiority over those of Japan. Last but not least, Japan was compelled to give much thought to defensive as distinguished from offensive or defensive-offensive operations.

Especially in or near enemy-dominated waters the Japanese found it necessary to substitute night for daytime naval attack in order to reduce the aerial risk. Old theories were evidenced in a "run in" attack by Japanese forces against a United Nations cruiser squadron on patrol off Savo Island at the time of the first

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American landings in the Solomons. Though they were successful they withdrew without pursuing their advantage. A subsequent night operation, wherein a strong force was repulsed in an attack on the American position on Guadalcanal, showed that night still held the disadvantages feared by both Ito and Togo. The darkness that sheltered the attackers from airplanes failed to avail against determined action by fast surface ships.

As Japanese theories of naval strategy and tactics are the reflection of geographic and political considerations, it is to be expected that changes in the latter have affected the former. Throughout the course of Japanese history the Navy had been primarily a protective shield for the homeland and for military transport. The insular territories which have now been seized require either continuous maritime communications or provisioning to stand a long siege, supplemented by aërial transportation. The intervening narrow waterways might be closed to hostile use by a *sufficiency* of air power. In the final analysis, the Imperial Navy has been strictly a servicing unit for the Japanese armies. In so far as such servicing might be more economically rendered by other instruments, such as air power, the Navy's significance would diminish as far as concerned the defense of the homeland and conquered territories, and hence greater risks could be accepted. But Japanese sea power would still retain its old significance with respect to coastal maritime moves.

The loss of certain strategic positions and the presence of strong hostile forces at points near Japan — as well as the fact that Japan's present enemies are imbued with an offensive as distinguished from the defensive spirit of most of her enemies in the past — may well have a profound influence upon Japanese concepts of naval warfare. As there is no evidence of the employment of Japanese naval forces on decisive operations of an oceanic nature, it is not possible to consider the status of Japanese naval thought on that subject. Any such employment would represent a revolutionary change in theory from the defensive, in the sense outlined above, to an outright offensive; and in the light of history it seems hardly likely that this would be done so long as the defensive qualities of sea power were required nearer home. Japanese surface ship operations in great strength and far at sea would be some evidence that Tokyo considered that the strategic position on the home front could be adequately defended by air power plus land forces, the latter being the most expendable commodity in militaristic nations. In oceanic fighting, it is logical to assume

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that Japanese theory would tend to conform to that of the West in all cases where the enemy was strong at sea. One may speculate, none the less, as to how much tradition, based on the lessons of the past, will continue to color Japanese operations.

Any discussion of current Japanese naval thinking obviously is handicapped by the lack of full and detailed information. For example, beyond the fact that Japan has employed extremely small submarines we know little as yet about Japanese theories with respect to that weapon generally. While the torpedoing by submarines of damaged ships is suggestive of the torpedo-boat action at Tsushima and elsewhere in the Russo-Japanese war, it is nothing new in naval warfare and was to be expected in such a vast region as the Pacific.

To summarize briefly. The Japanese Navy has been a floating wing of powerful armies occupied with offensive operations in an area which is militarily far weaker than Europe or North America. It was inevitable that Japanese theories and practices should differ considerably from those accepted in the United States and Great Britain, where the navy is usually a powerful defensive force backed by a relatively small army. It was also inevitable that Japanese theories should differ from those in France and Germany, whose objective usually was on land and attainable by means of land power alone. There are similarities between Japanese and Italian naval thought; both employed both sea power and air power to effect relatively nearby conquests. But Italy's coördination of the various arms was distinctly inferior to Japan's. Japanese naval theory as here revealed is not a revolutionary system. It merely represents the application of aggressive political thinking to the problem of how best to utilize sea power under different conditions from those obtaining in the regions where orthodox concepts of sea power were formulated.

As a lesson for the future, we may conclude that the Far East can no longer be regarded as a sphere for the exercise of the naval arm exclusively. We see that peace in this part of the world will depend upon the ability and willingness of the United Nations to employ there promptly, as occasion requires, a sufficiency of land and air power, flanked by amphibian wings, and secured by command of the sea. The history of Japanese diplomacy shows that in dealing with Japan we shall not be able for a long time to come to rely on words in treaties as a substitute for weapons.

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AMERICA AT WAR

Summer 1943

By Hanson W. Baldwin

THE summer just past marked the beginning of the decline of Axis power in Europe. President Roosevelt termed the conquest of Sicily and the opening of the Mediterranean the "beginning of the end for the Axis." . . . But only the beginning. For Germany, as autumn sets in, is still very strong. Gigantic air raids, the Russian Army and the Anglo-American campaign in the Mediterranean have weakened but have not broken her. And as the ring of retribution closes about her she is forging new political blades with which to defend herself.

Today political factors appear to be increasingly important — perhaps even decisive — for the outcome of the war. Nazi propaganda is emphasizing the natural lines of cleavage between the different members of the United Nations, and evidence grows that Hitler hopes by dividing his enemies to escape his looming fate. In view of this, the most urgent need is for a clearer understanding among the United States, Britain and Russia.

II

With the end of summer, outpost battles were drawing to an end in three theaters — the Mediterranean, Western Europe and the North Pacific. In one or all of them we were preparing to assault the enemy's "main line of resistance."

The largest campaign, and the one bringing the most immediate strategical results, was in the Mediterranean. Here all three elements of American armed power — land, sea and air — participated as sections of an Allied Force under General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the preparations, preliminary actions and final 38 days of fighting of the Sicilian campaign. The hundreds of thousands of American boys who fought shoulder to shoulder in Sicily with British "Tommies" and Canadians from the woods and prairie provinces can lay valid claim to a good share in the glory for the overthrow of Mussolini on July 25 and for the official (though not as yet ideological) dissolution of Italian Fascism which ensued.

The conquest of Sicily was a logical continuation of the conquest of Tunisia. But it had to be preceded by operations to

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reduce the Italian-held fortress island of Pantelleria and the lightly-held island of Lampedusa, lying in the Mediterranean narrows between Sicily and Tunisia.

Pantelleria was virtually bombed into surrender, the first time such a thing had occurred in military history. The rocky little island, garrisoned by 11,188 troops (all except 78 of whom were Italians), was attacked continuously and repeatedly, day after day, night after night, for 20 days, the last 13 of them intensively. Major-General James H. Doolittle commanded the Northwest African Strategic Air Force which conducted the bombardment. He declared that the fall of Pantelleria, exclusively to air might, was, like the German conquest of Crete, "definitely a landmark in the history of military aviation."

The Italian surrender of Pantelleria before our landing forces reached the beaches was also a prediction of things to come. For all observers agreed after an inspection of the island's bomb-pocked areas that poor Italian morale had been largely responsible for the lack of resistance to our surface troops. Some of the means to resist had been destroyed by our air bombardment; but there were still water and food, and some guns were intact. A determined garrison could have held the little island longer, though the end would have been the same. With the fall of Pantelleria there fell also Lampedusa and Linosa (another little island nearby), virtually of their own weight. The Mediterranean was practically open and the way to Sicily cleared.

The invasion of Sicily, which started on the night of July 9–10, was one of the largest amphibious expeditions known in history. As 3,266 transports, landing craft and ships, vessels and boats of all kinds steamed through the night to their appointed places off the Sicilian coast, scores of DC-3's and other transport planes winged across the narrow stretch of the Mediterranean. They carried what was one of the largest air-borne expeditions in history. The parachute troops and glider-borne infantry were both British and American. The American units, of the Eighty-second Air-borne Division, Major-General Matthew B. Ridgeway commanding, were landed some distance from their planned objectives, due in part to faulty air navigation, and were rather scattered in the darkness. The full shock of their attack thus was not felt as planned. Nevertheless, the "vertical envelopment" made possible by air power took the enemy in the rear, provided an effective diversion, and in some instances eliminated enemy beach defenses which otherwise would have opposed the landings

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of our sea-borne troops. An airfield was eventually seized and used as an "airhead" where transport planes could land.

The main sea-borne landing by American troops took place on the south coast, from six miles west of Licata to Cape Scalambri. Canadian and British troops landed around Cape Passero, the southeast corner of the tricorn island, and eventually on the southern part of the eastern coast, almost as far north as Syracuse. The landings had been carefully planned and prepared and the approach "softened" by intensive and prolonged air bombardment of Sicily's principal airfields. The landings themselves, and the Axis communications with the mainlands, were covered by air power and by naval guns. American cruisers, destroyers, "PC" boats, minesweepers and landing craft, and American Fortresses, Liberators, P-38's, P-40's and the new fighter-dive bomber, the North American A-36, formed the covering force.

General Eisenhower was in strategic command of the Sicilian operations, but General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander was the field commander, as he had been in Tunisia. The Fifteenth Army Group under General Alexander was composed in about equal parts of American and British-Canadian units. General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, with a reconstituted Eighth Army and a Canadian division and brigade, made the landings in eastern and southeastern Sicily. A newly formed American Seventh Army, under Lieutenant-General George S. Patton, Jr., made the landings on the south coast. The Seventh Army was composed of the "Fighting First" Infantry Division, the Third, Ninth and Forty-fifth Infantry Divisions, the Second Armored Division and the Eighty-second Air-borne Division, plus attached units. The initial sea landings were made by the First (Major-General Terry de LaM. Allen, commanding), which had served throughout the campaign in Tunisia and is perhaps the most battle-hardened of our American divisions, and by the Third and the Forty-fifth. Elements of the Second Armored Division's tanks subsequently "leapfrogged" through them, and later in the campaign elements of the Ninth Division were ferried over from Tunisia. The Forty-fifth (Major-General Troy H. Middleton) was transported directly to Sicily from the United States, with only a brief halt in North Africa. The Third (Major-General Lucien K. Truscott), and the Second Armored (Major-General Hugh J. Gaffey) had participated in the initial landings in North Africa but had not fought in the Tunisian campaign. The Ninth (Major-General M. S. Eddy) fought in a part of the Tunisian

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campaign, but did not participate in Sicilian operations until the latter part of the fighting. The Thirty-fourth Division and the First Armored Division (Army of the United States), both of which had fought in Tunisia, did not take part in the Sicilian operations. General Patton's two corps commanders were Lieutenant-General Omar N. Bradley, one of the finest American field leaders this war has developed, and Major-General Geoffrey Keyes. Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt commanded the American naval forces that participated, with Rear Admirals Alan G. Kirk, John L. Hall, Jr., and Richard L. Connolly as sub-commanders of American task forces.

Despite the immense preparations required for the invasion of Sicily, tactical surprise was secured and stood us in good stead. The enemy garrison of nine to eleven Italian divisions and three to four German divisions — a total of probably more than 300,000 men [1] — undoubtedly expected an attack and knew when it was coming; but they did not know where. Apparently they expected landings on the southwest coast. Because of the mobility which our forces enjoyed as a result of our control of the sea the enemy was unable to shift his forces quickly enough to meet our landings in the southeast.

Another factor, of course, that accounted for the success of the landings and the few casualties was the state of Italian morale. Sicily revealed it in all its weakness. Italian coastal divisions held the island's perimeter; contrary to expectation, they had done little to fortify and strengthen their positions, and after firing a few shots surrendered in droves. If Germans rather than Italians had formed the major part of the island garrison the nature of the campaign would have been materially altered; indeed, the outcome might have been different. This point cannot be emphasized too much, for the Tunisian and Sicilian campaigns have led Americans to belittle the difficulties of the battles still ahead.

The naval losses in the American landings and from subsequent attacks by Axis air forces were slight. The destroyer *Maddox* was sunk by a bomb, some other small naval units were lost and a couple of hundred ships' boats were probably damaged or destroyed; yet the loss of landing craft was remarkably small.

But the easy landing did not set a precedent for the Sicilian fighting. Scarcely had we established a beachhead near Gela before the troops of the First Division, still without armored sup-

[1] The President, in a cable of congratulation to General Eisenhower, stated that the enemy garrison had been 405,000; but this was much larger than estimates emanating from North Africa.

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port and with but few anti-tank guns and little artillery, were challenged heavily by tanks, apparently of the German Fifteenth Panzer Division. We seem to have been closer to disaster at that moment — a day or so after our landing — than at any other time in Sicily. About 100 enemy tanks made the assault; they penetrated our thin lines in the center; Italians and Germans attacked on the flanks; we were pushed back almost to the sea. At the end of the day, after the battle had surged and swayed, the men were exhausted, their ammunition almost gone, and the enemy was attacking again. Then an American commander (his name is so far unknown, but it probably was General Allen) issued an order: "We attack tonight!" It was an order which marked the turning point in Sicily.

In other engagements along the beaches the guns of American destroyers supported our forces ashore and in direct fire beat off enemy tanks, thereby supplying emphatic proof of the contention of Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Keyes, that naval gunfire can be of great effect against shore targets.

The Americans established contact with the Canadians on their right flank. The British pushed northward, occupying Syracuse and Augusta quickly and thence driving out onto the seamed and difficult Catania plain, where their parachute troops had seized and held for a long time a key bridge across a deep river gorge. The Americans and Canadians meanwhile were expanding inland, capturing airfields and key junction points, and constantly reenforced by the bridge of ships behind them. Then, as the Italian resistance collapsed, the Americans took Agrigento, raced across towards Palermo and fanned out over the entire western portion of the island. By July 21 the issue was no longer in doubt. Americans and Canadians were closing in on Enna, important road junction and communications center in central Sicily, and the capture of this place severed the main Axis communication routes. Palermo fell soon thereafter. The Americans then pushed on to take up their position with the British and Canadians in a line which extended across the island.

The hardest part of the fighting then commenced. The Italians had virtually been eliminated. Mussolini's deposition on July 25 made no apparent difference in Sicily, for as someone remarked the Italians could not possibly fight worse under Badoglio than they had under Mussolini. But the Germans remained — courageous, willing to die, well-armed. The terrain was so rugged that a few men could hold up a multitude.

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Troina was perhaps the toughest of the Sicilian battles. Its capture by American troops after four or five days of bloody effort really breached the enemy's Mt. Etna line and ushered in the last phase of the campaign. Americans in the center subsequently captured Randazzo, key junction point, and on the north flank, where the difficult Sicilian mountains shoulder the sea, our progress was facilitated by a series of bold outflanking amphibious movements which forced the Germans to give ground hurriedly. Units of the American Third Division entered Messina, bomb-battered bridgehead to Southern Italy, on August 17. Apparently the Germans had commenced preparing the evacuation of Sicily in the latter part of July, but they fought an effective delaying action until that date. Artillery guns immediately commenced to duel across the two-mile-wide Messina Strait. The Battle of Sicily had ended and the Battle of Italy was beginning.

The campaign took 38 days, somewhat longer than had been hoped, despite the fact that Italian morale proved even more brittle than we expected. Of the 300,000-odd Axis troops in the island, apparently some 65,000 — possibly more — escaped in the evacuation, and took much of their equipment with them. Well over 135,000 were prisoners, according to an incomplete account at the time of writing. The total Axis casualties were expected to mount to more than 200,000. The Axis planes destroyed or captured numbered 1,691; the enemy ships or boats sunk numbered 34; and several hundred tanks and more than 500 guns were destroyed or captured. Allied casualties were estimated by General Eisenhower at about 25,000. General Alexander said that 7,400 American soldiers were killed, wounded or captured in the campaign. British casualties were put at 11,835, Canadian at 2,388. Our plane losses were 274, our merchant ship losses perhaps 85,000 tons.

Sicily was a clear-cut victory. The conquest of the island helped to destroy Italian Fascism, shook Italy and the structure of Germanic Europe to its foundations, propped open a gateway to Europe and made the Mediterranean reasonably secure for the passage of Allied convoys. Moreover, the campaign marked the coming-of-age of the American Army, or at any rate of those units of the American Army that participated. The planning was good; the leadership and the battle discipline were obviously better — much better — than in Tunisia. The strategy and tactics used were sound, though cautious. We exploited our factors of naval and air superiority well. However, our naval superiority might

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have been used in a rather less fettered manner and (if General Eisenhower had been free to plan it) troops might have been landed directly on the Italian "toe" to cut the enemy's line of retreat. The air forces under Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder (with Lieutenant General Carl A. Spaatz, Commander of the Northwest African Air Force, as American chief) aided the ground forces materially. With the advantage of greatly superior numbers they quickly won and maintained air superiority.

III

While the battle of Sicily was being fought in the Mediterranean other American forces were helping to develop another major front in Western Europe — a front of the air. The Eighth United States Army Air Force, based on Britain, had been increased tremendously in strength in the spring and early summer, and by August was making raids of more than 300 planes deep into Germany. These raids dovetailed with RAF night raids (sometimes executed by more than 800 bombers) into as intensive and continuous a pattern of round-the-clock bombing as weather and the rate of losses permitted. The tonnage of bombs dropped upon Germany increased tremendously as summer advanced, and there was no doubt that the bombardment was having a major effect upon German morale, industry and transportation. In effect, the air front had become a major front.

The Eighth Air Force completed a year of operations from Britain in August. The following table illustrates its month-by-month growth better than words can do:

	Tons of Bombs Dropped (fractions eliminated)	*U. S. Plane Losses*	*Enemy Plane Losses*
1942			
August	170	0	2
September	188	2	16
October	294	7	34
November	669	9	12
December	381	13	38
1943			
January	547	18	52
February	641	20	70
March	1,666	19	141
April	997	28	144
May	2,865	67	340
June	2,458	85	304
July	3,600	108	506

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The 15,000 tons of bombs dropped from American-manned bombers on Germany and German-occupied territory are as yet only a small percentage of the 136,000 tons dropped by the RAF bomber command. But our Fortresses have proved — as those who had faith in them knew they would — one of the great tactical surprises of the war; they are now rightly called one of the world's best fighting planes. The "Forts" and the Liberators demonstrated their ability in July and August to penetrate deeply into Germany in daylight, something that had not been done since the war's beginning. Our losses have been large, however — 36 heavy bombers in one raid. As the German fighter defenses may actually be growing in strength, the demonstration is not yet conclusive. If it can be made so, it is the beginning of the end for Germany in the air.

In any case, the pattern of the air bombardment of Europe was definitely in an advancing stage in July and August. Not only did the weight and intensity of the attacks increase, but the range of the raids was increased. Germany was under aerial assault from two directions. Liberators smashed the Ploesti oil refineries in Rumania, and more Liberators of the Ninth and Twelfth American Air Forces in North Africa attacked targets all over Italy and a Messerschmitt factory near Vienna. The first daylight shuttle bombing raids starting from England and ending in North Africa also occurred.

The same story of victory on land and in the air was repeated at sea during the summer months. The German submarine campaign had commenced to lose some of its terrors in the spring, and it continued to languish. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill announced in August that we had sunk 90 submarines in three months, an average of sure sinkings of about one a day. Meanwhile, Allied ship sinkings were greatly reduced and Allied ship construction greatly increased. The battle of the Atlantic has unmistakably turned in our favor. Our lines of communication and supply across the seas have been secured.

IV

The long Pacific calm was broken by another amphibious move in the South Pacific and by the beginning of the process which will translate the Aleutians from a defensive to one from which we shall carry the war to the Japanese.

In late June, some weeks after the date for which it had been scheduled, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral William F.

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Halsey began a joint move. General MacArthur's forces moved toward Salamaua, Japanese base in New Guinea, and Admiral Halsey struck toward Munda, on New Georgia Island in the Central Solomons. Because the Navy's next step up the "ladder of the Solomons" moved across the demarcation line separating the zone of General MacArthur's authority from Admiral Halsey's, General MacArthur assumed command and immediately commenced issuing a coördinated communiqué. Actually, however, the two moves were far apart and coincided only as to timing and air operations. The Solomons fighting, which initially made much more progress than the New Guinea offensive against Salamaua, was planned and carried out by Admiral Halsey's headquarters.

The naval landings were made first on Rendova Island, off Munda, then on New Georgia itself. Australian troops, with American air support, closed in gradually through the terrible New Guinea swamps and jungles upon Salamaua, and American forces landed upon unoccupied Trobriand and Woodlark Islands to hew air bases out of the jungle within closer range of Rabaul. The progress in New Guinea was by inches; but Munda airfield on New Georgia Island, our principal objective there, was in our hands after some six weeks of jungle war. Bairoka Harbor, however, a nest of Jap resistance, was still holding out as these lines were written. In August our forces by-passed the enemy base of Vila on Kolombangara Island, just north of New Georgia, and using our sea superiority to advantage landed on the enemy-held island of Vellalavella. From two directions we were getting closer and closer to Rabaul, the key enemy base in the south Pacific area; but we still were beyond easy fighter plane range, and our progress, though much faster than that in the Guadalcanal campaign, was still painfully slow.

Two factors greatly aided us in the South Pacific. We had established clear-cut sea superiority, which the Japanese refused to challenge seriously by use of their heavy units (battleships and carriers); and we maintained a marked air superiority. But the jungle and the willingness of the enemy to die held us back, as did some of our own mistakes. At Munda, we apparently again underestimated the strength required to wipe out the enemy, thus lengthening the campaign. There were supply difficulties, too, some of them not well solved. In addition, the dual command set-up in the South Pacific, with Admiral Halsey under General MacArthur, but also under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz,

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Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, certainly left something to be desired.[3]

In the North Pacific, it will be recalled, we had reconquered Attu in May. We followed it up during the summer months by blockading Kiska and subjecting it to continuous pounding from the air and from naval guns. The bombardment reached a climax in the first two weeks in August. But when our Army and Navy forces, with some Canadians, made an amphibious landing on the beaches of Kiska on August 15, prepared for a desperate battle, they found that the entire Japanese garrison of some 8,500–10,000 men had been evacuated. Apparently the evacuation had been accomplished gradually over a period of weeks under cover of night and fog. Despite our great naval and air superiority in the area, we had known nothing about it. The bloodless capture of Kiska, though in a material sense favorable, made us look decidedly silly.

We did not wait for the reconquest of Kiska, however, to transform our defensive position in the Aleutians into an offensive one. Three times during the summer long-range Liberator Bombers of the Eleventh United States Army Air Force flew 765 miles over open water to reconnoiter and to bomb the Japanese naval and air installations on and around the island of Paramushiru, in the Northern Kuriles. The bombing formations were small — about nine planes at a maximum — and they apparently damaged the enemy only slightly; but they gathered valuable information and served notice of attacks to come.

Throughout the entire Pacific area the forces of the United States have been gaining greatly in military strength. We — not Japan — are profiting by time. The attrition suffered by Japanese shipping as a result of attacks by our submarines and planes has been serious. There is some evidence, too, that the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces, operating from India and China, and the Fifth and Thirteenth, operating from Australia and the

[3] Casualty figures for these South Pacific campaigns have not been published. The United States lost the transport *McCawley* and the destroyer *Strong* in the initial landings near New Georgia, and subsequently lost the cruiser *Helena* and the destroyer *Gwin* in a series of naval actions with Japanese task forces. The enemy, however, suffered greater losses, from our surface naval units and from air attack, though probably not as great as the figures we claimed. In August, at the great Japanese airfield of Wewak in New Guinea, our fliers caught 225 enemy planes on the ground (apparently preparing for a surprise stroke) and, according to General MacArthur's communiqué, practically wiped out the entire force. Japanese communiqués made large claims during the summer, though not quite up to their usual scale of extravagance. Some of our own communiqués from the South Pacific have, perhaps, an unconscious tendency toward exaggeration. Our greatest enemy in this area continues to be the jungle and malaria. Casualties from disease are still far higher than those from battle.

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Solomons, have been inflicting air losses upon the Japanese enemy almost as fast as he could replace them.

Although major moves in the Pacific — perhaps in Burma, perhaps in China, perhaps in the South and Central Pacific, perhaps in all areas — are plainly being prepared, they have not yet begun. We still are thousands of miles from Tokyo.

V

As the foregoing brief summary discloses, military operations during the summer just ended have progressed more and more favorably for the United Nations. But political factors have dampened greatly the enthusiasm we have a right to feel over our military successes. Unless certain political difficulties are solved they may rob us of some of the fruits of victory. One astute observer has even suggested that as our military power increases in Europe our political influence declines, because we have made our military commitment to our allies before we asked them to make their political commitment to us. This may have been due to the fact that our leaders were too busy with military problems to give political problems proper attention, or because our system of government did not permit them to postulate a definite postwar program of collaboration and take the first steps to give it effect.

As these lines are written, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill have just been meeting at Quebec with their staffs to discuss political as well as military strategy. The tenuous relationship of Russia with Britain and America presents the major problem. It is not too much to say that Russia holds the key to the successful outcome of this war and to the peace of the postwar world. What can we do to persuade her to use it aright, in coöperation with us and not against us? Our relations with the French National Committee of Liberation present another problem, the future of Italy a third, and there are a host of others.

Americans have long been accused of indifference to international problems. But it was thought that today, after the experiences of two world wars, we had come of age. The question of whether or not there will be, can be, an era of tranquillity and peace after this war will be settled before it ends. We owe it to ourselves to find a way to adopt a reasoned position on the problems that face us, to state it, to stick to it, and to win the respect and support of our Allies for it.

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CANADA'S SPLIT PERSONALITY

By Judith Robinson

THE Australian — he was a professor of International Law — said he was sorry for us Canadians. "You are so busy," he said, "proving to the English that you are not Yankees, and proving to the Yankees that you are not English, you have no time to be yourselves at all." Since he had just come from an Institute of Pacific Relations conference, it was easy to understand the Australian's sorrow. He went on to speak of the Statute of Westminster.

The Statute of Westminster is a document highly regarded by "representative" Canadians who attend conferences. It was made law at Westminster in 1931 and ratified by all Dominion Parliaments. It embodies the Declaration of the Imperial Conference of 1926 that the nations associated in the British Commonwealth are "self-governing communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate . . ." and so on. It was of no importance, the Australian said. It was merely a legal phrasing of accepted constitutional practice, a not-too-successful effort to embalm living usage in a formula. Its chief use was to soothe Canadians. It was the ring Canada required so that she might show it to the neighbors and prove that she was an honest woman. Australia and New Zealand, being quite certain they were honest women, felt no need of a ring to show. But Canada and, to a lesser extent, South Africa, set store by such emblems of respectability. Why?

The percentage of formalists is high among Canadians currently recognized as representative, and insistence on Canada's national sovereignty is one of their peculiarities. The circumstance is regrettable for it has created a sort of embarrassment between ordinary Canadians and other average citizens of other countries. We think we are reasonably adult, as inmates of this world go, yet we find ourselves treated in international company like touchy adolescents. This is the work of the representative Canadians, done from the highest motives.

The obsession with status that has shaped Canada's external relations for twenty years is a by-product of the attempt to invent a synthetic Canadian national consciousness. It is one of the tragi-comedies of the time that, in a world waking in agony to the insanity of its old nationalisms, the statesmen and teachers of

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Canada have spent two earnest decades struggling to induce a new self-conscious nationalism in Canadians to whom it does not come naturally.

The attempt has been well-meaning. It was planned as a solvent of the differences that divide us. It was copied, with reverent care, from the best United States model. National consciousness was a subject taught in infant schools, a mental exercise solemnly required of children, a duty preached to youth by zealous publicists and university professors. According to plan, it was to merge French Canada's self-centered nationalism in a larger national ego. It was to cure English-speaking Canadians of an ailment known as colonial-mindedness, which few of them knew they had until they were told of it. For Canadians new from Europe, it was to provide the urge towards assimilation.

It has not worked out that way. French-Canadian nationalism is more actively separatist, more ardently *Canadien*, more openly resentful of the rest of Canada now than at any time since the eighties. The new Canadians, until the war came, had embraced only one article of the new Canadian faith with enthusiasm; they were all for North American isolation. The English-speaking Canadians, a diminishing majority, already divided east, west and center by economic differences and regional resentments, divided again. One set of extremists cultivated a sense of inferiority to Canadians of French origin and an intolerance of British associations which was as sentimental and unreasoning as their reverence for the United States of America. The other set, more royalist than the King and more imperialist by far than Westminster, adopted Mr. Neville Chamberlain's umbrella as a symbol of Empire and defended it on all occasions against all comers.

Between the two, the bewildered run of us clung, half apologetically, to an idea that we owed several things of value to our British connections and a certain amount of sympathy to the British taxpayer who still footed our defense bills. We accepted in a daze our leaders' assurances that theoretical devotion to international security — Geneva pattern — was quite compatible with isolationist practice. We relinquished without much regret some historic doubts of the universal benevolence of American imperialism and we let the Orangemen worry about the French-Canadian birth rate. We also tried hard to believe what we were told: that an international capitalism which had inaugurated the depression by shutting down its Canadian subsidiaries

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and throwing the unorganized Canadian workman out of his job was individual enterprise, the bulwark of our freedom and the cornerstone of Canada's national sovereignty.

And all the time, in the higher air of conferences, far above our dumb defenseless heads, representative Canadians labored to establish our status, happy in the faith that by saving the surface you save all. It should be remembered in extenuation that they were not then alone in believing that salvation is by formula, or that a phrase repeated often enough becomes a fact. Moreover, it looked at one time as if their faith might be justified. When war came — for us, in September 1939 — they produced a formula for unity and the Government of Canada adopted it. It consisted of:

A separate declaration of war on Germany, made a week later than the United Kingdom's to vindicate Canada's status; an assurance of "limited participation" given French Canada and the mid-western isolationists; a token force of volunteers enlisted and sent to England to satisfy the sense of obligation of the majority.

While the static war lasted, the formula was good. It was so good it became the platform on which the present Government was returned to power with a big majority in early 1940, its solid bloc of French Canadian support cemented fast with a pledge of no conscription —"*jamais, jamais, jamais!*" [1]

But after May 1940, the formula hit hard times. One by one and with increasing speed as the majority wakened to the terrible realities and demanded action the limits came off Canadian participation. The token force became an army of volunteers. The Empire Air Training Plan, chiselled down at first by cautious dread of commitments, was doubled in size and doubled again by R.C.A.F. establishments to make Canada the free world's training school for airmen. The Canadian Navy, designed for coastal defense, moved out into mid-ocean, expanded and took on its half of Atlantic convoys; still expanding, it moved on into the Mediterranean. Canadian farms and factories turned out the stuff of war in volume that presently mounted up. All that was before Pearl Harbor, and we have done better since, with American help. But in one thing our failure is complete.

It is Canada's tragedy that this, the one country placed by history and geography in a position to show the way out of suicidal nationalism into sane internationalism, cannot find its own way out of its own confusion of spirit. Destiny caught us in

[1] The late Right Hon. Ernest Lapointe, Canadian Minister of Justice.

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Gandhi-pants and a gilt paper crown beating our national chest and repeating the formula prescribed: "Canada is a Nation!" We did it with the best intention. We were told by the most representative Canadians that it was the sure cure for Canada's split personality. But the cure has not worked and the hour of destiny is passing and the attending physicians have prescribed so far only a change of fixation. We are now invited to pursue unity as an end. This, like the old obsession with sovereignty, is by its nature self-defeating. In Quebec a new political party is already busy proving it. It is called *Le Bloc Populaire Canadien* and it grew out of the failure of a formula.

In less complicated countries than Canada good deeds do not invariably lead to schizophrenia. We have been put on the road to it by two things in our history of which we have no need to be ashamed. One is the Quebec Act of 1774. One is the clause of the British North America Act of 1867 ensuring French Canada against loss of its minority rights.

The Quebec Act, passed by the British Parliament, guaranteed to the people of the newly conquered French territory in North America security in their religion and language, their customs and tenures, under their own civil laws. It incidentally guaranteed that those people could in effect be insulated by their leaders from all direct contact with, and understanding of, the currents of thought that moved their English-speaking fellow-citizens. Its date indicates possible calculation in the generosity.

The British North America Act, passed 93 years later, provided that while Canadian Confederation lasts the Province of Quebec shall have, in the Canadian Parliament, a fixed representation of 65 seats and all other provinces shall be represented proportionately according to their population. This ensures French Canada an adequate weight in the federal councils and also ensures that politicians eager to get and keep office in Canada must guide themselves by the wishes of French Canadian leaders who can throw that weight around.

Whatever the virtues of the 1774 and 1867 arrangements in time of peace, in time of national danger they do not make for strong and resolute government, or for unity of action.

In the last war, when we were near defeat, the government of the day, obeying a majority vote of the whole country, attempted to apply conscription in Quebec as in the rest of Canada. The bitterness and hatreds born of that attempt, kept alive for more than twenty years in Quebec, were organized to ensure unbroken

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French Canadian support to the political leaders who had opposed conscription in 1917. Last year, the same leaders, newly pledged never to impose conscription in Quebec, were empowered by a majority vote of all the Canadian people to enforce conscription in all Canada. The formula chosen to meet this embarrassing situation was a half measure of conscription for home service only. Its chief products have been a sense of universal frustration and, in Quebec, *Le Bloc Populaire Canadien.*

Le Bloc is a party of resistance, organized in political revolt by French Canadian supporters of the present government. Its purpose is to punish what it regards as a breach of trust, by turning French Canada from the leaders who broke faith. Its argument, offered in all solemnity, is that the *Quebecois* were tricked into partaking of the present war "for England's advantage"; that Quebec was promised a profitable participation and no compulsory sacrifices; that it consented to participate on those terms and those terms have not been fulfilled. Therefore French Canadian support must be withdrawn from a government guilty of this betrayal. The argument is proving effective. It has recently won a Quebec by-election for the new party and ensured the defeat of the government candidate in two others.

But *Le Bloc* is more than a party of revenge. It is organizing methodically for postwar control of Quebec and the Quebec bloc in Ottawa. It has a program skilfully planned to channel all the economic grievances of French Canadian farmers and workers — and they have plenty of legitimate ones — into racial antagonism and bitterness. It is a curious commentary on the *Bloc* that its insistent demand that English Canadians respect French Canadian minority rights is mixed with open anti-Semitism. It has the only organized youth movement in Canada and it is training it on lines already too familiar. If the *Bloc* leader, Maxime Raymond, M.P., succeeds in his aim of bringing a large representation from Quebec into parliament behind him next election he will come close to being master in the House of Commons. For his *Bloc* can remain aloof from English-speaking politicians of every party and direct or disrupt government where it chooses, as its model, the Irish Home Rule party, did in England for years.

The *Bloc's* added importance is as the parliamentary repository of a romantic belief shared by many French Canadians who do not support it politically — that small countries can still get along by themselves in this world. *Bloc* leaders, preaching that a country as potentially rich and relatively weak as Canada can

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run its own show and needs no protecting association with other peoples, get a hearing in Quebec that they would not get elsewhere in Canada. The majority of Canadians have outgrown that particular error. We know the choices before us. We can become an American protectorate, more or less humored in our pretensions to sovereign status, or we can develop our present partnership in the British Commonwealth and, as its North American representative, cultivate the friendship of our neighbors south and north, the American and Russian Republics. What we cannot do is resume our prewar cultivation of status, under the joint protection of Britain and the United States, demanding recognition from, and refusing commitments to, both. Outside Quebec, that is fairly generally recognized.

Outside Quebec, the lines of the future are turning left in Canada as they are everywhere. The Coöperative Commonwealth Federation, the farmer-labor party established eleven years ago by prairie Fabians, has within the past two years moved into place as the official Opposition in the provincial legislatures of British Columbia and Ontario. In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, it has defeated government candidates in three recent federal by-elections. The handicap of federal government blessing ensured not only the defeat but the disappearance of one Liberal administration in Ontario this summer. It was succeeded by a minority government of Progressive Conservatives, a party whose nearest American counterpart would be Willkie Republicanism.

Whatever comes in Canada when this war is won, it will not be a return to the *laissez-faire* of prewar Liberalism, nationally or internationally, politically or economically. That much is already evident. The indications are that, if the C.C.F. were to gain power, the Pacific would dominate Canadian foreign policy. Cooperation with Australia and New Zealand, China and the United States in Pacific security plans would be their natural first approach to international organization, if for no other reason than that the ablest followers of C.C.F. leader M. J. Coldwell are men and women from the prairies and the Pacific Coast.

The Progressive Conservatives have plumped for internationalism. Their leader, John Bracken, is with Cordell Hull against trade barriers. Their foreign policy takes for granted Canada's acceptance of responsibility as the North American member of the British partnership and they are already talking, as more than a hundred thousand young Canadian air force men are thinking, of Canada's future in terms of world air routes.

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On the whole, the chance that Canada will gravitate on its own weight away from the British Commonwealth and towards some form of union with the United States looks less than it did. Discussions of the Quebec headache do not end this year, as inevitably as they did last, with "Oh, join the States, that'll settle it." And courting days are over on the Alaska Highway. Stories of the magnificence of American planners, the daring and speed of their execution and the size of their pay-checks were the staple export of Edmonton this time last year. Their tone is different now. A slight reaction has set in. The sensitive Canadian ear has begun to detect a note of possessiveness. There is a report, no doubt apocryphal, that telephone calls to U. S. Army Headquarters in Edmonton are answered briskly, "Army of Occupation."

One of the difficult things for a citizen of the American Republic to understand is the early history of British North America. Like his own early history, it is studded with stories of patriot stands against the aggressor. What he cannot seem to get clear in his head is that in our case the aggressor was *he*. There is, moreover, a certain reserve among all but representative Canadians regarding that four thousand miles of frontier without a fortress. Mention of it recalls to mind a few frontier adjustments made in the friendliest manner at our expense, from Maine to the Alaska panhandle. They were small matters really, and of no importance between friends with plenty of real estate. Yet we would rather not remember them now. With more important things at issue, most of us, at a pinch, can forget our interest in real estate. And Canadians are fortunate enough to have, if it had only been cultivated better, another set of values.

We were born internationalists. It was no embarrassment to our parents and our grandparents to own two citizenships and three allegiances and four or more affinities. On the contrary, they enjoyed it. To be at home by right of birth, tradition and circumstance, as were the fortunate among them, in London and Edinburgh, Dublin and Paris, as well as in Vancouver and Montreal and New York and New Orleans was not to their old-fashioned eyes a disadvantage. To have, as even the poorest of them had, a rich uncle in Australia or a second-cousin diamond mining in South Africa as well as a nephew getting along fine in the States did not make Canada a drabber place to them. To own, as a common inheritance, a common citizenship with half the world and a common responsibility for the good and bad done by fellow-citizens the other side of the world was not a belittling

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experience. It did not occur to our colonial great-grandparents that colonial was a term of ignominy and it was not their habit to magnify the ill manners of globe trotters who did think so into national grievances. They were perfectly capable of returning rudeness on a personal basis of exchange.

Sickly national sensitivity came late into Canadian life and where it came from is difficult to discover. Certainly not from our irreverent and confident fathers. Certainly not from the rank and file of the generation who went from Canada to war between 1914 and 1918. Their spirit was more robust. Their representative Canadian was the private soldier who, finding himself in London late in the evening of November 11, 1918, went to the Café Royal for something to eat, and presently concluded a discussion of inter-Allied relations by climbing upon a table, first having punched the eye of an English subaltern who tried to restrain him. He then grasped a lobster by the claw, swung it three times around his head and delivered it into the bosom of the nearest U. S. Army colonel with these representative words: "Once a Canadian, always a gentleman!"

Somewhere between 1918 and 1939, that helpful spirit of international Canadianism was lost to us in a search for status and respectability. The hope for Canada is that it will return, renewed, with the sons of the representative Canadian private. When last heard from, they were acting, in a manner their fathers would have been proud of, as liaison between Montgomery's men and Patton's on a Sicilian mountain side.

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INDIA'S MINERAL WEALTH AND POLITICAL FUTURE

By Charles H. Behre, Jr.

DISCUSSIONS of the future of India usually proceed in political and social terms and often in a vein of prejudice and recrimination. In the course of them it sometimes happens that observers lose sight of fundamental economic realities which are most important for any long-term solution of Indian problems. These material factors are less controversial and deserve far more consideration than they customarily receive. One of them — the presence under the soil of India of rich mineral deposits which in this industrial age are a primary source of national power and, even more significant, of social well-being — should be taken into account by all who wish their opinions on the question of India's political future to be soundly based.

India's mineral deposits will determine in considerable measure her place in the world; and the way in which that wealth is distributed will affect the relationship not only of each part of the country to the other parts but also of the country as a whole to the world outside. Moreover, it seems to have been demonstrated by history that any general rise in a country's standard of living affects favorably the relations between the various peoples inhabiting its component parts. As they become better fed and better housed they also become better educated, better informed and more understanding and more tolerant towards each other in spite of racial or religious or other cleavages.

Probably almost every literate person has an opinion on the question of Indian independence. No sensible person not informed at first hand and not compelled by world events to find an immediate answer will propose a categorical solution to the problem of how it might be attained. This article does not pretend to report on many of the major elements involved. Political and religious questions, for example, are to an indefinable extent a matter of personal values, and a comparison of the validity of differing viewpoints founded on such values necessarily lies outside the technical competence of a geologist like the present writer. But although the geologist cannot propose the ideal solution for the cultural and political problems of India, his particular kind of information may be of value in helping to determine which of two specific steps in a difficult transition

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period might be more practical and helpful — in a word, the better — and which one might be the worse.

The bare facts regarding India's mineral resources and the manner of their distribution suggest conclusions as to her economic strength and her capacity for attaining national self-sufficiency. In particular, they suggest conclusions regarding a particular proposal which is highly charged with political and religious feeling — namely, that India be divided into two separate states, Pakistan and Hindustan, one largely Moslem, the other mainly Hindu.

Any discussion of the question of a division of India must begin with assumptions as to the line of division. It is difficult to say exactly what the boundaries of the proposed Moslem state of Pakistan would be. One has the impression that the rapid growth of the Pakistan movement has surprised the Moslems themselves almost as much as it has startled the Hindus, the British and people abroad. This may be one reason why both objectives and boundaries have been varied and ill-defined.

The idea of Pakistan, an independent Moslem state or federation of states within India, probably was first proposed as recently as 1933. In that year the plan of a Moslem nation, composed of certain present-day Indian states, was advanced by Choudhary Rahmat Ali, a post-graduate student at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. The name Pakistan[1] was devised from the word *Pak* — difficult of exact translation into English but meaning "pure," "clean," that which is noble and sacred for a Moslem — and letters taken from the names of the five Moslem Provinces in the northwest of India: Punjab, North West Frontier, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. A status of nationhood was also claimed for the provinces of Bengal and Assam, in the northeast of India. In the early literature of the movement these two northeastern states were grouped under the name of Bang-i-Islam. The founder of the movement also proposed a third Moslem state, to be known as Usmanistan, comprising chiefly the present Hyderabad in the center of the Indian peninsula. As the movement developed, however, the names Usmanistan and Bang-i-Islam were apparently discarded.

It is a matter of opinion to what degree deficiencies of Hindu Congress leadership, as evidenced under the majority system in the self-governing provinces from 1937 to 1939, may have contributed to the growth of the Moslem desire for a separate state.

[1] As explained by F. Krenkow in the "Encyclopedia of Islam," Sup. no. 4, p. 174.

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On this the writer can hazard no comment. It is likewise an open question whether Moslem support of Pakistan is as unanimous as the leaders of the Moslem League assert, and whether, as Congress leaders maintain, it is supported by the British under a policy of "divide and rule." There is no doubt, however, that the Moslem League now stands firmly, indeed apparently intransigently, for the idea of Pakistan, that the League is a major political party in India, that its power is growing, and that its proposal represents a genuine political possibility, recognized as such by the British Government and feared by the Hindus.

Those who favor Pakistan usually propose to divide India on a basis of religions; but even among the Moslems there is still no general agreement on precise boundaries. British India is now divided into more than 450 states, provinces and principalities. Some Moslems propose that the independent Moslem state or federation of states be formed by cutting across all these political boundaries. Thus pictured, Pakistan would be a state with redrawn borders, comprising those areas in northern, northwestern and northeastern India which have predominantly Moslem populations. Other Moslems include only those present states, principalities and federations in each of which the plurality of the population is Moslem. This latter is, of course, the simpler plan, though it implies the inclusion of many "island" populations.

Any attempt to utilize mineral resources as a criterion for judging the proposed division of India must assume that a boundary between Pakistan and Hindustan would be drawn along preëxisting state lines (see accompanying map), for nearly all statistical data are classified by such boundaries. However, for our present purposes the difference is not important; examination of the alternate plans indicates that in general the distribution of mineral resources between Pakistan and Hindustan would not be materially changed under either plan.

Authoritative figures giving the proportions of the various religions and races in the Indian states and agencies are not available. "The Statesman's Yearbook" gives estimates, however, for certain of the British Provinces which might be assigned to Pakistan, that is, in which the Moslems are believed to outnumber any other one religious group. The estimates are as follows: Baluchistan, 405,000 Moslems out of 464,000, or 87 percent (1931); Bengal, 32,560,000 out of about 60,300,000, or 54 percent (1941); North West Frontier, 2,764,000 out of about 3,038,000, or 73 percent (1941); Punjab, 13,322,000 out of 23,580,000, or 57 percent

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(1931); and Sind, 3,208,300 out of 4,535,000, or 71 percent (1931). Two other British Provinces would be included, Assam and Kashmir. In 1931, Assam is reputed to have contained 2,755,914 Moslems as against 4,931,760 Hindus. It will be noted that these figures do not give a plurality of Moslems. The province is nevertheless included in Pakistan because: (1) it is generally regarded by proponents of Pakistan as predominantly Moslem; and (2) the population of the sections not controlled by the British, though not carefully enumerated, is more strongly Mohammedan than Hindu — perhaps enough to make the region as a whole Mohammedan. The figures for Kashmir vary, but the Moslems are stated to constitute the "bulk" of the population.[2]

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the President of the Moslem League, identifies Pakistan as consisting of the seven states named above — Baluchistan, North West Frontier, Kashmir, Sind and Punjab in the northwest, and Bengal and Assam in the northeast. Their borders represent the boundaries of Pakistan for the purposes of the present survey. As the accompanying map shows, the eastern and western parts of the proposed Moslem state are separated by the peninsula of Hindustan, which along the northern frontier of India is some 700 miles wide.

II

India, exclusive of Burma, now is or promises soon to be important in world trade as a source of coal and petroleum, iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, gold, bauxite, salt, magnesite, mica, gypsum, various gemstones, monazite and certain refractory materials. The location of the chief deposits and mines of most of the foregoing is indicated by appropriate symbols on the accompanying map.

Industrial power in the modern world is based on the trinity of coal, iron and oil. Together, coal and iron are the foundation for industrialism in our present steel age. They are to the development of the machine what oxygen and hydrogen are to the growth of the human body: they must be present in combination. Oil, though also valuable, is far less essential; in times of peace, a state rich in coal can do entirely without oil deposits if exchange in mineral commodities is free. Even if it has no oil, it may convert its coal to liquid fuel, as Germany does. Oil is of little direct

[2] The northern parts of the provinces and states east of the Punjab — the United Provinces, Bihar and Bhutan — tend to be Moslem, but as they are not separate political entities they are not here grouped in Pakistan.

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value in the making of steel, and cannot as yet be substituted for coal in the steel industry. Coal remains essential.

Both in aggregate value and in distribution the most important single industrial mineral resource in India is coal. The grade varies from low to high, and from lignite to local anthracite. It is found in almost every state, but the best, and by far the greatest amount — more than 98 percent — has been and will be taken from the moderately old (Permian) rocks found chiefly in three provinces: Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.

Broadly speaking, the major better-grade coal fields extend in an arc from the great bend in the Ganges (where it crosses the boundary between Bihar and Bengal) westward and slightly south to the western edge of the Central Provinces, and then sweeps back abruptly southeastward to the mouth of the Godavari River in the Madras Presidency. The reader might at this point consult the map again, fixing in his mind the position of the two eastern provinces of Bihar and Orissa. These are provinces in which Hindus vastly predominate (31 million Hindus, as against 4.2 million Moslems in 1931). In any political division of India on religious lines, both provinces would be part of Hindustan. Since they are the repositories of India's greatest mineral wealth, including the highest quality of coal that she possesses, they constitute the most important area from the point of view of present and future industrial development. It will be noticed that both adjoin the Pakistan state of Bengal; and that Bihar lies directly between Bengal and the five Moslem states of Pakistan to the northwest. The geologist would note further that the geological characteristics of Bihar and Bengal are similar; rocks that appear in one province extend in large part into the other. Thus the coal fields of Bengal are an extension of the fields in Orissa and Bihar.

Central India contains several coal fields, of which the Johilla field is probably the largest in extent and value. Estimates of the reserves of this field differ widely, ranging from 30 million tons to about 100 million tons. In either case, it is probably the most important in Central India for the future. The Wardah Valley field is the most extensive in the Central Provinces, containing about one and a half billion tons. Isolated coal fields are also developed in Baluchistan.

But by far the largest fields, containing coal best suited for general and varied use and especially for coking, and at the same time most accessible by rail and sea, are those of Bihar and Orissa, mentioned above, and their extension northeast into Bengal.

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Estimates made between 1915 and 1934 indicate that they hold a total of about 10,150 million tons of coal of good grade. These deposits are concentrated chiefly in the Karanpura field (eastern Bihar), the Raniganj field (mainly in southwestern Bengal but striking into eastern Bihar as well), the Jharia field (Bihar), and the Bokaro field (Bihar).[3] Farther southwest are the great coalfields of the Godavri Valley, continuing through Hyderabad and Madras, almost to the sea at Cocanada. They represent about 6,400 million tons of high grade coal.[4] The reserves of these two areas alone should easily last for four centuries.

Thus India's high grade coal reserves are exceeded only by those of China, the U. S. S. R., Poland, Germany, England, Canada and the United States. Yet they are, on the whole, localized. This limited distribution unfortunately acts as an effective brake upon widespread industrialization. That fact in turn affords a glimpse into the future of India and makes possible a reasonably safe forecast as to the loci of industrialization.

The economist would say that India is fortunate because her vast coal deposits are in close proximity to her great iron deposits. The iron production of India comes likewise chiefly from the deposits of Bihar and Orissa, again running northward into Bengal. Total production in Bihar and Orissa from 1900 to 1932 was about 22 million long tons of ore,[5] valued at roughly £4,215,000; and latest figures previous to the outbreak of the war indicated a continued increase.[6] Residual ores are widely scattered throughout the peninsula in bodies which, though small, are commonly of fair to good grade; such deposits are especially widespread in central India. The most important type of ore, however, partly because of grade, partly on account of continuity and access, is that bearing much resemblance to the Lake Superior iron ores of Canada and the United States and occurring in immense quantities in the easterly provinces of India, notably Bihar and Orissa, and in smaller but still important bodies in Bengal and locally elsewhere.

Reserves of these various iron deposits are difficult to estimate. Most attention has been given to the ores of Bihar and Orissa, and

[3] C. S. Fox, "The Lower Gondwana Coal Fields of India," *Geological Survey of India Memoirs*, LIX, 1934.

[4] V. Ball and R. R. Simpson, "The Coal Fields of India," *Geological Survey of India Memoirs*, XLI, Pt. I, 1913.

[5] J. C. Brown, "India's Mineral Wealth." London: Oxford University Press, 1936, p. 106.

[6] S. G. Koon, "Iron and Steel" in "The Mineral Industry During 1938" (ed. by G. A. Roush). New York: McGraw, 1939, p. 353.

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estimates[7] give the following totals of economically mineable ore:

Singhbhum district, Orissa	1,047,000,000 long tons
Keonjhar State	988,000,000
Bonai State	648,000,000
Mayurbhanj State	18,000,000
Total	2,701,000,000 long tons

More recent estimates[8] suggest that the above figures are in part too low. Since the ores now being mined carry an average of slightly more than 50 percent of iron, they represent mineral reserves of 1,400,000,000 tons of metallic iron, or enough for at least 500 years at present rate of use. This favorable estimate, it is true, makes no allowance for a marked rise in consumption, but it also discounts the possibility of extending the reserves by further exploration. One should add that, as iron ores the world over go, these are of relatively high grade.

Although India has only fairly recently begun producing iron and steel in any quantity she already was exporting those commodities before the present war. About 55 percent of the pig iron was exported in 1937 to Japan (281,748 long tons) and the rest went chiefly to the United Kingdom (215,801 long tons) and the United States (88,013 long tons).[9] Probably most of the steel exported went to Japan also. Only special kinds of pig iron were imported. India is, however, an importing country for steel of certain compositions, including ferro-alloys, and for many kinds of specially fabricated shapes. Indeed, steel billets and even sheet steel, and similar raw materials for steel fabrication, are as yet produced in only moderate quantity.

In 1932 there were four major producing firms in India: (1) the Indian Iron and Steel Company, with two blast furnaces each with an annual capacity of about 150,000 tons at Burnpore; (2) the Mysore Iron Works, with a few small charcoal furnaces at Shimoga; (3) the Bengal Iron Company, with five blast furnaces at Kulti having a total capacity of about 250,000 tons of pig iron per year; (4) the Tata Iron Company, whose large Jamshedpur works had a pig iron capacity of 510,000 tons per year, said to be steadily expanding. The war has stimulated the growth of the

[7] H. C. Jones, "The Iron Ore Deposits of Bihar and Orissa," *Geological Survey of India Memoirs*, LXIII, Pt. II, 1934, p. 249–255.

[8] M. S. Krishnan, quoted by H. C. Jones, *op. cit.*

[9] A. M. Heron, "The Mineral Production of India and Burma, During 1937," *Geological Survey of India Memoirs*, LXXIII, 1938, Pt. III, p. 337.

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industry, and if it receives reasonable support India's production of iron and steel for peacetime purposes may be expected to continue to expand until it reaches the point of self-sufficiency.

It will be seen that all of India's leading iron districts are in Hindustan. There are many small iron deposits in the western part of Pakistan but none that would sustain a large steel industry. The one exception is the northward and eastward extension of the Orissa ores into Bengal. This occasioned the founding of the Bengal Iron Company, a corporation that began production in 1940. Even these Bengal deposits are not large compared with those in Orissa.

India is less well supplied with petroleum, the third of the three great components of industrial power. Although Indian production has increased in recent years, and now amounts to about 275 million gallons of crude oil annually, the rise has not been spectacular and production still is not adequate to supply domestic requirements. In fact, about as many gallons of fuel oil and "kerosene" are imported each year as are produced from Indian drilling. With increased industrialization and with steady, intensive exploitation like that practised in the United States or the Caucasus the supply of Indian petroleum may some day become adequate for local needs, at least temporarily. But the longer future is far from bright. India's annual production is somewhat less than 1 percent of the world's petroleum supply, and of this small quantity about four-fifths comes from Burma.

The oil fields of India proper are chiefly located in two regions. In Assam there are areas containing oil which extend in a broad arc southward into eastern Bengal. They parallel the rich pools of Yenangyat (made famous in war dispatches) and other oil fields of Burma, yet so far only two important fields, at Digboi and Badarpur, have been found. The Badarpur field was once a great producer, but has steadily declined; it produced only 847,000 gallons in 1932 and apparently yielded none in 1938. The Digboi field yielded 66,718,437 gallons in 1937 and holds much promise for the future. The other important region is the Punjab, where three fields, Khaur, Dhulian and Chharat, are promising. The output of Khaur has recently fallen off, but numerous oil "sands" and favorable structures are known to exist there, and there is some hope of finding new pools. Reports for 1938 gave no production for Chharat; for 1937 only 9,939,420 gallons were reported for the Khaur and Dhulian fields together.

It is pertinent to our present purpose to note that almost all of

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the petroleum so far reported and *known* to be in the ground is in the Moslem part of India. The great backbone of Hindustan, the peninsula, is of a geological composition to exclude the discovery of noteworthy petroleum resources there. Another significant fact, as we shall note more carefully later, is that Burma, India's neighbor on the east, is rich in petroleum.

In the hierarchy of industrial power, manganese and chromium hold important rank because of their use as alloys in making high grade steel. India is abundantly supplied with deposits containing recoverable amounts of manganese, the alloy metal which makes steel hard and tough. Indeed, in recent years her standing has been first or second in order of production among the world's sources. In 1938, for example, the Indian output came after that of the U.S.S.R., but was nearly twice that of its next competitor, South Africa. In 1937 the leading producing states of India were Central Provinces, with 65.8 percent of the total ore produced; Madras, 16.2 percent; Bombay, 5.7 percent; Bihar and Orissa, 1.1 percent; and Mysore, 0.5 percent. All of these are in Hindustan. The export shipping of manganese has been handled from coastal cities located chiefly in Hindu India, except for Calcutta; and the new port of Vizagapatam in the Madras Presidency has still further strengthened the Hindu hold on this important raw material.

Chromium is the alloy next most important to manganese in making steel. Its function is mainly to increase toughness and strength and, in certain proportions, to make the steel relatively rust-resistant. The sources of chrome ore in India are widespread, but lie mainly in Baluchistan, Mysore, Bihar and Orissa. Estimates as to reserves are not available, but the nature of the deposits suggest that the resources of the different states are of about the same order as their production. On this basis they seem to be about equal in Hindustan and Pakistan.[10]

Of the precious metals, India is well supplied with gold. The Kolar district in Mysore, in the Hindu region, has mines employing about 24,000 workers, and their production in 1937 was 330,710 troy ounces. Indeed, this district is one of the outstanding gold sources of the world. A smaller deposit of gold, now unworked, is situated in the Anantpur district of the Madras Presidency. Silver is one of the many metals mined in the Bawdwin

[10] The increasingly important steel alloy molybdenum is found in several localities in the Hindu parts of central India, but commercial production is small. The same can be said of the other common steel alloy metals.

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district of Burma; but in recent years no noteworthy production comes from within India proper.

Among the non-ferrous base metals, bauxite, the source of aluminum, is widely distributed in India, some in the Pakistan area of Kashmir, but more by far in the Hindu area — the Central Provinces, Bombay and Bihar.[11] The grade of Indian ore does not justify a premium, nor are there other factors favoring the industry; hence, despite its wide distribution, bauxite mining and aluminum manufacture have not achieved prominence in the industrial life of India as a whole. A steady growth may be anticipated in the future, however, to the degree that aluminum maintains its previous hold on the light metal market. Such aluminum as is now made in India is chiefly to satisfy domestic needs. Fabrication of aluminum into utensils on a moderate scale is progressing at several plants, especially in the Hindu area.

Copper is produced in amounts of about 7,000 long tons of metal annually, the only two noteworthy mines being those at Mosaboni and Dhobani in the Singhbhum district of Orissa. Lead and zinc are plentiful in Burma, but the fact does not affect the relationship of Pakistan and Hindustan. Burma, likewise, is the source of tin and nickel for Indian metallurgical plants.

In any state where industrialism is to become highly developed, certain non-metallic minerals are of great significance. In the early stages of mechanization and modernization they generally are of little importance; but their rôle mounts with the increase in fabrication and especially with the growth of the chemical industries found in most large countries of dense population and varied occupations. Conspicuously important among such non-metallic minerals are salt, lime, sulphur, gypsum, clays and magnesite, as well as phosphates and potassium sources.

Deposits of all of the foregoing except sulphur are known and worked in India. Lime is widespread, and the degree of its exploitation for use in plaster and cement making and in the heavy chemical industries is mainly a matter of transport facilities and local demand. We may assume that both Pakistan and Hindustan would find enough lime for ordinary uses within their own boundaries. The same can be said of gypsum. Salt is extensively mined in the form of rock salt in the Punjab and North West Frontier Province, both of them in Pakistan. More than 85 percent of Indian salt, however, comes from the evaporation of sea

[11] C. S. Fox, "The Bauxite and Aluminous Laterite Occurrences of India," *Geological Survey of India Memoirs*, XLIX, 1923, Pt. I, p. 62–187.

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water, chiefly in Bombay and Madras, and of lake water, chiefly in Rajputana — all in Hindustan. In any case, reserves of this important chemical material are adequate for domestic use, even in Pakistan, despite the possibly increased demands of a much larger chemical industry. Pottery clays, china clays and fire clays are widespread also, and though estimates of reserves are not available it is safe to say that both Hindustan and Pakistan have sufficient to support an autonomous status. The best fire clays are in the eastern coal fields and extend across the proposed political boundary. Magnesite, which is used as a refractory in certain cements and can also serve as a source for magnesium, occurs in large quantity in Madras; smaller deposits in Mysore are also productive. Indian mica and kyanite are exported widely, mainly from Hindu areas.

Phosphates, of course, not only are useful in industry but are essential in agriculture. This is especially true of old countries, such as India, where farming has been carried on intensely for many, many centuries and where the soil is therefore approaching or has reached exhaustion. All of India, Hindustan and Pakistan alike, is lamentably short in phosphate sources. A large tonnage of manure and fertilizer is annually imported, a third of it consisting of materials intended to supply phosphate to the steadily impoverished soil. A minor mineral source of phosphate occurs in two broadly contrasting areas where it is worked with relative difficulty, in Bihar and Orissa. Another and as yet unworked source consists of the nodules in the coal-bearing shales of the Punjab, and in various rocks in southern India. Again, the chief sources of this mineral material, whether natural or artificial, are in Hindustan. Potassium sources, furnishing another fertilizer ingredient essential to land that has been long and intensively cultivated, are available to Pakistan and Hindustan alike.

III

From the preceding survey of India's mineral resources, brief though it is, our first conclusion is apparent: India is not abundantly supplied with oil, but she possesses large reserves of most important industrial minerals — coal, iron, several of the ferro-alloys which make good steel, and the subsidiary minerals — in ample quantity to make her a powerful and reasonably self-sufficient industrial nation. The per capita supply is relatively low in comparison with that of most of the great industrial nations, but per capita consumption could be materially raised without seri-

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ously endangering reserves of the more essential minerals in the reasonably near future.

It is also apparent that India's minerals are so distributed between the parts of India in which Hindu and Moslem people preponderate that if India were divided on the basis of religious population the Hindu state would be rich and the Moslem state would be conspicuously poor. This disproportion is sufficiently great so that, speaking generally, it does not even seem to be cancelled out by differences in population density. Not only is this fact of Hindustan's relatively greater mineral wealth true for the present, as judged from a comparison of the minerals now produced; it will doubtless be an even more striking fact of the future, as the industrialization of India advances. The significant conclusion as to the question of Pakistan and Hindustan is corollary to this fact.

Hindustan has great reserves of coal and iron; it has excellent reserves of the more important ferro-alloy metals (though these must be supplemented by the import of others) and of the non-metallic minerals and gold; it has considerable reserves of bauxite and some copper. Pakistan has a small amount of coal and iron; few ferro-alloys; and little bauxite. But Pakistan has as much of the ferro-alloys, other than manganese and chromium, as has Hindustan; it has adequate reserves of the other subsidiary minerals, except magnesite; and it has most of the oil. The leading feature of the complicated picture is, as we have noted, that Moslem Bengal is geologically a continuation of Hindu Bihar and Orissa. Speaking very generally, about 90 percent of India's coal and 92 percent of her iron would be in Hindustan; the remainder would be in Pakistan, but the grade (and rank) of the latter is relatively poor. Hindustan would have most of the ferro-alloy and subsidiary minerals which complete the requirements of a relatively autonomous industrial realm; yet Pakistan would have some of them. Under conditions of moderate industrialization and with fairly high living standards, India as a whole would have less oil than she needed for her internal combustion engines; most of what she had would be in Pakistan.

Our second conclusion, in short, is that the Hindu and Moslem areas of India are interdependent. Not only would Hindustan need some of the resources of Pakistan; for industrial life, Pakistan would desperately need great quantities of the resources of Hindustan.

In a closed trade system the Pakistan state of Bengal would,

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industrially speaking, die. In such a situation one would expect violence. And it is permissible to note that the Moslem state which would thus be strangled would contain the people who are considered more aggressive and warlike than their richer neighbors. The economic position of the Moslem state of Assam, adjoining Bengal on the east, would be also unfavorable. It has no outstanding mineral wealth; petroleum and chrome ore are its only noteworthy mineral resources. In a divided India, then, it would seem to be even more hopelessly situated, economically speaking, than Bengal. Division or no division, there would be little need for change in the economy of the Punjab, Kashmir, and the Moslem states to the west. They would remain as they are now, pastoral and agricultural, economically tributary to Hindustan. A division of India strictly on religious lines would seem to destine all of Pakistan for such a status.

Whether Mr. Jinnah accepts this fact, or merely postpones consideration of it, one cannot quite tell. In a recent interview with Herbert L. Matthews, appearing in the *New York Times* of September 21, 1942, he remarked that: "Afghanistan is a poor country, but it gets along; so does 'Iraq and that has only a small fraction of the 70 million inhabitants we would have. If we are willing to live sensibly and poorly so long as we have freedom, why should the Hindus object? . . . The economy will take care of itself in time." He added to this somewhat cryptic statement the observation that for administrative purposes "a corridor could be established" between Bengal and the Pakistan states in the west. In the modern political vocabulary, the word "corridor" has come to have ominous overtones.

A possible solution of the confusion resulting from the economically "unnatural" boundary between Bengal and Bihar might be to redraw the border of the proposed state of Pakistan, giving to Bengal the region north of the Ganges and westward to the United Provinces, and allotting to Bihar in compensation that part of the present Bengal south of the Ganges. This would be in part justified by the present distribution of the adherents of the two major religions. It would place all the Bengal coal lands of major potentiality under the sovereignty of Bihar. It would reduce, but would not remove, the great Hindu prong represented by the United provinces, which separates Moslem Punjab from Moslem Bengal. It would inevitably add more marked economic differences, and eventually greater cultural differences, to the religious contrasts which already exist between the two factions.

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On the other hand, it would still leave agricultural Pakistan with some resources, notably oil, which industrial Hindustan needed. Moreover, it might perhaps tend to reduce the sources of conflict by allotting a dominant industrial rôle to one people and a frankly subordinate one to the other. Is this desirable?

The pressure of industrialization is pressure for unity, in India as elsewhere. But does India want industrialism?

In his "Democratic Ideals and Reality," Sir Halford J. Mackinder refers — a trifle wryly, perhaps — to the psychology or ideology of nations, by saying that "the influence of geographical conditions upon human activities has depended . . . not merely on the realities as we now know them to be and to have been, but in even greater degree on what men imagine in regard to them." India's mineral resources and her potentialities for industrial well-being are realities. Yet the geologist, like the geographer, must remember that it is not so much the facts as the way men look upon them which largely determines action.

Mr. Gandhi evidences even less interest in India's industrial future than does Mr. Jinnah. It is not within the province of this report to analyze Mr. Gandhi's point of view. Yet perhaps we are justified in wondering whether he advances his program of handcrafts as a realistic economic policy for India or as an admirable symbol of India's needs: her need of greater self-sufficiency, above all her need to look to the village, the small community, for well-being.

Among the things in the Indian village which it would seem difficult for anyone to overlook, from any angle, is the poverty. There seems to be fairly general agreement that no approach to the problem of India which does not promise amelioration of the conditions of desperate poverty under which India's millions labor can hold any serious hope of a solution.[12] A possible form of amelioration is certainly the manufacture on a grand scale of consumer goods, whereby price may be lowered and purchasing power increased. Industrialization, if not the trigger by which this happy result can be assured, is at least one means that may be used, once the desirability of it is recognized.

The war has given a tremendous impetus to the process of industrialization of India, and, although the history of industrialism is still in its early chapters, there is nothing in the record of man's experience with this unruly geni — sometimes beneficent,

[12] *Cf.* "The Indian Village and Indian Unrest," by C. F. Strickland, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1931.

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sometimes cruel — to suggest that once unloosed it can ever be bottled again. India not only has coal and iron for the machine. She has a superabundance of the final resource on which the machine is based: manpower. And the distinguishing characteristic of India's immense manpower, at least in Western eyes, is its low per capita consumption, in a word, again, its poverty. Given the natural resources, given the manpower, given the need for an increase in the standard of living of the people of India, an increasing degree of industrialization of India would seem inevitable.

India's decision as to the terms of her political future will determine whether that advance toward industrialism is relatively easy or difficult. The experience of "new" and financially weak South American states bears on India's problem. "New" nations, in process of industrial development, have customarily paid stiff prices in terms of concessions and franchises, for needed capital, when they have been forced to seek that capital from private entrepreneurs. A united India would be in a position to command the sympathy and confidence of other governments, and to ask for loans under international auspices on some such terms as those for which China will ask. But an India, and yet more *two* Indias, using newly-won sovereignty to erect tariff walls around the national borders, would be a poor economic risk. Possible investors would demand the gambler's percentage.

Once committed to a program of industrialization, India would rapidly find herself confronted with the problem of controlling the program in the interest of all her people rather than of a few — the familiar task which has agonized Western nations for a century and which, of course, is already a present component of the Indian situation. Divided into economic fragments, India would find this unavoidable issue doubly painful of solution. In a united India, the problem would seem to present the spur urging the country to the higher degree of social consciousness which her friends within and outside would wish.

With her coal, her iron, her manpower, India could share Asiatic leadership with China or perhaps assume the outstanding rôle in the industrial development of Asia. External factors press her toward unity no less than does the logic of her economic resources. Buddhist Burma, on her eastern frontier, aspires toward nationhood. From Burma, India must have nickel, tin, tungsten, lead, zinc and probably petroleum. Economic relations with Burma would be more fruitful for a United India than for a frag-

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mented one. As China develops her own heavy metal industries in association with her coal deposits in the northeast, near the coast, India's iron ore, travelling by water, will be her most easily transported and least expensive source of supply. The present restrictions of British imperial policy would, however, have to be removed before this interdevelopment of Chinese and Indian resources could progress.

This report does not pretend to assess the responsibility for the delay in the settlement between India and Great Britain, any more than it wishes to belittle the importance to the peoples of India of their religious values. It notes merely that, from the point of view of mineral resources, the Hindu and Moslem areas of India, intimately intergrown, are also interdependent economically. It urges that political interdependence is a wise solution where economic interdependence is so intimate and so essential. It implies that the Moslem sections of India would have more to lose than the Hindu sections if a separation by states on religious lines were carried out. And it suggests, finally, that the economy of India as a whole is interdependent with that of other parts of Asia.

Chinese leaders have shown statesmanship in recognizing that it is to the advantage of China that her great neighbor on the south be a strong and unified nation. It is likewise to the advantage of Hindus and Moslems within India.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE RED ARMY

By Leland Stowe

THE over-all answer to the frequent question as to why the Red Army made such a poor showing in Finland and was able to perform such extraordinary exploits against the German invaders lies, I think, in its rapid and intelligently directed evolution. This evolution of the Red Army began as early as December 1939 and continued steadily, partly because of and partly in spite of fresh reverses and losses, until now the Russian war machine is not only the most resilient but in other ways also the most remarkable of modern times.

The outside world does not sufficiently appreciate the extent to which the Soviet high command learned the lessons of the experience in Finland and the speed with which they proceeded to turn them to account. The adaptability and energy they showed in reforming the Red Army put it in shape to resist the first German onslaught and probably saved Leningrad and Moscow from capture. The Russian forces started in Finland in low gear, with inferior equipment and very spotty leadership. I saw the first Russian prisoners taken by the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus, and they were poorly-clad and ill-equipped. That condition did not continue. Only three weeks later at Tolvajaervi I saw hundreds of frozen corpses of an utterly different, first-class Russian division. From that time through the remainder of the Finnish war the caliber of Soviet troops was maintained at a high level. Officials in Helsinki believed that Soviet Russia, misled by the reports of their agents from inside Finland, had expected the Finnish Government to capitulate without a fight. Later in Moscow I saw indications that the Russians had counted on securing Finnish bases without actually going to war and had found themselves compelled to use force before they were completely prepared. That fact, I believe, chiefly explains the early setbacks of the Red Army in Finland — plus, of course, the superb all-round quality of the Finnish officers and soldiers and the terrible cold of the winter of 1939–40.

At any rate, the result of the Finnish campaign was that Stalin and the high command undertook a wholesale reorganization of the Red Army, including a revision of formations, tactics and command. For this purpose they actually had only fifteen months, from the time of the Russo-Finnish Armistice in March

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1940 to the German attack in June 1942. They of course knew perfectly well that Hitler would strike at Russia the moment his hands were free in the west and hence that they must proceed with energy and dispatch. The chief qualities they showed were an ability to look far ahead and exceptional administrative and technical flexibility. Their chief aims were to improve tactics and weapons and to improve leadership by a careful sifting of army corps and divisional commanders. Needless to say, their own qualities and the objectives they had in view would have been vitiated and defeated if the Russian soldier had not meanwhile shown superb fighting spirit and remarkable endurance.

Two other factors contributing to their eventual success must also be mentioned. Simultaneously with the overhauling of the Red Army the Soviet Government began putting into effect a bold scheme to transfer machinery and indeed whole industries eastward from the Ukraine, and particularly from the Donets basin, and also began accelerating the expansion of the inner industrial fortress beyond the Urals. Later came the delivery of British and American war materials — much later in reaching decisive dimensions than most Americans appreciate. Due particularly to heavy shipping losses on the Arctic route to Murmansk and Archangel, the American lend-lease and British supplies did not reach Soviet Russia in sufficient proportions to become a major factor in the crucial defensive fighting along the Don, in the northern Caucasus and at Stalingrad during the summer and early autumn of 1942. The flow became really important only about the time that the Russians had already demonstrated their bulldog grip on Stalingrad.

The first fifteen months of the Red Army's resistance thus represent an almost exclusively Soviet achievement. Throughout this defensive phase the Russian command was preparing to make the weight of the Red Army effective in a different way. On the Karelian Isthmus I saw how much the Russians relied upon massed artillery and steamroller concentrations of tanks and infantry to break the Mannerheim line. In their long withdrawals from White Russia and across the Ukraine and the Don steppes they gradually perfected an elaborate method of defense in depth, and also anti-tank tactics to make use of their new anti-tank weapons. Eventually, in the winter of 1942–43 and in the campaign of the summer just ended, they demonstrated that they could conceive and execute a well-timed offensive.

These achievements and this progress were due as much to

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intelligence and alertness and adaptability as to moral fiber. Hitler inherited a technically expert military élite with traditions dating back to Frederick the Great. But the master strategists of the Wehrmacht were first checkmated and then confounded by a virtually upstart military machine. This was not an accident, as we clearly see when we retrace the major steps of the Red Army's evolution in more detail.

II

One of the lessons learned in Finland had to do with the amount of authority that should be delegated to the political commissars. Following the purges of 1936–37, the commissars had returned to the Red Army provided with all the necessary powers to check on the loyalty of every officer. But in Finland they often showed themselves too zealous and they often insisted on too rigid control over strictly military decisions. I was later told that this had accounted for more than one of the Russian setbacks during the Finnish campaign.

During the Russian Civil War and in the years following the commissars had been primarily political. They were security officers who propagandized for the Communist ideology. But they had become much more than that. They were a combination of army chaplain, educational director, propagandist and efficiency expert. Within a month after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Presidium Council issued a significant new decree (July 16, 1941) specifying precisely the future functions of commissars in the Red Army. This decree did not refer to them as "political" but as "war" commissars. It was based upon Stalin's conception: "If the commander is the head of the regiment, the regiment's commissar must be its father and soul." In the new decree the commissar's task of political and party work in military units was not even mentioned until the final article. The chief emphasis was placed on his responsibility "for fulfillment of the fighting task." He was to be "the moral leader of his unit, the first defender of its material and spiritual interests;" he must "inspire the troops to fight," must popularize the best men and commanders and "carry on a merciless fight against cowards, panic-mongers, deserters. . . ." It was also his job to hear and remove just grievances of the troops. In a word, the Red Army commissar's first task was the building of morale. It still is.

Brigadier General Philip Faymonville, chief of the U. S. Army supply mission in Moscow, confirmed my opinion that morale

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building is the commissar's chief function. "The whole Russian Army," he said, "feels that while the commissars are there wrongs won't go unrighted, that grievances will be heard and that any serious delinquencies will be reported to the top. This has a salutary effect on military commanders. They know that the morale of their men is high and that they have got to produce the goods themselves. The system keeps officers as well as men on their toes. The office of our Inspector-General is not nearly so thorough as the commissar system is, nor does it operate so swiftly. Another important thing is that since the commissar system is a selective system it is almost bound to bring the best men to the top. The commissar goes into the attack with his outfit, and often leads it. Thousands of commissars have been killed in action, but there were other thousands of well-trained men ready to take their places."

For the first sixteen months of the Russo-German war the Red Army operated with officers and commissars on the dual-command basis. Through all the withdrawals and reverses, culminating in the black summer of 1942 when the Nazis infiltrated into Stalingrad and surged up into the foothills of the Caucasus, its fighting morale remained amazingly high. Allied military observers on the spot had to admit that the powerful leadership of the Russian commissars was a real factor in this performance.

Nevertheless, the dual command authority was finally removed in October 1942. Significantly, this was the moment when Marshal Stalin was preparing the first great Russian counter-offensive. Many Allied officers who had not been in Russia during the present war leapt to the conclusion that the commissar system had failed and was being abolished. This seems to me an error. Doubtless the high command wished to give the military commanders in the field complete freedom of decision in the great and complicated offensive action directly ahead. This was now possible, for Stalin had finished the reorganization of his general staff and had evolved an imposing number of commanders upon whom he could rely. More important, I think, was the fact that in sixteen months of incessant combat the Red Army's 300 divisions had suffered heavy losses in officers. In its commissars the Red Army possessed a unique reserve officers' training institution which had been functioning, not hundreds of miles from the scene of combat, but in the front lines. Under the dual command system every commissar from the rank of lieutenant up to colonel and general had been going to school under shellfire. The commissars,

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especially those of higher rank, had participated in every strategic decision; had been in daily contact with commanders with twenty or more years of experience behind them; had seen which operations succeeded and which failed, and could judge why.

Thanks to the commissar system, then, the Red Army possessed the finest battle-tried reserve of officer material of any army in the present war. All the commissars lacked was certain specialized technical instruction. The October decree therefore provided that the most capable commissars should be withdrawn for courses of three or six months at officers' training schools. By the spring of 1943 the Red Army had them back again in active service, their experience at the front supplemented by new technical knowledge. Meanwhile the remaining commissars, and other new ones, continued their former work. Now, however, there was a single military command in every unit.

III

Following the reorganization of the Red Army after the Finnish war and the revision of the commissar system in July 1941, Stalin found himself confronted with the need of making changes in his high command. During the Finnish campaign he had relied upon his old comrade of civil war days, Marshal Klementy Voroshilov. The results had been disappointing. In the first months of the Nazi invasion Marshal Semion Budenny, another of his close friends, had failed disastrously to hold up the German advance across the Ukraine. In late October 1941 both Voroshilov and Budenny were withdrawn to train new armies in the rear. This was the first step toward the building of the present high command. Stalin must have found the decision difficult to take. The fact that even in the case of these old friends he acted so impartially testifies to his peculiar value as a supreme commander. Later he took the same stern line with Marshal Semion Timoshenko.

From the time of the eclipse of Voroshilov and Budenny until the Russians launched their offensive of November 19, 1942, the commanders of the Red Army remained cloaked in anonymity. The Soviet press rarely published the names of army corps commanders or other generals, though occasionally they appeared in lists of those receiving high decorations. Younger men — many of them surprisingly young — were becoming major generals, lieutenant generals or colonel generals, and were distinguishing themselves. But month after month they were denied the privi-

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lege of becoming popular heroes. Sometimes in Moscow we used to wonder why there were so few names on the Russian side of the war. Eventually we learned that the Government's policy barred publicity until commanders had completely proved themselves in battle and until victories on a great scale could be celebrated. In the long interim the sifting out of colonels and generals and the advancement of the ablest continued unheralded to the Russian people or to foreign correspondents. When at last the Russian people learned the names of the new marshals and generals these were already turning the Nazi tide at Stalingrad or throwing back the German invaders.

The first evidence of important changes in the Soviet high command came in August 1942, when General Gregory K. Zhukov was appointed vice-commissar of national defense directly under Stalin. Until then this important post had been held by Marshal Timoshenko — although the Moscow newspapers carefully failed to mention that fact. Rostov had just fallen, suddenly and without the customary yard-by-yard Russian resistance. Timoshenko commanded all the troops in that lower Don area. The censorship did not permit us to point out the fact that Zhukov had succeeded Timoshenko as Stalin's right-hand military man — and American editors forgot to inquire who had been Zhukov's predecessor. So American newspapers for the next five months continued to comment on Marshal Timoshenko's defense of Stalingrad, unaware that the third old-time Red commander had been relegated to a comparatively unimportant zone of activity because of the catastrophically swift German break-through at Rostov on July 25.

It was not until September 13, when the battle for Stalingrad was just beginning, that correspondents in Moscow got their first inkling of the dimensions of the collapse which had occurred at Rostov. The second and most drastic reorganization of the Red Army general staff and field command which it had precipitated had of course also been unknown to us. But on that day *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the Red Army official newspaper, made the following revealing declaration: "We have everything to mince Fascist forces at approaches to any town. All these possibilities were available during the defense of Novocherkassk and the German drive on Rostov. But they were not fully utilized. Some cowards and panic-mongers fled the field of battle and leaders lacked the decision to deal mercilessly with the cowards and faithless. Novocherkassk and Rostov, prepared for impregnable defense,

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were captured by the enemy." To the best of my knowledge, this is the only case to date in the Russian war where important towns have not been defended with savage stubbornness. The commanders involved were held rigidly responsible. Timoshenko was probably saved from complete disgrace by Stalin's remembrance of the elderly Ukrainian warrior's past services to the Soviet Union.

The disaster at Rostov revealed where fatal weakness still existed in the Red Army machine and paved the way for the great comeback between November 1942 and February 1943. Immediately the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to younger generals, men of strong physique and greater competence in modern warfare. Lieutenant General Vassili Chuikov, who commanded the 62nd Army inside Stalingrad itself, later gave Henry Shapiro of the United Press a vivid account of the fighting in the Volga city. Chuikov said that when he took command Stalingrad was already a flaming inferno. "Our units were tired," he said. "There were many whining pessimists in the army. I threw these panicky people out of the army right away and set to work. I told our men we could not retreat beyond the Volga. . . . I believe that nowhere in this war was there such bloody hand-to-hand combat. Nowhere else were bayonets and hand grenades used so widely as in Stalingrad. . . . Lieutenant General Rodimtzev's division was first to arrive there and received the fierce German blow. Rodimtzev told me, 'We will fight to the last man but we shall not leave the city.' . . . Our soldiers had only one idea. Stalin had ordered us not to retreat."

At the time they were commanding this battle, perhaps the decisive battle of the war, the names of Chuikov, Rodimtzev and the other generals with them were known only to a few thousands among Russia's many millions of civilians. The most striking feature of these and the other new military commanders was their comparative youth. Very few of them are more than 50; most are in their early or middle forties. Yet most of them are fighting in their third or fourth war. On the Rzhev front, Leliushenko was a lieutenant general at the age of 39; Lieutenant General Rodimtzev, one of the heroes of Stalingrad, was only 36. At 50, Colonel General Andrei Yeremenko, who commanded the southern pincers which recaptured Kotelnikovo and liberated Rostov, was one of the oldest army group commanders on the entire Don front. Lieutenant General Malinovski, who served with Yeremenko, was but 44. Such ages have become the norm in the upper hierarchy of the Red Army.

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At last when the Red Army had smashed the German and German-satellite armies back across the Donets and virtually to the points where they had started in June 1942, the veil was lifted and the dominant personalities of the new Russian high command became known to the world. Stalin meanwhile had emerged as a marshal, a title which his leadership had unquestionably won, especially since much of the grand strategy of Stalingrad seems clearly to have been his. Zhukov had also become a marshal. Vasilevsky, who had been promoted a marshal in February, was Chief of Staff. These three planned the great counter-offensive. Marshal Alexander Novikov, chief of the Red air force, also had won his final elevation in the Stalingrad operations. Now, like Napoleon, Stalin distributed the greatest laurels after they had been won on the field of battle — to Marshal Nikolai Voronov, chief of artillery, and to a long and still growing list of generals, men like Rokossovsky, Vatutin, Tulenev and Golikov. It is doubtful that many further substantial changes in the high command will occur in the course of future hostilities. The men were there, and they have been found.

The significance of the victory at Stalingrad and the successful winter offensive which followed can scarcely be exaggerated. The Red Army had already demonstrated its ability at defense in depth. Now it revealed its mastery of great encircling movements and annihilation tactics. Nothing that Hitler's Wehrmacht had achieved in two summer campaigns in Russia outdid the paralyzing speed and sureness of the Red Army's winter blows.

IV

Coincident with its strictly military evolution the Red Army had also undergone other changes of psychological and political importance. Today much less than formerly does it have the conformation and appearance of a "workers' and peasants' army." Stalin has rewarded his victorious officers and soldiers with embellishments which make it more of an élite within the Soviet state than any Soviet body has ever been in the past. Russian officers now wear huge shoulder epaulets adorned with gold stripes. Those above the rank of colonel also have bright red stripes on the sides of their trousers. Dress uniforms have become much more elaborate. During the first eighteen months of the war, officers on leave in Moscow did not have to concern themselves much about personal appearance beyond a reasonable degree of neatness. Often they wore their frontline uniforms and their

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clumsy but warm felt boots and carried as many bundles as was convenient. These things are now strictly forbidden. A Russian officer must wear his best uniform in the cities; he must be a reminder to the general public that this army represents something special — that it has class and position.

Russian soldiers still address their commanders as "Comrade Colonel" or "Comrade General." But various developments make the degree of comradeship, to say nothing of equality, rather doubtful. Officers' clubs (as C. L. Sulzberger pointed out recently in the *New York Times*) have now been established for the first time in the history of the Soviet Union. At the Rzhev front I saw Russian women in uniforms (the WACS of the Red Army) performing many of the duties of orderlies at various headquarters. A few months later, despite the strain on manpower, it was decided that Red Army officers should have male orderlies to serve their meals, polish their boots and perform similar routine services. A few years ago the suggestion of any such development in the proletarian Red Army would have been denounced by most Communist leaders as a betrayal of the Revolution.

The Soviet plan for postwar reconstruction, announced in outline form in Moscow on August 22, 1943, contains provision for nine military schools to train boys between 8 and 17 years of age to become officers in the Red Army. Named in honor of Alexander Suvorov, who defeated Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava, these schools recall in some respects the cadet boarding schools of prerevolutionary days.

All this indicates that there is a new tone in the Red Army today. It is the tone of an élite military organization which places increasing stress on nationalism and less — considerably less — emphasis on revolutionary doctrines. The Red Army man has become the first citizen of the USSR. Indeed, the Red Army officer has probably come to rate more privileges and public distinctions than most representatives of the Communist Party.

Psychologically as well as physically, then, this is a new Red Army. It is adorned with the prestige of great achievements and seems slated for a lifetime of unrivalled power. This development has occurred coincidentally with a steady crescendo of nationalistic faith among the people of Russia as a whole. It was not an accident that the Kremlin, from the beginning, publicized this as "the patriotic war," or that the newest decorations have been named after the great military heroes of Russia's past: the order of Alexander Suvorov; the order of Mikhail Kutuzov, who

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confounded Napoleon; the order of Alexander Nevsky, who repulsed the Teutonic knights in the battle of Chudskoye Lake some 700 years ago. Among the various revolutionary decorations, including those of the Red Banner and the Red Star, only that of Hero of the Soviet Union and the Order of Lenin rival or surpass the distinction of these new nationalistic orders.

However, the extent of the Red Army's power inside the Soviet federation in the next generation may depend in the end on whether it has served chiefly for the protection and security of the Soviet state or whether it has become an instrument for another imperialism. So far, one can say truly that its chief motivating force has been the flame and faith of Russian nationalism.

V

The true stature of the Red Army is now known throughout the world. What has made it so great? On the technical side I am not qualified to offer judgment. But after experience in seven theaters of war from Norway to China a correspondent may be allowed to mention various important factors which, as he watched the Red Army in training centers and in action around Rzhev, seemed to him of paramount importance to its success:

1. Hard work coupled with intelligent direction. From early days, the training of the Russian Army has been based upon physical endurance, alertness and efficiency.

2. The development of leadership, from the top all the way down. A factor here has been the availability of an exceptional number of officers with more than twenty years of service and combat experience in several wars.

3. Powerful and accurate artillery. It was the Red artillery alone which broke the Mannerheim line at Summa, thereby precipitating the Finnish collapse. Against the mechanized German divisions its devastating fire has again and again played a decisive rôle — against the German tanks quite as much as against the infantry. A Red artillery general informed me proudly that the Russian artillery school, one of the two oldest in the world, was then celebrating its 138th anniversary.

4. Early concentration upon the designing and development of tanks, with a particular aim of avoiding inflammability.

5. The development of first-class pursuit planes, from the early Yak and Mig to steadily improved models. The progressiveness of Soviet military aviation has been recently demonstrated by the new models produced in the spring of 1943 — the Yak-7; a new

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attack bomber known as the Ilyushin-4; a new heavy bomber (the four-motored TB-7); and a dive-bomber called the Petliakov-2. The Red air force, although long outnumbered by the Germans, has seldom been outclassed in its planes.

6. Ruthless elimination of incompetents and a capacity to learn quickly from past mistakes.

7. A willingness to buy time with space and with the bodies of Soviet soldiers so long as this was necessary.

8. An unusual and effective system for building and maintaining the morale of troops. This system, based primarily on the commissars, was greatly aided by the Red Army's belief that its efforts and sacrifices were not being vitiated by graft and incompetence in the Government and in the civil administration behind the lines, a belief absent to a demoralizing degree in the Tsarist armies of 1914–1917.

9. The fact that this is the first Russian army, in modern times at any rate, in which every soldier is well-clad, well-shod and adequately equipped with rifles and small arms.

10. The fact that it is the first Russian army in history consisting of a literate soldiery. The overwhelming majority of Red Army soldiers can read and are fighting for a government which taught them how to read and which has opened the door to officers' commissions to any man of ability, regardless of his humble origins.

11. The transfer, in time, of a large percentage of Soviet industries from western Russia to safer regions further east and the expansion of an "inner industrial citadel" behind the Urals.

12. The gradual arrival of large amounts of American and British war materials. When British and American planes and tanks at last began reaching Russia in important quantities in the spring of 1943 they were of great help to the Red Army in stopping the German offensive along the Kursk salient and in launching its own summer offensive. From early August of 1943 onward, Soviet aviation enjoyed parity in the air with German aviation for the first time, and this parity certainly could not have been achieved without the American and British contribution of several thousand pursuit planes and bombers. The diversion of some enemy air forces to deal with the British and American air attacks in Western Europe and the Mediterranean also helped.

13. The logical development of a broadly-conceived over-all plan, both for defense and offense, under the leadership of Field Marshal Joseph Stalin. An example of Stalin's determination and

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boldness was the decision to hold Stalingrad at whatever cost, and to sustain any sacrifice in troops however enormous, until the moment came to trap and destroy 250,000 German soldiers.

By now it is clear that the Soviet Union will emerge from this war with the greatest and most efficiently organized army in either Europe or Asia. The Red Army will be enormously powerful and its new military aristocracy will wear an aura of well-earned glory. But it will be standing guard over a country of which vast areas have been ravaged, whose 160,000,000 civilian inhabitants (more or less) are destitute, and whose economy is gravely dislocated. Above everything else Soviet Russia will need a long period of peace for rebuilding and rehabilitation. The Red Army will be able to assure it.

Soviet Russia's present allies may easily become obsessed by fear of the Red military colossus, even though, in the absence of any reliable system of general security, its size cannot really be considered out of proportion to the one-sixth of the earth's surface which it is designed to protect. They must keep in mind the enormous price which the Russian people have paid for their national existence and their form of government, and the saving in British and American lives which their heroism effected. Only in that way will western nations be able to overcome their fear and join with the Soviet Union in confident coöperation. A nation which has sacrificed the lives of from fifteen to twenty million of its soldiers and civilians — perhaps more — and has emerged triumphant from the holocaust can scarcely fail to be conscious of its stature. It will require respect and understanding. I think that it will be willing, in turn, to give respect and understanding to others. Success in achieving this relationship may be hard to obtain, but it is indispensable if the world is to know an era of peace.

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ITALY AND HER NEIGHBORS AFTER THE WAR

By Count Carlo Sforza

WE need not be astonished at the length of the crisis precipitated by the generation of 1914. The war of 1914–1918 and the uneasy armistice which lasted until 1939 were stages of a revolution, and revolutions go on for a long while. The nature of the revolution is now plain. We are witnessing, and enduring, the breakup of nationalism.

We drew our concept of absolute national sovereignty from the idea of absolute monarchy, checked first by what remained of feudalism and, later on, by the liberal thought of the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century found this concept useful in its struggle for liberty. But when the idea of absolute national sovereignty reached its final forms — the "100 percent" patriotism of the democracies and the totalitarian state of the dictators — it became more dangerous than it had been under the kings. The internecine wars of nationalism are the political counterpart of the final excesses of religious absolutism which saw the persecution of the Protestant minority in France and the Catholic minority in England.

The concept of absolute sovereignty dies slowly. Its hallmark is strife. During the Middle Ages the Italian cities fancied themselves absolute sovereignties; and they never ceased fighting with one another. Even the prophetic genius of the Florentine Dante could not separate itself from the hatreds of the time: Dante's denunciations of Siena or Pisa were as full of venom as the tirades of Hitler and Mussolini in 1939 and 1940.

On the day when the excesses of nationalism have been finally buried in disgrace and ruin we shall move with more speed toward the next stage of man's political development. The "realists" who can see no future less bloodstained than the past forget that problems can come to a head in certain periods and be disposed of. During long periods of history the "best people" believed that slavery was a law of nature. But the idea of slavery has been totally discredited; and more was done to wipe out slavery during the forty years which followed the American Civil War than during ten preceding centuries. To add a minor example: those of us who were young at the beginning of this century have seen the immemorial institution of the duel dis-

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appear in our own time. When I tell my children that I fought a duel as a young diplomat they listen to me enchanted, as if I were telling a story from "The Thousand and One Nights."

Our revolution, then, is the breakup of the dogma of nationalism. But it has a secondary aspect. Its rigors are exacerbated by the resistance of those to whom nationalism gave special privileges. In every nation certain groups delude themselves into believing that by maintaining the old and unhealthy fevers of nationalism they will be able to retain a privileged economic position. It is largely from within those groups that we hear the protest that it is unpatriotic and downright wicked for people to propose the relinquishment of a degree of national sovereignty to an organization larger than any single existing state. That protest was disastrously effective, in 1935 and 1936, in preventing the application of sanctions against an aggressor state and thus in destroying the one agency which might have prevented the current war. Powerful groups in France and Great Britain would not permit their dear Mussolini to be seriously harmed; they expected that he would, indirectly, protect their interests. But two world wars in the same generation may have given those groups a clearer understanding of where their true interests lie.

II

Europe will not move toward unity at the wave of a magician's wand. The theoretically splendid plans showing how the interests of every European nation can be harmonized in one organization, immediately, are not political possibilities. It is wiser to begin in a smaller way. One accomplished fact is more significant than a hundred theories or a thousand exhortations.

What is needed in Europe is a concrete example of unity between nations, in one part of the Continent. Shown an open door, other nations will enter. Italy and France can give the example. When this war is over, no Italian will dream any more of a reconstituted Roman Empire. Frenchmen will not carry in their minds pictures of Louis XIV on the far side of the Alps. Both nations will be lifting themselves from the dust. They can most easily get to their feet by the simple and natural act of stretching out a hand to one another. The people of Italy know that they have no reason to fear France. They know that they can live in harmony with Frenchmen. I spent the first five months of 1940 in Provence and Languedoc. In the little hill towns, where people are so hard working and happy, I spoke of Mussolini's plan for

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an attack on France. Everyone thought it impossible. "Nearly thirty or forty percent of our population is Italian," people said. "We understand each other. We have intermarried. We live together happily." The spirit of the French people and the spirit of the Italian people are harmonious.

Will a passion of hatred for Italy sweep over France after the war? I do not believe so. One finds today exactly the same breadth of spirit among the young officers of the Fighting French as I found in those lovely towns of Provence. Those young men enter battle to risk their lives willingly. They shy away uncomfortably when subjected to anti-Italian tirades. Frenchmen know that the spirit of Fascism was alien to the spirit of Italy. They know that the Italian heart was never in Mussolini's war. France knows, too, that this nationalist war is also a class war. It was the Prime Minister of France, Poincaré, who rescued Mussolini from his mad enterprise at Corfu — his first defiance of the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Shortly before Poincaré's death I asked him why he had saved Mussolini on that occasion. "My majority was enthusiastic about Mussolini," he replied. "He was being called the savior of the West." The story was the same at the time of the Fascist invasion of Ethiopia, and this time the French hand that was put forth to save Mussolini was the hand of Laval.

Surely by now there can be few, in Italy or in France, who do not see the essential fact that the responsibilities, the wrongs, the treasons of the tragedy which culminated in the "stab in the back" of Mussolini against France were the result of a line-up of interests and emotions which placed Frenchmen and Italians on one side and Frenchmen and Italians on the other side. Recriminations are beside the point. The fact is that the people of Italy are now and for centuries have been democrats, that the people of France are democrats, and that the common interest and the common ground for harmony between these two peoples is democracy.

III

Michelet wrote once that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees." It is one of those facile generalizations, tempting to repeat and quite false. The opposite is true. The Mediterranean is the center of Western Europe and the frontier of Europe is the Sahara. The armed forces which have been locked in battle for the mastery of Europe on the terrain between the Sahara and the south coast

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of the Mediterranean were drawn to that region not by theory but by the facts of geography and of history.

The Mediterranean is a common fatherland for all those peoples who live about it. Men experience the same feelings at the foot of the Leaning Tower of Pisa, on the quays of Zara, or in Santa Sophia at Istanbul. Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine are more European than African or Asiatic. The Turkey of Constantinople was certainly European; and if the Turkey of Ankara is less so, that is because the proud genius of Kemal Ataturk preferred to turn his young republic as a pioneer of civilization and strength toward the East rather than toward the West, where he believed it would always be looked upon as a poor relation. When one perceives the true meaning of the Mediterranean world, which with Greece and Rome was the supreme inspiration of the West, one sees more clearly the frail nature of our national boundary lines. What *are* the national boundary lines of Europe? Are they those of Vienna of 1815? Those of Paris of 1855? Or are they those of Versailles of 1919? Why cannot the truth about this question of national boundaries be spoken plainly? Some of the boundaries seem good to us today, some seem bad; all, in point of fact, are merely a set of scars left after violent surgical operations. The day will come when boundary lines drawn with pencil will replace those now drawn on the map in indelible ink. It is blindness not to see that political good sense and moral and social good health demand that these hermetically sealed frontiers be opened.

For different reasons France and Italy will be greatly weakened by the war. Italy will have the terrible responsibility of having submitted to Fascism too long. France will not be able to escape an extended period of internal purification, which the timid are already calling civil war, but which others perceive to be merely the final chapter of the French Revolution, never accepted by an important French minority. And France and Italy will both be weakened in the field of international action. After their mistakes of the past, and in their weakened condition, neither country can command the respect of the world through force; they can obtain the world's respect only by winning its admiration.

In the world of tomorrow it will be easier for a country to behave greatly than to be undistinguished. To move in harmony with the law of the future will be to act greatly. To dream of the restoration of unworthy dynasties is one excellent way of violating that law; another is to insist upon continuing to think of

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European nations in terms of watertight compartments. There must be more room to breathe in the Europe of tomorrow.

Arch-Italian that I am, I hope with all my heart that those marvellous centers of western civilization, Italy and France, England and Spain, Portugal and Holland, will continue to enrich the world with their special philosophy, their particular art and their individual traditions. But tomorrow it will not be enough for any man merely to say: "I am Italian," or "I am French," or "I am Spanish." We shall be Italians and Frenchmen and Spaniards, certainly; but we shall think of ourselves also as citizens of a European and a world organization. Hitler has done us a good turn or two in that direction in spite of himself: he has talked about the unity of Europe in the same words that Mazzini used in 1850.

I am among those who distrust too exact blueprints of the future. Briand's plan for uniting the Continent was harmed by its neat label, "The United States of Europe," precise as a postage stamp. Some concrete acts inspired by the idea of union between France and Italy must be achieved. But we must leave open for the present whether the first steps should be taken in the sphere of politics or in that of economics — such as the establishment of joint central banks, a common currency and equal opportunities for trade and labor. If we try to be too precise today we risk sounding utopian. What matters is the moral will: where there's a will there's a way.

When France and Italy give the great example their neighbors will follow, bringing added strength and added harmony to the new constellation. It is worth noting that the Swiss have been helped in withstanding the impact of two world wars upon their national unity by the fact that Switzerland is composed of people of three nationalities, French, Italian and German. Had there been only two, the strain would have been greater. It is for this reason that the adhesion of a free Spain would be most valuable to whatever organization France and Italy create.

Some sort of union between Spain, France and Italy would inevitably attract other neighbors. It would exert a helpful influence on the solution of North African problems. France has had splendid proof of the loyalty of her Arab troops, but it should not be forgotten that before the war the Arab people were restless from Syria to Morocco. The weakness of Marshal Lyautey's great work was that it was based on the interests of the feudal Moroccan chiefs. Their privileges and their ribbons

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of the Legion of Honor kept them content, but the silence of the masses was menacing. The situation in Algeria is not much better. Since 1914–1918 there has been a complete revolution in the attitude of the "natives," as we naïvely call them — as if we were not all "natives" of some place. The union of the three most important names of the Mediterranean would strengthen the position of Europeans in North Africa and the Near East without involving any threat of aggression, and that in turn would result advantageously for the Arabs themselves, who would be able to look forward to the day when they could enter the new Mediterranean Commonwealth as a national entity. There is nothing utopian about this. The Arab world needs only an Arab Kemal to be one again, as it was centuries ago. And our most practical western interests should teach us not to hold blindly to our old prejudices of race and empire. Do we want to maintain the better part of our old position among the Oriental peoples? If so, there is only one way to do it: to accept new views of social and moral equality.

Among other results, the revival and integration of the Arab world might bring closer the solution of the Jewish problem. This cannot be solved within the narrow confines of Palestine; it can only be solved within the framework of a territory which embraces Syria and the region of the Euphrates, much of it desert land today but a prosperous and flourishing area at the time of the Roman Empire. With irrigation for agriculture and with industrialization to care for a larger urban population, it could become a new fatherland for the Jews, one much nearer their hearts than the Uganda, sometimes spoken of as the alternative. Greater strength for the Arabs, hence less fear of the Jews, is the pre-condition for Arab-Jewish harmony. Greater security, particularly economic security, for all the Mediterranean countries is the pre-condition for harmony among them all.

That security can be achieved only through mutual help. French capital and industrial strength, Italian industry and manpower, Spain's exports and her special import requirements dovetail; the one greatly strengthened body which the three united countries would form could provide the stabilizing influence that the whole Mediterranean area needs to pursue the solution of its problems in peace. The old slogan of "balance of power" inspires nothing but fear. But it would be apparent to anyone that by its nature the Mediterranean union could not

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be a force for aggression. Yet if a new spirit of national hegemony arose elsewhere it would be a bulwark of security for all.

IV

In August 1942, the Congress of Free Italy in America which convened at Montevideo unanimously approved a political program which I had formulated. The eighth point read as follows: "The Italians will coöperate with courage and serenity toward the solution of any international problem concerning them, on only one condition: that there will be no discussion of Italian problems as such, but of Italian sides of European problems." A year later the wisdom of that formula is still more plain. There is no Italian problem. There are Italian, French, Spanish, Jugoslav and Greek aspects of European problems. No lasting or valid action can be taken toward any one part except in relation to the whole.

It is hardly necessary to note here that the interests of the British Commonwealth, which are vital in the Mediterranean, have everything to gain from the establishment of new and closer links between the three great Latin nations. These nations can be united only in a policy of peace and as members of a world organization. An aggressive Latin bloc is just as inconceivable as an imperialistic Switzerland.

Jugoslavia is part of the Mediterranean world. One of the reasons for my hostility to Fascism at its beginning was the certainty that Mussolini would end by making war on Jugoslavia. In the last conversation which I had with him, in November 1922, I emphasized Italy's need of help from the young Slav state in the common defense against the renewed German *Drang nach Osten*, already clearly to be foreseen. Nothing could now be more desirable than to have a federated Serb-Croat-Slovene state join the group of which France and Italy would be the center but in which Jugoslavia would hold an equal rank. In that event, the question of boundary lines which certain backward-looking Jugoslav writers have raised would lose much of its sharpness.

Italy and Jugoslavia together might make an important proposal. It is not certain that the new League of Nations which will rise from the ashes of the old one will wish to have its seat at Geneva, home of too many memories of a not-too-brilliant past. And it is by no means sure that the Swiss, whose traditional neutrality had just escaped the hurricane of war, would wish to have the headquarters of a much more powerful League in their

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territory. Italy and Jugoslavia could offer Fiume and the necessary neighboring territory to the new League as the seat of its sovereignty. Italy and Jugoslavia would be sacrificing territory and claims, but they would gain inestimable moral advantages. And the League would be admirably located between the Latin and the Slav worlds, with one of the best ports of the world at its disposal.

It is unnecessary to say that both France and Italy would be delighted to see Greece add her illustrious name to the new group. A free Italy should voluntarily offer Greece the Dodecanese Islands as proof of her friendship. And the Greeks are too intelligent not to know that what they gained through a voluntary and friendly action would be much more worth having than the same thing handed over to them as the result of a dictate from the conqueror to the vanquished.

V

I said at the beginning that the people of the nineteenth century found the principle of nationalism useful in their struggle for liberty; but the Nation, once a pure goddess, has been transformed little by little into a terrible idol, Nationalism. The word is now synonymous with the most vulgar racism, with anti-Semitism — this socialism of fools. The work of the monster has culminated in two world wars and 30 million dead. The evil can be checked only by a new conception of international relationships, based on a Declaration of the Interdependence of Nations which would be for mankind what the Declaration of Independence was for America at the end of the eighteenth century.

Generations follow one another and their tasks change. The task of tomorrow will certainly still be to protect all independent nations, since each is a treasure-house of art, the disappearance of which would leave Europe and the world poorer. But a new imperative will be ours: to proclaim the new law of interdependence. This law will permit free nations to manage their domestic affairs as they wish, but will insist, under threat of sanctions, that they behave in a way to make war impossible. The social, moral and economic progress of the world depends upon that reform. Without it nothing important can be done, either in the moral or in the economic and social field. France, Italy and Spain would crown the glory of their great histories if they would begin by giving the example.

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF FRANCE

By André Istel

FRENCH reconstruction should be considered in relationship to France's population problem, geographic location and natural resources, historical background and political psychology. This approach may appear ambitious and will be distasteful to a friend of mine who advocates a "League for the Promotion of Lack of Knowledge Between Nations," because, he contends, the more the people know each other, the more they quarrel. However convincing his argument might sound, the main objection to it is that systematic use of a lack of knowledge has been tried over and over again, even in recent times, but the results have not always given full satisfaction.

The population of France has increased relatively slowly during the last century, with a consequent decrease in relation to other countries. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the French population, around 25 million, was about equal to the population of the German Confederation, only slightly smaller than that of Russia, about twice that of Great Britain, and twice that of Italy. In 1940, the French population of 41 million had become smaller than the population of either Great Britain or Italy, had dropped to about one-half of Germany's and about one-quarter of Russia's. And for each 10 French births there were 17 Italian, 27 German, 80 Russian.

French hegemony in Continental Europe, which had been conceivable in the Napoleonic era, became inconceivable in the twentieth century. If French and British officials had pondered over these fundamental facts of demography immediately after the First World War they would have neither hoped nor feared French hegemony in Continental Europe; and the two countries in coöperation might have been able to erect a dyke against German and Italian aggression.

French demographic conditions have been interpreted in certain quarters as a sign of decadence in the French race. But the causes of the relative decline in the birth rate are not physiological. They are chiefly economic. There are good reasons to believe that proper economic and legislative measures could reverse the trend. Careful analysis shows that different causes operate in the cities and in the countryside to lower the French birth rate. In cities, the decline is due largely to cost of living

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and to lack of housing facilities; a well-known French industrial firm, through family support and home-building, substantially increased the birth rate of its employees. In the countryside the chief cause is probably the extreme division of French agricultural property. A peasant reasons that if he has a large family none of his children will have sufficient land. Remedies have been sought in recent years through modification of inheritance laws, but the efficacy of such remedies depends ultimately on fundamental economic conditions, that is, on the possibility of finding means of livelihood for children of large agricultural families.

Since 1940, the French population trend has again moved downward; a decrease in population of about two and a half million had been registered by the end of 1942. Excess of deaths over births accounts for about 600,000,[1] emigration for 400,000, prisoners and workers in Germany for 1,500,000. The last-named will of course return, but many of them in a poor state of health, temporarily or permanently ill-fitted for work; and in any event, their protracted absence is affecting French natality. The average age of the French population, already the highest in the world, is increasing still further. Its health has also deteriorated. Child tuberculosis has made alarming progress. However, the gradual disappearance of alcoholism seems partly to have offset the ill effects of food deficiency among adults.

Another important element of the French demographic situation is the immigration problem. France is more sparsely populated than her eastern and southeastern neighbors and so has attracted immigrants during several decades. There were about two million foreigners in France around 1930. A large part of them were in process of assimilation, due to France's favorable climate and the friendly character of her population.

The influx of foreigners was the result of normal trends, not of a deliberate policy. French opinion in general did not realize how great a contribution foreigners make to national wealth, for they arrive ready to work, sometimes with valuable knowledge, and with the costs of their upbringing and education already met. When France was belatedly struck by the world depression a large number of foreigners were expelled, especially between 1932 and 1936. French policy in this respect was no more shortsighted than that of other countries. Between the two wars almost every nation practised what Professor Jacob Viner has

[1] About half of this excess appears due to increased mortality, and half to decreased natality.

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called "topsy-turvy economics," which means considering the admission of goods, services and men a plague instead of a blessing.

When France is free again, a carefully considered liberal immigration policy would be the most speedy and effective method for increasing the French population. Population is the most vital French problem. The solution of it requires a coördinated plan of economic and legislative measures to increase natality, improve public health and favor immigration.

II

France is located at the west of the small cape of Asia called Europe. Her geography is characterized by extended coastlines along the Channel, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Northeastern France, a flat country linked to the great Asiatic steppes, has for centuries been the road of eastern invasions. France belongs to three civilizations: the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the European.

French natural resources are well balanced, favoring both agriculture and industry. The country has a fertile soil. Several sections are well suited either to mixed farming, cattle raising, fruit growing — particularly in vineyards — market gardening or wheat growing and sugar-beet cultivation. Attempts to grow wheat in unsuitable districts in order to achieve self-sufficiency — at a high cost to the consumer and therefore to the whole French economy — originated in political motives.

France has the largest aluminum ore deposits and iron ore deposits in Europe. It has potash deposits in Alsace sufficient for world requirements.[2] French coal mines, which are relatively poor, supply only about two-thirds of normal requirements. The coal is in thin layers; and there is a lack of "fat coal" for coke, which French metallurgy, in normal times, imports mainly from the Ruhr. France has large reserves of hydro-electric power, fairly well developed and interconnected. French North Africa has important phosphate deposits.

Metropolitan France lacks most of the essential raw materials: copper, lead, zinc, tin, nickel, manganese, oil, cotton, rubber, silk. Thus more than two-thirds of French imports before the war were raw materials, chiefly imported from overseas. If Laval had given due thought to these fundamentals he would have

[2] Germany also has potash deposits sufficient for world requirements, so that a Franco-German potash cartel is practically unavoidable.

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realized the fallacy of attempting to integrate France in a European "New Order." France must be on friendly terms with the Powers which control the sea lanes. France cannot sever her American and British ties without choking from a lack of vital supplies; but neither can she sever her Mediterranean or her European ties without disintegration.

III

France's long agricultural tradition is part of her historic background. The development of industry and the concentration of population in large cities are barely two centuries old. Even today the French population remains almost equally divided between country and cities. French agricultural policy has frequently been based on social and political rather than on economic grounds, for most French Governments have considered the peasant class the mainstay of social stability. And today certain elements in the Vichy Government, looking with suspicion upon industrial growth and wishing to see the whole of France revert to the traditional family life of the peasant and the craftsman, watch with a certain satisfaction how the Nazi conquerors ruthlessly crush French industrial power.

The French Revolution of 1789 did not affect French economic policy deeply. Indeed, the French Revolution did not bring the "people" into power. It displaced one ruling class, the nobility, in favor of another ruling class, the bourgeoisie, which has in fact governed France from 1789 through 1943.[3] Athough the bourgeoisie includes less than ten percent of the French population, it has held its power for two reasons: it controlled all high and medium civil and military permanent offices, and the bulk of the press; and it has maintained an unwritten political alliance with the peasant class. The leaders of French industry and trade have acquiesced in the maintenance of agricultural tariffs, notwithstanding the resulting increase in their own cost prices. They themselves did not suffer. They shifted the burden of the increase to the public by means of tariff protection for French industry, obtained with the help of agricultural deputies. The general efficiency of French agriculture and industry, as well as the general standard of living, suffered from the deal.

French internal politics are a puzzle to most foreigners. When

[3] Even during the *Front Populaire* in 1936 practically all the members of the Government, even the Socialists, belonged to the bourgeoisie; so did virtually all the members of Parliament except the Communists.

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they hear that there are about two dozen different political parties in the French Chamber they decide that they can never learn so many names and simply give up. But when a French elector decides to vote for a candidate, he usually thinks in terms of only four groups: right, center, left, Communists. Often he thinks in terms of only two groups: right and left.

Widely-held opinion to the contrary, the political convictions of the French electorate, as expressed every four years, have shown a remarkable stability for three decades. The figures indicate a slow trend toward the left, with slight intermediary movements forward and backward. Between the wars the swings of the pendulum became wider in both directions: a mildly rightist house after the First World War, followed by a mildly leftist one; a rightist reaction, followed by a "Radical"[4] success; then, between two elections, after a financial scandal, a conservative government with a tinge of Fascist tendencies. The shortsighted financial and economic policy of the conservatives brought the *Front Populaire* into power at the next election, and the economic mistakes of that group caused a swing of public opinion toward the center.[5]

With the French military collapse, the right came into power under Pétain for the first time in more than 60 years — without elections, under duress. French public opinion now links this régime to German oppression, hunger, cold and national humiliation. It is fairly safe to predict that the next swing, at the first elections after liberation, will be strongly toward the left. Those who are flirting with former Vichy enthusiasts converted to the Allied cause are betting on the wrong horse.

Another puzzle to foreign observers was the frequency with which Prime Ministers changed under the Third Republic. This was due to faulty parliamentary methods. Undoubtedly this lack of stability was a great weakness, and every thoughtful Frenchman feels the necessity of reforms in the postwar Constitution so as to attain greater stability. But the contention that French parliamentary instability was the real cause of the French defeat is biased. The same parliamentary situation which existed in 1940 prevailed before the war of 1914, which was won; it did not prevail before the war of 1870, which was lost.

French statesmen have recently lacked character. This was

[4] The *Parti Radical-Socialiste*, whose chairmen were Herriot and Daladier, is neither radical nor Socialist in the American sense. It is in fact a liberal bourgeois party, formerly with anti-clerical leanings, and generally with a tendency toward government ownership of private monopolies.

[5] With Daladier and Reynaud as Prime Ministers.

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not due to a general lack of character of the French people, but to the way politicians were recruited. The French parliamentary system made it in fact impossible for any man to obtain a ministerial position unless elected to Parliament, and in order to be elected a man had to go through such ordeals that many people of standing and character preferred to keep aloof.

This was not new in French politics, but it became tragically important when it was accompanied by the sharp decline in the quality of the French Civil Service. As a result of the first war inflation, the best civil servants left to take business jobs. The permanent high officials, who exercised the effective power, lacked vision. The French General Staff believed in the methods of warfare of 1914, not in mechanized forces or aviation. The civil servants from the *Inspection des Finances* caused loss of war potential and created social unrest by submitting French economy to an irrational deflation between 1932 and 1936. These civil and military officials were the power behind the scenes under the Third Republic. And both became the profiteers of the disaster under the Pétain régime.

As both were typical products of the French bourgeoisie, it is hardly possible that the power of the bourgeoisie will remain unscathed. What form will the change take? There are too many unknown factors for a positive answer. But after the protracted sufferings of the French population it may be prophesied that the *Revolution nationale* of Marshal Pétain will be followed, after the liberation, by another type of revolution coming from much deeper inside the people.

IV

What are the prospects and what are the immediate problems for the postwar reconstruction of the French economy? France will lack every essential — food, fuel, fats, soap, oil, lubricants, fertilizers, seeds, plumbing, rolling stock, medicine, shoes, clothing — the list is almost endless. Yet if it were not for the suffering caused by the shortages they would be the lesser tragedy in the French situation; for they can be remedied in fairly short order.

What of capital goods and productive capacity? For three years, French industry has been systematically disorganized to make it a subsidiary of the German war machine. French industrial production is less than half of prewar output, and only a small part of even this goes to the French population. Notwith-

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standing fictitious paper profits,[6] the bulk of French industry has consumed its inventories, used up its machines, and has been unable to renew or even to maintain its equipment.

The French peasant has been comparatively privileged. He has usually been able to sell part of his production on the black market at great profit, and even those products which are ultimately delivered to the German authorities are paid for at satisfactory prices, for the Germans have francs in superabundance. Peasants are experiencing difficulties in obtaining shoes and clothing, but at least they have food. They are accumulating cash. Agricultural land prices are more than five times higher than in 1940. But agricultural production has considerably decreased owing to manpower shortage and the lack of fertilizers — especially since North African phosphate is no more available — seeds, insecticides, transportation and agricultural equipment. Wheat and sugar-beet production has decreased by one-third, vineyard production almost one-half.

The livestock situation may be even more dangerous. Except for hogs, which seem practically to have disappeared, there has been until now no catastrophic decline in livestock. The number of sheep and cows has been reduced by about one-fifth; the number of oxen and calves has been maintained, although their weight has been considerably reduced; the number of horses has been reduced by about one-sixth. But the growing scarcity of animal feed, and unpredictable German action at the time of retreat, may change the situation drastically before liberation.

Only two things are available in France in larger quantities than ever before: currency, which has trebled in volume since 1940; and bank deposits, which have doubled. They are the products of scientific German looting. German authorities receive a credit of 500 million francs a day from the Bank of France, an equivalent, for a year, to about three times the French prewar budget. As it is much larger than the actual occupation costs, it enables the German authorities to purchase all kinds of goods and services, including industrial shares, control of French concerns, real estate, jewels and works of art — even the consciences of some Frenchmen. Billions are thus thrown into circulation, with the usual inflationary consequences, especially when goods are so scarce. One of the great dangers threatening French re-

[6] In a well-informed article *La France Libre* of May 15 points out that in French industrial balance sheets amortizations are generally computed on the basis of prices much lower than present replacement costs. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* itself admits that a true balance would show a loss of more than five billion francs per year for the whole French industry.

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construction is the moral and psychological deterioration which results. Black markets and frauds are prevalent, the more so as many Frenchmen are glad to infringe regulations dictated by the German oppressor. But the bulk of workmen and employees have to put up with wages and salaries which barely enable them to obtain their share of rationed food: about 1,100 calories against normal requirements of 2,500. They starve and see their children starving.

Even the daily loot of 500 million francs was not sufficient for the Germans. They manipulated the Franco-German clearing account for normal commercial transactions so that in 1942 it piled up a deficit in their favor of 30 billion francs. The expenses of the French Government, including its own budget, amounted in 1942 to about 300 billion francs against receipts of 80 billion. The substance of France is being sucked by Germany.

V

It is a gloomy picture. But two factors give us cause for hope. The first is the nature of the French. Whatever it was that happened to the upper class of French society, it has not affected the fundamental thrift, steadiness and intelligence of the French people as a whole. The second factor is the nature of modern wealth. Modern techniques and mass production have considerably increased the ratio of wealth produced annually to total existing wealth. Although modern wars are more destructive than ancient wars, destroyed wealth can be more speedily restored than was the case in ancient times. The French should be able to take full advantage of modern techniques to recover prosperity. What are the conditions required?

The first, of course, is social order. Perhaps, as we have noted, there is a revolution brewing in France; but we must hope that it will take an orderly course, with a strong administration in power. Allied Governments can help by withholding support from any man or group whose political outlook is not in conformity with the wishes of the majority of the French people, and who, therefore, might sharpen the conflict. The second condition is assurance of peace — "freedom from fear" — without which no sound economic expansion can take place. It is essential for France, as for all other countries, that the United Nations solve this vital problem. The third condition is a program in harmony with modern techniques of production, transportation and distribution.

This condition is far-reaching, economically and politically.

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Every European nation west of Russia is, as a self-contained economic unit, too small for modern methods of production, transportation and distribution. Inability to realize this fundamental fact may have been one of the chief causes of the failure of the Versailles Treaty. Between the two wars the most elaborate methods were devised to prevent increased transportation facilities from carrying more goods, and to prevent increased production facilities from improving living standards. European nations could not afford such a policy without catastrophic consequences. New technical developments, in aviation for instance, make it still more dangerous today.

This does not mean that regional agreements or a European federation would be sufficient to solve the French economic problem. France, like every other country in fact, cannot advance toward genuine prosperity without the attainment of freer circulation of goods and services, of men and of ideas, not only on regional but on international lines.

But there are certain essential problems which France must solve as a member of the European community. Primary among them is the question of foreign trade controls. Undoubtedly such control will be continued. The magnitude and complexity of the task of European reconstruction will make it inconceivable that private businessmen, each acting independently, will be permitted to import foreign products without restrictions. For a while governments will have to control both the volume and the nature of imports. Ex-enemy countries will of course have to be subjected to strict foreign-trade and foreign-exchange control. The practical question is whether necessary controls should be established in terms of separate European national units, as generally contemplated at present, or within a framework of larger units, with United Nations coöperation.

There is one powerful argument in favor of centralized European controls: that they are now in actual operation. They are imposed by Nazi tyranny, of course, for the purpose of plunder and domination. But they do exist. Even unified destruction is unification and holds forth the possibility of unified reconstruction. Those who object to centralized European controls point out that the economic and financial situation in Western Europe will probably differ greatly from the situation in Eastern Europe. But the experience of the United States and Canada, where the economic and financial structure is vastly different in the East and in the West, suggests that such a difference does not prevent

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unity. As the East is mainly industrial and creditor in the United States and the Middle West mainly agricultural and debtor, the two regions are complementary and form an integrated whole. The second objection to centralized European controls is that the same rules cannot be applied to victims and to plunderers. But there is no reason why they need be. Enemy countries will be subjected to such special treatment as will be decided by the United Nations.

At the least, European foreign-trade controls should be imposed on a wider basis than that of single prewar nations. And they should be prepared now, without waiting for the actual liberation of the occupied countries. Once national controls have been allowed to dig in, the vested interests of both capital and labor will exert too strong pressure ever to be overcome.

There is no need of customs duties as long as strict foreign-trade controls are in operation; indeed, they would introduce senseless complications. Will it be possible not to reëstablish inter-European customs tariffs when controls are lifted? This problem should not arise for several years but is worth mentioning now, since a constructive solution would be a great step toward European unification. Certain Americans are suspicious of attempts at the unification of Europe. But surely it could not offer any danger half so threatening to peace (and hence to American interests) as the danger of European anarchy. Europe divided into "zones of influence" between the Great Powers would contain the seeds of war between these Powers. An organized Europe might be a bridge of goodwill between them. In a unified Europe the problems of railroad traffic, electrical interconnection, air traffic, postal, telegraph and telephone communications, and others in addition to the problem of tariffs, could be solved in a way to benefit all the people of Europe and of the world.

VI

We should discuss briefly two other important decisions that France must make in preparation for resuming her own economic life: she must adopt a policy in regard to imports, exports and production, and she must take action to save her currency.

The most urgent needs of relief and rehabilitation will have to be filled by imports. French authorities have submitted a list of needs to the Interallied Committee for Postwar Requirements, and plans are being prepared under United Nations sponsorship. France still has important holdings in gold and foreign securi-

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ties which will aid in the problem of financing these imports.

Some of the needs can be met by French national production. The natural tendency of French producers will be to try to fill more domestic needs than they should, to the detriment of efficient distribution of world goods and of the standard of living of the French people. The avoidance of such an effort to achieve national self-sufficiency will constitute a challenge to French statesmanship. A plan should be worked out for agriculture and industry. It should have two elements: (1) National production should be scheduled according to two lists of goods, quantitatively established, one list for national consumption, one for export. (2) The requirements of national consumption which are to be filled by exports should be listed quantitatively.

France should not try to produce goods which can be produced more efficiently elsewhere. France should concentrate on productions fitted either to her natural resources or to the special qualities of her workers. For example, she should attempt to specialize in the export of all kinds of finished products in aluminium or iron. She should try to avoid exporting aluminium and iron in the form of ore. She should continue to grow wheat only in Brie, Beauce, Nord and Ainse, departments which are favored by nature and where cost prices are low. One of our best young economists, who writes under the name of Robert Vacher, has shown how agricultural production could, under certain conditions, be modified in order to improve living standards. The very extent of the present ruin of France gives her an opportunity to plan her future on a sound basis.

She must take immediate thought of her currency. The position of the franc is not as desperate as German-induced inflation makes it seem. A rate of exchange does not express a currency's relationship to a theoretically stable standard but to other currencies. If the franc has deteriorated, the purchasing power of the dollar and the pound sterling has also been affected. Francs have been printed and French bank deposits have been increased for the purpose of handing over things to the Germans; but dollars and pounds have been printed and American and British bank deposits increased for the purpose of hurling things at the Germans. The military and moral difference may be enormous; the difference in the resulting deterioration in currency is not so great.

Of course nobody can prophesy what the Germans will do in France before their departure, but up to now increases in French circulation, bank deposits and public debt, as well as in prices of

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rationed goods, are not considerably out of line with corresponding increases in the United States and Great Britain. (Black-market prices of goods in France reflect their present scarcity rather than the future value of the franc. Similarly, black-market prices of French banknotes reflect the present frantic desire of trapped men to flee the country rather than the future value of the franc.) Wages have not risen, in francs, more than American and British wages in dollars or pounds. Of course they are much too low; their purchasing power must be substantially raised, either by an increase in the number of francs, or by a drop in prices, or probably by both. The franc should not be considered a doomed currency. Its exchange value will have to be fixed in relation to several factors, including an estimate of future French productive capacity.

Should the franc have a special link with other European currencies? Under the international monetary plans presently under discussion among the United Nations, there would be a general although somewhat elastic link among the currencies of adhering countries. Under modern conditions of government interference, the financial status of each nation has become so integral a part of its economic and political status that no two currencies can be considered strongly linked unless the two nations are also strongly joined economically and politically. A centralized foreign-trade control established in a large section of Europe immediately after the liberation would be an important step toward economic unification and therefore toward real monetary unification.

VII

This bird's-eye view of French reconstruction problems omits many important questions. But the central problem of French revival is a problem of a state of mind. The world is undergoing fundamental changes in structure. Techniques of distribution must be adapted to revolutionary progress in production and transportation. France, struggling out of her ruins, will be in the position of the owner of a good old serviceable car which lies by the roadside after a crash. Will she attempt to patch it up and rattle along in it? Or will she strain all her resources to acquire the new streamlined car which modern techniques can give her? France is confronted by a momentous choice and a great opportunity.

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ENEMY-OWNED PROPERTY: RESTITUTION OR CONFISCATION?

By John Dickinson

IN THE present world conflict the warring governments have appropriated private property widely on the ground that it is enemy-owned. The United States, Great Britain and the countries of Latin America, as well as Germany, Italy and Japan, have taken possession, under various statutes and administrative decrees, of large amounts of property — bank deposits, factories, shares of stock, corporate bonds and patents — belonging to private citizens or corporations of the nations with which they are at war. Germany in particular has by various devices caused the transfer of untold wealth from the unfriendly hands of loyal citizens in Poland, Holland, France, Belgium and other subjugated territories to German concerns or to collaborationist elements. These transfers, often made under the guise of sales, mergers and other voluntary transactions, have resulted in the concentration in Nazi hands of a great part of the productive wealth of the European Continent.

The ultimate disposition of the property thus seized or transferred will constitute one of the problems of the peace settlement. In the midst of the larger and more spectacular political issues then being discussed it is not likely to attract much public interest or attention, especially since it necessarily is enveloped in technical details which tend to obscure the basic issues involved. The purpose of this paper is to present the problem in simple terms and to point out the desirability of early agreement upon the principles to be applied.

There can be little doubt that in the event of an Allied victory an effort will be made to undo the seizures and transfers effected by the Axis Powers. An intention to this effect was announced by the Governments of the United Nations in a declaration issued in the early part of January 1943, in which they state that,

> they intend to do their utmost to defeat the methods of dispossession practiced by the governments with which they are at war against the countries and peoples who have been so wantonly assaulted and despoiled.
>
> Accordingly the governments making this declaration and the French National Committee reserve all their rights to declare invalid any transfers of, or dealings with property rights and interests of any description whatever which are or have been situated in the territories which have come under the

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occupation or control, direct or indirect, of the governments with which they are at war, or which belong or have belonged to persons (including juridical persons) resident in such territory. This warning applies whether such transfers or dealings have taken the form of open looting or plunder, or of transactions apparently legal in form, even when they purport to be voluntarily effected.[1]

There also can be little doubt that the victorious Allies will insist that the Axis Governments disgorge or pay adequate compensation for the property within their own territories belonging to Allied nationals and sequestrated or expropriated during the war. There remains the question of what policy the Allied Governments will pursue with respect to property of Axis nationals which they have themselves seized on the same grounds. What, for example, will the United States do with the credits, shares of stock, patents and corporate obligations belonging to German nationals which it has seized and vested under the Trading with the Enemy Act and its 1941 Amendment? What will Brazil and Mexico do with the German property seized in those countries?

In the latter connection attention may be called to three decree-laws already promulgated by the Brazilian Government, one applying to certain shipping companies and the others to certain banks and insurance companies, which purport to "incorporate in the national patrimony" the interests of Germans and Italians in such concerns. To all intents and purposes this confiscates those interests.[2] In the same connection it is of interest to note one of the recommendations adopted by the Conference of the Twenty-one American Republics, held in Washington, June 30–July 10, 1942. This recommendation is to the effect that each of those Republics adopt, as soon as possible,

> All necessary measures to eliminate from the commercial, agricultural, industrial and financial life of the American Republics all influence of governments, nations, and persons within such nations which, through natural or juridical persons or by any other means, is, in the opinion of the respective government, acting against the political and economic independence or security of such Republic.[3]

It may be that the Brazilian decree-laws do not envisage outright confiscation, but look ultimately to some form of compensation for the expropriated owners. Likewise the recommendation

[1] Department of State Bulletin, January 9, 1943.
[2] Brazil Decree Law No. 4.611, August 24, 1942; Decree Law No. 4.612, August 24, 1942; Decree Law No. 4.636, August 31, 1942.
[3] Pan American Union, Congress and Conference Series No. 39, 1942, Recommendation No. VII, par. 1.

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just quoted may be limited in its reference to the duration of present hostilities; it may not contemplate, as it appears to do, the permanent exclusion of persons or concerns of Axis nationality from the holding of property in those countries. However, the language and tendency of both the laws and the recommendation, as well as of other documents issued by the Allied Governments, are sufficiently ambiguous to raise the question whether the United Nations expect to hold themselves to the same rule which they will doubtless apply to their defeated adversaries. If they do not, what principle will they follow? Some light may be shed on this question by the experience of the last war.

II

Most of the statutes and ordinances under which enemy property has been seized during the present conflict are amplifications and elaborations of those introduced during the war of 1914–1918.[4] That legislation was initially presented under the guise of a two-fold purpose: first, to protect the sequestrating state against the possible use of the property for hostile ends; and, second, to protect and preserve the property for its owners at the termination of hostilities. This was explained by the Alien Property Custodian, A. Mitchell Palmer, in a statement issued November 14, 1917.[5] As the war progressed, the purpose underwent a decided modification. By a clause in the Urgent Deficiency Act, approved March 28, 1918, the Alien Property Custodian was given a general power to sell any property in his custody. It was not clear from the provisions of the Act, nor from the debates, what was intended to be the eventual disposition of the proceeds from the sale of such property. Speaking of this power of sale, Mr. Palmer, in his report of February 15, 1919, used quite different language from that of his announcement of November 1917. He presented the expropriation of enemy property as a measure of so-called "economic warfare," a term then just coming into vogue. "Instead of permitting myself to become a mere conservator of enemy property," he said, "I have tried to make the Trading With the Enemy Act a fighting force in the war." [6]

[4] For a summary of the laws and decrees adopted by the principal countries with respect to enemy-owned property during the First World War, see J. W. Garner, "International Law and the World War." New York: Longmans, 1920, v. I, p. 86–116.

[5] U. S. Committee on Public Information, *Official Bulletin*, November 14, 1917, p. 1.

[6] "Alien Property Custodian, Report of All Proceedings Had By Him During the Calendar Year 1918 and to the Close of Business on February 15, 1919." Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919, p. 15.

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That is to say, the seizure of the property of private concerns of enemy character was avowedly conceived as a measure of hostility against their governments. Implicit in this view is the conception that the property of enemy nationals should stand responsible for the acts of their government, and that private individuals should to that extent be identified with the hostile state to which they belong. In justification of this view, it has been pointed out that new conditions of economic life and new methods of warfare have invested practically the entire citizen-body of a state with military character and value. Today the economic organization of a modern nation is so close-knit and integrated, and the functioning of that organization is so completely at the disposal of the state's military power, that it is said that the old distinction between civilian and military character can no longer be accepted without question. In words of former Secretary of State Lansing:

> In the past . . . the noncombatants of the populations have formed a class which was without military value and which was on that account free from hostile attack. But today each able-bodied individual in a state, though not serving in the armed forces of a belligerent, is a distinct asset in the prosecution of a war. . . . This Great War has been a war of peoples, and not a war of armies and navies alone. Whole nations have been mobilized in the supreme effort to vanquish their enemies. How this manifest fact will affect the rules for the immunity and protection of noncombatants is a question which will require very careful consideration.[7]

This identification of the alien enemy with his government, resulting in the imposition on his property of responsibility for the acts of his government, is the view which dictated the provisions of the Versailles Treaty relating to the disposition of the property of German nationals sequestrated by the Allies. The subject is covered in Sections 297 and 298 of the Treaty. These sections provided that Allied nationals whose property had been sequestrated or expropriated by Germany should be entitled to its restitution or to compensation. However, the property of German nationals which had been seized by the Allied Governments was to be retained by the latter and constitute a fund out of which their own nationals were to be paid the damages owed to them by the German state.[8]

These provisions of the Treaty did not pass without criticism.

[7] Robert Lansing, "Some Legal Questions of the Peace Conference," *Reports of the American Bar Association*, 1919, 238, 245.

[8] *Cf.*, B. M. Baruch, "The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty," New York: Harper, 1920, p. 103–105.

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One commentator referred to them as turning the clock back several hundred years, reviving an ancient barbaric practice, and making private property depend for its security upon preponderance of force.[9] Judge Moore wrote: "I venture to think it directly contrary to the interests of the United States to resuscitate the doctrine that enemy private property found in a country on the outbreak of a war may be confiscated."[10] Opinions such as these had a definite influence in preventing the United States from taking full advantage of the treaty provisions.

The Knox-Porter Resolution of July 2, 1921, provided that the property of German nationals sequestrated by the United States should be retained only until other "suitable provisions" had been made for the satisfaction of claims of Americans against Germany. In 1923 the so-called Winslow Act effected the return of all sequestrated funds of less than $10,000 to their German owners, as well as the payment of $10,000 on each of the larger trusts. In 1926 the Treasury Department proposed an arrangement for discharging American claims against Germany out of annual sums to be received from the latter country under the Dawes Plan and meanwhile returning the sequestrated property outright to its German owners. This proposal failed of adoption by Congress, and the result was a compromise embodied in the War Claims Act of 1928. Under this Act the German owners were to receive immediately 80 percent of their property in kind or cash, and 20 percent in interest-bearing "participating certificates" to be amortized over a period of 25 years out of annual receipts under the Dawes Plan. The amounts not returned, together with other sums appropriated by Congress, were to constitute a fund for the payment of awards for damages entered in favor of American nationals against Germany. After the cessation of annual payments by Germany to the United States in 1933, the Harrison Resolution of the following year stopped all further payments to German owners under the War Claims Act.

A somewhat similar course of action was followed in England. Certain specified categories of liquidated German property were released to the former owners in accordance with the recommendations of the Blanesburgh report of 1924. In 1929 the British and German Governments concluded an agreement providing for the release of German property not finally disposed of at that time.

[9] E. M. Borchard, *American Journal of International Law*, 1924, v. 18, p. 523–526.

[10] J. B. Moore, "International Law and Some Current Illusions," New York: Macmillan, 1924, p. 24.

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Thus in the end there was neither a complete restitution of enemy property to its private German owners, nor a full application of the Treaty provision devoting such property to the satisfaction of the claims of Allied nationals against Germany. The policy and principles were left very much at large, so that no clear guide as to future practice is offered by the experience of the last war. If that experience can be generalized at all, it amounts simply to the fact that during the later stages of the war and immediately after its conclusion the Allies were strongly inclined not to restore or compensate for seized German property, but to apply it for the benefit of their own citizens; but this inclination definitely receded during the years following the peace, so that in the end a large measure of restitution was effected.

Nor can it be said that opinion crystallized during the period of these developments. The divergent views of both statesmen and commentators have left a heritage of confusion and disagreement. The policy of the Versailles Treaty in making sequestrated property liable for claims against the government of the owner found defenders on the practical ground that unless the private property of enemy individuals is thus used, domestic claimants will be unable to obtain compensation, and that it is better for enemy citizens to lose than for our own nationals to go uncompensated.[11] Again, it has been urged that the confiscation of privately-owned German investments in the United States is a justifiable measure of reprisal for Germany's unlawful destruction of the lives and property of American citizens.[12] Professor C. C. Hyde has criticized these contentions.[13]

At present not much attention is being paid to the problem, nor, for that matter, to the general question of how the seized and sequestered property of Axis nationals shall be treated at the termination of hostilities. Instead, active effort is being exerted to deal with enemy property in the manner thought to be most effective for winning the war, and in this country as elsewhere a succession of immediate measures are being taken to liquidate Axis-owned concerns, sell their property and assets, and make use of their patent-rights for the purpose of our own war effort. These measures admittedly constitute "economic warfare" on a scale never before practiced. In the words of a publication of the Treasury Department, "It is the policy of the United States

[11] *Cf.*, *Proceedings of the Grotius Society*, v. VIII, p. 89.
[12] *Cf.*, Garner, *op. cit.*, I, 105–106.
[13] C. C. Hyde, "International Law." Boston: Little, 1922, v. II, p. 240.

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Government to eliminate all financial and commercial activity engaged in by individuals and concerns within the United States whose influence or activity is deemed inimical to the defense of the Western Hemisphere." [14] In accordance with this policy, the Alien Property Custodian on a single day (May 12, 1943) advertised for sale at public auction 285 companies owned by German, Japanese and Italian nationals.

There is sound authority for the view that there can be no criticism of such sales of going concerns owned by enemy nationals for a fair and reasonable price. "The law of nations does not forbid a state to suspend or cut off the privilege of transacting business within its territory for the ultimate benefit of alien enemies, or to convert properties belonging to them into cash assets to be held in trust for the owners." [15] While this is true, it should not be ignored that much of what is now being done in the way of immediate or temporary measures of wartime control will have a pronounced and perhaps determining effect upon what will be done or can be done after the war. A good many long-term decisions may be implicit in the current acts of economic warfare. Those acts may produce situations which cannot later be undone, or can be undone only with great difficulty. For this reason a well-considered long-time policy might be of substantial practical value if ultimate mistakes are to be avoided. There is a very real necessity for coming to grips with principles at the present time rather than again following the purely opportunist course. The issue is one of policy rather than of international law in the legal sense; but because law always embodies or at least illustrates a sense of long-run policy, the available legal materials on the question of the treatment of enemy-owned property are not without value.

III

In primitive warfare whatever belongs to the enemy is legitimate booty, whether seized on the enemy's own territory or on that of the captor. The enemy's towns may be pillaged, his home looted, his personal property seized, his women and children sold into slavery. These harsh practices were sanctioned by the usage of the Romans and were accepted in a spirit of realism as the customary law of warfare by the earliest writers on international

[14] *Administration of the War-Time Financial and Property Controls of the United States Government.* Washington: Treasury Department, December 1942, p. 26.
[15] Hyde, *op. cit.*, II, 241.

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law. However, since modern international law began to take form in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a constant effort has been made to mitigate the savagery of primitive belligerent practices by the establishment of customs more in conformity with the ideas of civilization.

The major efforts have been in the direction of regulating and mitigating the treatment of conquered territories. These efforts culminated in the "Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" adopted at the Hague Conference of 1907, and to which nearly all the states of the world subsequently became signatories. Article XLVII formally prohibits pillage. Article XLVI provides that "private property cannot be confiscated." Article LII prohibits requisitions in kind or services, except for the necessities of the army of occupation, and requires that "what is furnished shall as far as possible be paid for in ready money; if not, the fact of furnishing shall be recorded by receipts and the sums due paid as soon as possible." It thus has become the conventional law of nations that the private property of enemies in occupied or conquered territory is protected against confiscation and only the public property of the enemy government may legitimately be seized.

There has been no such conventional codification of international law respecting the treatment of enemy property within the territory of the other combatant. In this case the original practice has, however, been progressively mitigated by usages and treaty provisions extending through centuries. Significantly, there is an important provision on the subject in Magna Carta to the effect that "if in time of war merchants of the country at war with us shall be found in our country at the outbreak of the war, they shall be attached without damage to their bodies or goods, until it be known to us or to our chief justice how merchants of our country who are then found in the country at war with us are treated; and if ours are safe there, the others shall be safe in our country." When Louis IX arrested the English merchants and their goods in France at the outbreak of war with England in 1242, his conduct was protested as an outrage giving rise to the right of retaliation. Throughout the later Middle Ages a series of statutes and treaties provided that enemy merchants or individuals should be permitted to withdraw with their goods on the outbreak of a war, or to dispose of them, and should have a reasonable time within which to do so. By the early part of the eighteenth century a usage was practically established under which

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enemy subjects were ensured an opportunity of leaving with their property in safety. Where this privilege was guaranteed by treaty, such treaties were considered by some publicists as only an affirmance of common right. Bynkershoek, who regarded the primitive savage practice as still the rule of international law, admitted that in this respect "the law of war has yielded to the advantages of commercial intercourse." [16]

By the middle of the eighteenth century a still more liberal usage began to find its place in treaty provisions. This was to the effect that enemy aliens within a country at the outbreak of a war were to be permitted to remain and continue to enjoy their property during good behavior. Such permission was granted by the English government to French persons in England at the opening of the war with France in 1756, and like permission was given to Spanish subjects in England in 1762. Similar provisions were included in the Jay Treaty between England and the United States in 1795 and in numerous treaties concluded between the United States and Latin American countries during the first half of the nineteenth century.

With the progress of these developments publicists began to maintain by the middle of the eighteenth century that as a matter of law a sovereign who declares war cannot confiscate the property of subjects of the enemy who happen to be in his state at the time of the declaration.[17] Especially was the illegality of such confiscation of property said to be the case with respect to debts owing to enemies at the declaration of war. This view was favored in the United States by authoritative writers like Wheaton and Chancellor Kent.

The courts have not been willing to go so far. In the leading case on the subject, Chief Justice Marshall held that while a declaration of war does not in itself work a confiscation of enemy property within the jurisdiction of the United States, Congress is free in its discretion to confiscate such property by legislative enactment if it decides to do so as a matter of public policy.[18] He left no doubt, however, that the "modern usage" against confiscation was one which "like other precepts of morality . . . cannot be disregarded without obloquy;" and another Chief Justice has said that "confiscations have fallen into disuse . . .

[16] "Quaestiones Juris Publici," b. I, c. 3.

[17] Vattel, "The Law of Nations," b. III, c. iv. (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1916, v. 3, p. 256.)

[18] *Brown* v. *United States* (Supreme Court of the United States, 1814), 8 Cranch 110. (J. B. Scott, "Cases on International Law." St. Paul: West, 1906, 486.)

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from commercial policy, which European nations have a common, and indeed a strong, interest in supporting." [19]

Law thus remits the question to policy; but the growth of law, at least up to the time of the last war, indicated and recognized a strong policy against confiscation. As late as 1918 Lord Finlay in the British House of Lords said that "it is not the law of this country that the property of enemy subjects is confiscated. Until the restoration of peace the enemy can of course make no claim to have it delivered up to him, but when peace is restored he is considered as entitled to his property with any fruits it may have borne in the meantime." [20]

The public policy which lay behind the legal developments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was effectively presented by Alexander Hamilton in his defense of the clause of the Jay Treaty already referred to. Hamilton's argument was that a nation in throwing open its ports and territories to foreign commerce in effect invites alien merchants and businessmen to bring their property within its borders. This invitation carries with it by implication an assurance that the property will be protected. "An extraordinary discretion to resume or take away the thing [property] without any personal fault of the proprietor, is inconsistent with the notion of property." The implied assurance of protection, coupled with the invitation to trade, is a prerequisite of international commerce, and international commerce is a source of national wealth. "Will justice sanction, upon the breaking out of a war, the confiscation of property which, during peace, serves to augment the resources and nourish the prosperity of a state?" Furthermore, he contended that the exercise of the power to confiscate is neither an effective deterrent to war nor a valuable aid in conducting it, while the confiscation of the property of enemies is likely to be but a first step in a general war upon credit and eventually upon all property.[21]

Hamilton's arguments have been elaborated and reënforced by Judge Moore's warning, already quoted. It may well have significance in the light of the recommendation of the Conference of the Twenty-one American Republics, referred to above, that those Republics adopt any measure that they desire in order to eliminate from their economic life the influence of any nation which they regard as acting against their independence or

[19] Chief Justice Ellsworth, *Hamilton* v. *Eaton*, in Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

[20] *Stevenson* v. *Aktiengesellschaft für Cartonnagenindustrie*, 1918, A. C., 239, 244.

[21] Alexander Hamilton, "Works," edited by Henry Cabot Lodge. New York: Putnam, 1904, v. 5, p. 405–421.

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security. Such a recommendation may well have ominous repercussions for the future of American trade and investment in Latin America.

Current thinking in every field is dominated by the impression that the vast changes in technology — industrial, commercial and military — which have occurred in our time, have rendered most past thinking outmoded and necessitate an entirely new approach to old problems. It is pointed out that today international trade is carried on under conditions wholly different from those which prevailed a century or even a half-century ago. The old-fashioned merchant with his warehouse and his counting-house has given place to great international enterprises controlling mines, factories and selling organizations, employing thousands of workers and knit together into a network which sometimes spans half the globe. The question is naturally asked whether it can really be safe to harbor within our borders a segment of such an organization which is under foreign ownership and control. Certainly during a war such instrumentalities are potential sources of great danger. And it is accordingly suggested that war affords an excellent opportunity to rid our economy of these dangerous alien intruders. The question thus raises the whole problem of international commerce and economic relations in the postwar world.

IV

There can be little doubt that from a military standpoint it is more important today than it once was to exert an effective control over a good deal of the enemy-owned private property within the territory of a nation and its allies in time of war. This is of course not true with respect to the small personal savings of individuals invested in real-estate, bank-accounts or the securities of American corporations, which by no stretch of the imagination can constitute a threat to our war effort. It is true with respect to important plants in key industries belonging to concerns which are owned or controlled by alien enemies, and to large organizations of any kind which might become focal centers of enemy influence. Plants in key industries must be utilized for our own war effort without danger of sabotage or ineffective operation. Obviously this means that they must be operated by Americans. And we cannot run the risk of permitting enemy-owned organizations in banking, selling, advertising and other service fields to be used for hostile purposes.

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All these considerations necessitate a policy of sequestrating certain kinds of enemy property — not necessarily all — during the period of hostilities and turning it over to Americans for use and management. The considerations in question do not, however, in themselves require either that the enemy concerns should be sold or liquidated, or that they should now or later be confiscated for the benefit of the United States or any of its citizens. Arguments for sale, liquidation or confiscation must rest on an essentially different basis and must find their justification, if they can, in conceptions of postwar policy.

If the object of these actions is simply to injure the enemy as much as possible during the war, mere sequestration achieves it fully. Sale, liquidation or confiscation embody a conscious or unconscious purpose to achieve some different end. If this purpose is to find its justification in the new conditions of world industry and world economy about which so much is said, it must relate to the operation of these conditions in the postwar world. It cannot, for example, be simply a purpose to help pay the costs of the present war at the expense of enemy-individuals; that is a very old purpose, having nothing to do with the new conditions, and one which is as vulnerable today to the strictures of Hamilton and Judge Moore as it ever was. Again, it cannot be merely the purpose to compensate our own citizens for their losses at the expense of such property of enemy-persons as we can most readily lay our hands on; this is likewise an old purpose to which modern changes in technology are irrelevant. If the new nature of international business and international enterprise is therefore to supply justification for liquidation and confiscation of private enemy property, it must be as an appropriate and legitimate method of meeting certain postwar problems which the new conditions are expected to bring about. This is in fact substantially the justification which in none too explicit form is from time to time being tentatively put forward.

Foreign trade, it is said, is today essentially an arm or weapon of political expansion. This is especially true in the totalitarian states which we are fighting. In totalitarian states, foreign trade "is no longer the private concern of businessmen. They work for their own profit, but, more important, they also serve the cause of the State. . . . They . . . have the financial assistance of the State in order to beat foreign competition. State control of exports has forced upon them a 'national discipline' — a united front against foreign competition. . . . The exporter of a totalitarian

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country is compelled to act as the agent of one big State trust, coördinating his policy with the sales policies of all other exporters and getting full support financially and otherwise from his Government. His foreign competitor, on the other hand, represents only his own private firm." [22]

When this close connection of foreign trade with political aggression is considered, together with the vast scale of foreign enterprise today and its penetration into some of the most important key industries of our own national economy, a strong argument is presented for using the war to eliminate this dangerous alien menace from our midst once and for all. If we do not do so, it is said that we shall have largely fought the war in vain. At its conclusion, even though victorious, we shall still find large segments of our industry being controlled and manipulated from Berlin and we shall still be harboring within our borders a Nazi army ready to resume the task of boring from within in the hope of ultimately taking revenge for its previous defeat. It is urged that the only way to meet this threat is to destroy it utterly by liquidating the German property in America and confiscating the proceeds, so that they may not be used after the war to finance a new German attack upon our economy.

This argument envisages a more or less continuous state of economic war between this country and the nations which are now our enemies. It is based on the assumption that during the present armed conflict we should be preparing for this future economic war against Germany and Italy. But it also involves obviously larger assumptions. It assumes that today foreign trade in general must inevitably be conceived as a kind of warfare. While we have already had an experience of such warfare with Germany, there is no reason to suppose that some other country or countries might not at any time adopt the methods which Germany has used. Against this danger there is likewise need for preparedness. It is not sufficient to prepare for economic war with Germany and Italy alone; we must be prepared for the same kind of war with other countries as well. It should be our purpose in the peace settlement and afterward to organize our international economic relations so as to wage economic war most effectively and successfully. All this is presupposed in the argument that under modern conditions it has become necessary to depart from previous international practice by liquidating enemy-owned concerns in time of war and confiscating the proceeds.

[22] Guenter Reimann, "The Vampire Economy." New York: Vanguard, 1939, p. 229–230.

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The question of whether or not the postwar period shall be a period of economic warfare is one of the most important, if not the most important issue, to be determined by the peace settlement. It lies at the basis of the political settlement as inevitably as economic questions always lie at the basis of political questions. One kind of economic settlement will bring about corresponding consequences from the political settlement as surely as another economic settlement will produce different political results. If a general policy of international economic warfare is accepted as the pattern of the postwar world, much of what is now so earnestly and confidently hoped from the political settlement will inevitably prove abortive from the outset, and even more modest and substantial expectations will also be defeated.

Under the new conditions of trade and industry, national prosperity and the maintenance of internal peace and order depend more than ever upon an adequate flow of international trade. When this flow is impeded beyond a certain point by trade restrictions, the result is a curtailment of both production and consumption in the internal economy of nations, with depressing effects on human welfare. The aggressor in this international economic warfare shuts off some of the normal parts of its foreign trade in order to force other parts artificially. The nation or nations under attack retaliate by erecting barriers.

We saw during the thirties that economic warfare was one of the most important factors in the rapid deterioration of political relationships. It was only a prelude to military warfare — as certain nations undoubtedly intended it to be.

On principle and in the light of experience two attributes of economic warfare should be clear. In the first place, it progressively and drastically diminishes the advantages of international commerce, which requires a large measure of freedom, coöperation and confidence. In the second place, it promotes and intensifies political friction, and is an active agency in bringing on armed hostilities. The whole issue has been summed up by Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, in the following impressive language: "If we want to make sure, this time, that postwar reconstruction policies will really be directed toward winning the peace, we must make sure that the cessation of armed hostilities will not be followed by a continuation of economic warfare."[23]

[23] Leo Pasvolsky, "The Problem of Economic Peace After the War." Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942, p. 18.

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We are all in agreement with this desire to bring an end to economic warfare. What then should be our policy toward the disposition of privately-owned German property in the United States and other Allied countries after the war? If Germany is no longer to be allowed to use her "commercial army" on our soil to wage economic war against us, and if the functions of her businessmen are to be limited to the normal processes of commercial competition, then the legitimate defensive reason for liquidating and confiscating their property disappears. If confiscation should nonetheless be persisted in, it could have only the character of a punitive and retributory measure against industrial concerns and their owners. Such a measure of retribution and punishment would undoubtedly have a strong disturbing and deterrent effect on the establishment of the normal and healthy trade relations which it will be the purpose of the settlement to bring about in the postwar world.

Doubtless it may be urged that in spite of the possible repercussion of punitive measures on trade policy, such measures would be amply justified both legally and morally in the case of many, if not all, German concerns. It is of course a well-known fact that the Nazi Government has for years controlled the acts of German concerns in foreign countries and has in many instances actually intruded itself into their management by undisclosed methods and even acquired some direct or indirect participation in their ownership. There is a tendency therefore to say that German concerns generally should be treated as in fact instrumentalities of the Nazi Government, and, as such, properly subject to expropriation and confiscation. Even, however, if the matter of trade policy is dismissed, the question cannot be dealt with in quite so summary a fashion.

To some extent it has always been true, since the days of Jacques Coeur and the Merchant Adventurers of Elizabethan England, that foreign traders have been implicated in the policies and affairs of their governments. In spite of this the policy embodied in treaties and legislation has favored protecting them as a class with immunity from confiscation. Other measures have been thought sufficient and more appropriate to prevent their allegiance to their own state from becoming a detriment to the country where they traded. So long as they were invited to trade or permitted to trade, their commercial activity was regarded as sufficiently beneficial to justify protecting their property. Their connection with their government was, in other words,

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not deemed an adequate basis for making their property responsible for the debts or acts of that government.

Undoubtedly in recent years the control of totalitarian governments over the acts of their citizens has been closer still. This has not always been with the consent of the citizen himself; often it has been a matter about which he could do nothing. The question for our own determination now is whether in dealing with individuals who are Nazi subjects we are to adopt a Nazi philosophy. Of course if the facts should disclose that any particular business concern was owned, directly or indirectly, by an enemy government, then the existing law should be sufficient to dispose of the case, since the public property of enemy states may always be confiscated. There is obviously no reason for relaxing this rule in favor of the Axis Governments. It may be urged that in many cases the proof will be difficult. Doubtless it will be, but it is hard to see that this makes a difference. The Nazi Government will certainly be gone, and with it will disappear its secret interest in the property. The result would at most be that German private individuals will succeed to this share, and this need cause no concern except on the theory that these individuals ought to be punished for collaborating with their own government.

Nothing that has been said is of course intended to imply that the German state should not be held to pay as ample damages as can be exacted, consistent with sound policy, for its unlawful and uncivilized acts and depredations. On the contrary, what has been said has been meant to emphasize that that is essentially a different question from the one discussed here. If Germany is called on to pay reparations through her Government, the burden of such reparations can and will be spread through taxation over the entire German population. Civic responsibility in this corporate sense for the acts of government is an altogether different thing from attaching such responsibility to particular individuals merely because they happen to have property within easy reach of an enemy state.

The substance of the argument advanced here is accordingly that, at the end of the war, if the United Nations intend to build a durable peace, there should be no confiscation of the privately-owned enemy property which has been seized and sequestrated. It should be held and administered for the benefit of its owners and duly restored to them at the conclusion of hostilities. It is important that a decision to this effect should be promptly

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reached. Knowledge of the nature of the decision, one way or the other, is needed to guide interim policy with respect to the sequestered property. In the absence of such a decision, things may be done — indeed, are apparently already being done — which will make it exceedingly difficult to arrive at a sound policy when the time for decision can no longer be postponed.

For example, the rapid sale or liquidation of many small enemy-owned concerns not important to our war effort would seem to have no other explanation than an intention to eliminate Germans and Italians from participation in our economic life after the war. It points definitely toward a continuation of economic warfare in the postwar period. And the wholesale character of such sales raises a question as to whether adequate effort is being made to preserve the value of the property for the benefit of its owners. In the seizure of enemy-owned patents and the issuance of licenses thereunder to American industry, no provision is apparently being made for the reservation of any royalty to the owner or of any right of subsequent recovery or control of the patent. In the words of a report by a special committee of the American Bar Association dated February 26, 1943, "this policy stated by the Alien Property Custodian [with respect to patents] is considered by your Committee to be outright confiscation or commercial destruction, which is an undistinguishable equivalent."

All these developments, which are proceeding apace, are charting a policy from which it may prove very difficult to recede at some future time when the importance of a different policy becomes evident. The public is little interested in them. But their tendency is to commit us imperceptibly and irretrievably to a continuance of economic warfare in the postwar era. They offer a serious warning of the necessity of making war in a way which will not deprive us of the ability to make the kind of durable peace upon which our hopes are centered.

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GERMAN RULE IN OSTLAND

By Joachim Joesten

WHEN the Nazis occupied the countries which Soviet Russia had annexed in 1939 they acquired their one opportunity to pose as friends and liberators. All the other countries which they had entered regarded them from the start as brutal invaders who had come to kill and to plunder. In none of them was there a chance that they could ever succeed in making themselves popular even if they genuinely wanted to do so. But in the east of Europe things were different. In the Baltic countries, Eastern Poland, and to some extent also in White Russia and the Ukraine, there was a possibility that the Germans could win over a substantial part of the population by introducing a more tolerant and palatable régime than the one they had just ended.

The Soviet régime had not yet had time to assimilate more than a fraction of the local population in the former Baltic States. Large masses remained unreconciled and potentially rebellious, ready to welcome any power that would remove the Bolshevist rule. When the German armies overran Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in midsummer 1941 they were in fact greeted as "liberators" by a large section of the population. Coöperation with the Nazis in Estonia and Latvia was on the whole passive, but a powerful Lithuanian fifth column — Colonel Kazys Skirpa's "Freedom Fighters" — took active part in the campaign against the Red Army.

But Germany then was at the apex of her power, and the Nazi armies were marching east to conquer colonies, not to make friends. They never dreamed of restoring national independence to the Baltic States. The provisional government set up in Kaunas by the "Freedom Fighters" lasted only a few days. The organization was disbanded by the German military authorities and its leaders were taken into custody. Latvia and Estonia did not enjoy even a flurry of independence. The result of the German invasion was merely that all three Baltic countries changed masters.

The German conquerors set up their new order with a promptness which suggested a prepared and minutely elaborated plan. On July 17, 1941, Hitler signed a decree creating a new German administrative unit, the "Ostland," under Reichskommissar Hinrich Lohse, the former Gauleiter of Schleswig-Holstein. As the German armies rolled eastward, the Ostland expanded and its administrative structure took clearer shape. By September 1941, the pattern of the New Order in Eastern Europe had been evolved.

Alfred Rosenberg is overlord of all conquered territories in the east and is responsible only to the Führer. His official title is "Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete." His Ministry comprises two branches: the "Reichskommissariat Ostland" under Hinrich Lohse, and the "Reichskommissariat Ukraine" under Erich Koch. The Ostland is divided into four general commissariats, the Ukraine into five. Both are further subdivided into regional commissariats.

The general commissariats of the Ukraine — Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, Nikolsev and Dniepopetrovsk — correspond by and large to the former territorial divisions of that area. The Ostland, however, is an artificially created unit, made up of diverse elements: the former independent states of Latvia,

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Estonia, Lithuania and the Byelo-Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (White Russia) which the Germans have renamed White Ruthenia. The long-disputed Vilno district of Lithuania is included in the "Generalkommissariat Litauen" as part of the Ostland.

The four General Commissars of the Ostland are veteran members of Hitler's party. Latvia is ruled by the former mayor of Lübeck, Otto Heinrich Drechsler; Estonia by the S. A. General Karl Sigismund Litzmann, a son of General Karl Litzmann who distinguished himself in the last war; Lithuania's boss is Dr. Adrian von Renteln; the General Commissar for White Ruthenia is Wilhelm Kube. The General Commissar is the highest civilian official in his territory, but he shares authority with two military personages, the Wehrmacht commander and the chief Gestapo official. Dr. von Renteln in Lithuania, for instance, has at his side the Commander of the "Sicherungsgebiet Litauen," Major General Just, and the "SS-und-Polizeiführer Litauen," Lucian Wysocki.

A certain amount of home rule was granted the Baltic countries early in 1942. In the General Commissariat Estonia there is a five-man State Council headed by Dr. E. Mae; Latvia, which apparently enjoys the greatest autonomy of all occupied territories in the east, has a "self-government" of six "general directors" headed by General Dankers; and in Lithuania one finds seven "general councillors" under the chairmanship of General Petras Kubiliunas, the former Chief of the General Staff of the Lithuanian Army. White Russia and the Ukraine have no degree of self-government.

There is great variety of official titles in the local administrations. The city of Riga, for example, is headed by a burgomaster, a German Balt named Wittrok, but Kaunas has a "Stadtkommissar," Hans Krämer. In other towns the Russian titles of "natchalnik goroda" and "gorodskoi golova" are used. Odessa, in the Ukraine, is ruled by a governor. None of these officials is elected; all are appointed by the German authorities, or have their appointments confirmed by them. Autonomy is limited to such matters as education, public health, agriculture, industrial production and social insurance, although in the Baltic countries the various "self-governments" are also charged with the maintenance of order and safety. A superabundance of police formations has sprung up in the Ostland, as in the Reich. In addition to the city police, rural police, criminal police and so on, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania each now has its "Schutzmannschaft," organized along the lines of the German "Schutzpolizei," its "Sicherheitspolizei" or security police and, of course, a Gestapo.

German propagandists claim that the various general commissariats of the Ostland enjoy almost complete autonomy and that German influence in local administration is held to a minimum. They assert, for instance, that only 15 Reich Germans occupy posts in the Latvian government. If this were true it would mean nothing, for there are thousands of Baltic Germans who can be passed off as Latvians or Estonians. (In Lithuania, the German element never played a comparable rôle.) In reality these "Latvians" and "Estonians" are 100 percent German and Nazi. Alfred Rosenberg himself is a native of Reval, Estonia, as is well known. In point of fact, there is not a single office of any consequence that does not have its Reich German or Baltic German adviser attached to it. All the real decisions are made by Germans.

History alone can decide whether the various "autonomous" administrations should be set down as Quisling governments or deserve to be described merely as shadow cabinets. General Dankers of the Latvian "self-government"

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appears to be a full-fledged collaborationist who heartily endorses the anti-Russian crusade. The records of some of his ministers and of Dr. Mae, his Estonian colleague, are not so clear.

The case of General Kubiliunas and of his Lithuanian General Council is particularly interesting. There can be little doubt that Kubiliunas, an old putschist in his own right, was a Nazi stooge when he took over control from the disbanded "Freedom Fighters." General Stasys Rastikis, who played second fiddle in the new setup was another of the same stripe. But last February their collaboration with the Nazis went sour. The Germans, hard-pressed in Russia, demanded more help from the Baltic countries, especially from Lithuania. Kubiliunas and Rastikis were willing enough to help fight the Bolsheviks, but they wanted a much greater degree of national independence and attempted to trade military assistance for concessions in that direction. General Commissar von Renteln refused to bargain, and the Lithuanians refused to budge. There were demonstrations, strikes and acts of sabotage. Then the Gestapo Chief Heinrich Himmler appeared on the scene, with the usual drastic consequences. The General Council was dissolved and four of its members were arrested. In one Lithuanian district, 40 village eldermen were publicly executed. This savage act of repression led to the outbreak of sporadic guerrilla warfare throughout the country. The Germans resorted to new reprisals, closing the universities of Kaunas and Vilno and arresting hundreds of students and professors. Public libraries and scientific institutions were sacked, burned or closed by the infuriated Gestapo. But the guerrillas have apparently not yet been brought under control.

The press of the Ostland has been largely taken over by the Nazis, or brought into line. Old newspapers have ceased to publish and new ones have taken their places. Each of the four General Commissariats has its German-language paper which carries the official announcements and calls the tune for the rest of the press. The leader of these German dailies is the *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland*, the organ of Reichskommissar Lohse, which has been published in Riga since July 1941 and is now the second biggest Latvian daily, with 120,000 subscribers, according to German claims. The other German-language dailies, *Revaler Zeitung*, *Kauener Zeitung* (which has a branch paper at Vilno, the *Wilnaer Zeitung*) and *Minsker Zeitung*, are published at the respective headquarters of the General Commissars. A special Ostland News Service, with offices at Riga, Reval, Kaunas and Minsk has been in operation since January 1, 1943.

The native press is strongest in Latvia, which has 21 papers of which five are dailies, the most important being *Tevija* with a claimed circulation of 250,000. Of the 15 Estonian papers, the most prominent is the Reval daily *Eesti Sona*. In Lithuania, about a dozen newspapers have been published in the native language; the chief one, *I Laisve* (Towards Freedom), of Kaunas, was reported "suspended" on December 31, 1942. In the General Commissariat of White Ruthenia six newspapers are printed in the White Russian idiom, of which the most important are *Bialarusskaya Hazeta* and *Holos Vioski*. In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine there are some 70 Ukranian-language papers, led by *Novo Ukrainske Slovo* in Kiev. The official German paper, *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, is published at Luck.

The new masters pursue a strictly opportunistic economic policy. There has been no general restoration of private ownership, German promises notwithstanding. The basic theory of the occupation authorities seems to be that they

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are legal successors to the Soviet régime and that therefore all property nationalized by the Russians automatically falls to the German "Wirtschaftskommando," the central economic authority of the occupying power. The property which the Soviets had taken from German nationals, whether Reich Germans or Balts, has been restored to a limited degree. More than 100,000 Volksdeutsche were repatriated to the Reich in November 1939 from the Soviet-controlled Baltic States, but only a fraction of them, who qualified as thoroughly reliable, have been allowed to return to their homes.

Lithuania offers the clearest illustration of the Nazi policy in this respect. After the repatriation agreement had been concluded, some 50,000 Lithuanian citizens declared themselves Volksdeutsche and departed for the Reich. Perhaps about 17,000 of these were actually people of German descent. The others were full-blooded Lithuanians who merely wished to escape the Soviet régime which, while not fully established, was clearly in the making. These would-be Volksdeutsche were not permitted to return after the Nazi occupation, but most of the Germans went back and were reinstated in their possessions.

The real estate, land, houses, stores and factories which had been nationalized under the short-lived Soviet régime are being administered by the Wirtschaftskommando through a specially created holding corporation, the "Deutsche Grundstücks Gesellschaft." This agency is supposed to facilitate the return of nationalized property to private hands, but only Germans and Baltic nationals recommended by the occupation authorities can qualify as former owners or as new purchasers. In order to qualify, a native Latvian, Estonian or Lithuanian must accept service with the German armed forces, a police formation, or a labor battalion. The Nazis use the desire of the inhabitants of the Ostland to regain their lost property as the most powerful leverage for keeping them in line.

The return of agricultural property to private ownership presented special difficulties for the Germans. The collective system of agriculture has been in operation for up to fifteen years in the Ukraine, White Russia and other territories originally belonging to the U.S.S.R.; and to have broken up the collective farms might dangerously have reduced their yield. The Nazi approach to this problem has been cautious. In principle, collective farms were abolished in all territories under Alfred Rosenberg's jurisdiction by a decree of February 27, 1942. In practice, however, a majority of collectives still operate as before, although they now go under the names of "communal farms" or "joint farming establishments" and are under the supervision of German commissars. The only real change is that the surplus of a collective is no longer divided among its members but is seized by the "Wirtschaftskommando." Similarly, most of the former state farms are operated as before, but under German management and for German account.

In the Baltic countries, where the Soviet régime was hardly able to take root and where collectivization was still incomplete when the Germans marched in, many former estates could be easily reconstituted. They were restored to their former owners, who in most cases were German Balts or aristocrats sympathetic to the Germans. In cases where a return of the former owner appeared undesirable, estates or large farms have been reconstituted in their original form but placed under the management of a German commissar. A limited number of Dutch and Danish Nazis have also been settled on land confiscated from Baltic nationals.

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Much the same tactics have been followed by the Germans in industry, finance and commerce. Needless to say, all establishments belonging to Jews have been "aryanized," or placed directly under the "Wirtschaftskommando." Germans and reliable Balts have regained possession of their enterprises. In doubtful cases the former owner of a factory or commercial establishment has merely been appointed director or manager, subject to dismissal. There has never been much large-scale industry in any of the territories now included in the Ostland, and present conditions are not conducive to its establishment. The occupation authorities are doing all they can to encourage small industrial establishments and handicraft. Trade is centralized in the hands of two or three large German firms.

The money system of the Ostland was reconstituted by a Rosenberg decree of November 4, 1942, which set up the "Notenbank im Ostland," with head offices in Riga. This bank has the sole right to issue bank notes in a new currency called Ostland mark. Hitherto, both rubles and "Reichskreditkassenscheine" were also legal tender in the Ostland.

Working conditions in the Ostland are the same as those in other Nazi-occupied countries. The workday in theory is 10 hours, six days a week, but most workers are forced to put in 12 hours or more. The average pay does not exceed four marks a day, even in hazardous occupations like work in saw mills, limestone quarries and cement factories. One of the main grievances of the Baltic people against the new régime stems from the discrimination in food rationing. Germans are favored at the expense of the native population. Not only do they get larger rations but they have exclusive access to special restaurants which serve cheaper and more substantial meals than those catering to the general public.

Since the last days of February 1943, general mobilization has been in effect throughout the Ostland, supplanting the former recruitment of volunteers for the Waffen-SS, which had produced singularly meager results. Now all able-bodied men between the ages of 17 and 45 are being forcibly drafted into SS-legions, one each for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These legions, like the Waffen-SS to which they belong, are considered integral parts of the German Army; they are officered by German Balts or German-minded Baltics. The legionaries wear the field-grey uniforms of the Waffen-SS, with the coat-of-arms of their respective countries on the left sleeve. Nominally at least they enjoy the same rights as German soldiers as regards pay, rations, clothing and pensions. If wounded or sick, they are treated in German military hospitals.

It remains to be seen whether this total mobilization will yield the Germans useful reinforcements. It has exacerbated patriotic resistance everywhere, although no such explosive developments as the Lithuanian outbreaks mentioned above have occurred in Latvia and Estonia. To press subjugated foreign nationals into uniform and to place firearms in their hands would seem to be a move of desperation. One instance in which members of the SS-Legion Latvia promptly opened fire on the Germans after receiving their rifles has already been related in the Russian press. It would not be surprising if entire units of these Baltic legions deserted to the Red Army, at the appointed hour, or joined the guerrilla bands now operating in the Ostland. Even those who do not rebel will hardly have much heart to fight for Adolf Hitler, Hinrich Lohse and their hierarchy of commissars.

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NOTES ON ARAB UNITY

By Joel Carmichael

THE idea of Arab unity, dead for a thousand years, is fashionable once again, at least for purposes of discussion. Arab union of one kind or another has become the focus of political probabilities for the whole of the Near East and even North Africa. Although the Arabs have not been an important people in modern times, the question of their unification gains a certain weight through its connection with matters of world import, notably the maintenance of British imperial communications and now the American entry into Africa and Asia. The Arab rôle, although in a sense a minor one, may nevertheless be played out in the center of the stage.

Who are the Arabs? The word "Arab" is ambiguous. That is because Islam, which has only recently become westernized, or secularized, does not recognize distinctions of nations or races as important: it is Islam which constitutes an all-embracing community for its adherents. Since the overwhelming majority of Arabs are Moslem the western concept of nationality has had to compete with the religious concept of Islam as a locus of crystallization for group feeling. The consequence is that Islam contains a welter of ethnic types which also permeate the Arab world: types ethnically distinct only to the mind of a westerner preoccupied with differences of race and nationality.

It has not been possible for a thousand years and more to speak of an Arab community which is based on any biological similarities. Even at the time the Arabs burst out of their peninsula they do not appear to have been a physically homogeneous stock; but whatever their unity may have been founded on at that time, the combined effects of Islam and the persistently nomadic movements of Arabs throughout north, central and east Africa have converted the Arab world into a genuine melting pot in which all origins are forgotten, or, rather, all origins are granted a more or less fictitious "Arab" character. At present if one were told that a given individual were an Arab one would not know in advance whether he was coal-black, blond, tall, short, or whatever. And, by way of extension, an individual representing any one of a variety of racial stocks would consider himself an Arab, and would be so considered by other "Arabs."

From the point of view of nationalism, the most concrete achievement of the Moslem conquests, initially borne abroad by Bedouin (the original meaning of "Arab"), was the spread of Arabic. The Arabs managed to create a vast cultural unity through their language and literature; the Arab language, at the height of Islam merely the learned language of the universal Islamic society, eventually contracted with the political decay of Islam to the confines of populations speaking it as a vernacular: populations in which there existed scarcely more than a few drops of "Arab" blood in the old sense.

More than four and a half million square miles in Africa and Asia are solidly Arabic-speaking; the extent of this area is the background for the equivocal character of the word "Arab."

The definition for which so many people strain is in reality a metaphysical distinction, a definition shaped to fit into some sort of logical scheme. There is no need for such a definition. What is required is precision in referring to certain

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living individuals and communities who often are called and often call themselves "Arabs." For most purposes it will be found that the best criterion is language (regardless of whether or not language is invariably a defining quality of nationality), with the exception of certain communities in whose case some other criterion acquires decisive importance, such as the Jews and perhaps some other minorities. It is most reasonable to consider as Arab lands all those regions in which Arabic is the vernacular and Islam the overwhelmingly preponderant religion and pattern of society. This "definition" will comprise the Arabian Peninsula, 'Iraq, Syria, Palestine (with some obvious qualifications), Transjordan, Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (with the exception of the pagan Negro region in the south), Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (perhaps debatable, because of the strong Berber population). There are of course border-line cases, as in the Somalilands.

Every physical type is represented in the so-called Arab communities. Some of them are entirely white: some are almost entirely black. The Hijaz is one of the most racially mixed communities on earth, and Mecca has been a city of mulattoes and quadroons, of all racial blends, since the fourteenth century. Since the race question does not exist in its European and American form, racial considerations as such have no weight.

Accordingly, there is some sort of de facto ethnocultural unity among Arabs, or rather, there is *enough* unity to provide an ethnic foundation of political unity. What are the obstacles to a realization of this political unity?

The obstacles most commonly mentioned revolve around the lack of cohesion of the Arabs as a people. It is quite rightly maintained that the Arabs lack unity in two respects: on the one hand there are enormous cultural disparities between various levels of the Arab world in general (such as between the nomad and the cultivator, the fanatic and the free-thinker), and between the ruling cliques of one Arab country as opposed to another in particular.

The root of this is the social and economic backwardness which pervades Arab society as a whole. This is a matter of notoriety. Not only are broad sections of the sedentary population still involved in a tissue of feudal socio-economic relationships, but throughout nearly the whole of the Arab world the problem of nomadism, solved almost everywhere else, retains considerable force. This split among the Arabs into the Desert and the Sown is very ancient, indeed it may be taken as the fundamental element in their history as a people.

It is true that nomads are now only of minor consequence numerically; they scarcely play a rôle in the more densely settled centers of Arab culture, such as Syria, Palestine and Egypt. But even here whole strata of the population are in transition from nomadism to peasant cultivation. Beyond its material weight the desert has always been a vital element in Arab society: not merely has it performed a purely economic function (as a purveyor of the products of livestock, etc.), but it has been the principal source of manpower. The debilitating effects of eastern cities have been compensated for by a steady flow of life from the wilderness via the fields. In addition, the nomads have always been the "Arabs" par excellence, the repository of traditional Arab culture, even though from a purely statistical point of view the Arabs have probably always been a predominantly sedentary people. At the very height of the Islamic State the rôle of the Bedouin was almost, though never quite, eclipsed. Since then it has been a decisive element in the pattern of Arab life.

But there is nothing in the nature of nomads as such which makes it difficult

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to persuade them to settle on the land as farmers; on the contrary, the history of all nomadic groups appears to be a spasmodic struggle to attain the well-being, security and comfort of a rural life and abandon the harshness and uncertainty of the incessant trek. Although Bedouin may sneer at fallahin as low fellows devoid of glamor, still, when the pinch comes, and it always does, they are only too glad to be able to exchange the exhausting rhythm of their own lives for the security of a mud hut.

Nomadism exists only because the technical capacities of the nomads are only just sufficient to maintain them in a sort of precarious equilibrium with the exigencies of their environment. They are stretched taut from one season to another, barely eking out an existence by shuttling back and forth between grazing grounds with not enough of a breathing-space possible to recuperate their powers and acquire enough technique for the taming of nature. They are always only just one step ahead of starvation.

Clearly, the only thing that can alter this finely drawn equilibrium would be either a sudden increase in the lushness of the environment, or else an exotically augmented power over nature, which would provide reserves for a community whose accounts at present just barely balance. It is precisely this increased power over nature which is supplied by modern technique, and which puts the final seal on the doom of the nomads. Their settlement on the land in Arabia has been begun on a grandiose scale, inspired, in Saudi-Arabia, by the religious fanaticism of the Wahhabi puritanical reform movement, and elsewhere in the Peninsula, as in 'Iraq, by more prosaic considerations.

However, the social and economic backwardness of which nomadism was a single aspect is given a concrete and institutionalized expression in the political life of the whole area. The well-known phenomenon of "leader-politics" is the direct outcome of this stagnation on a low level of economic intercommunication. Where production exists principally to satisfy restricted local needs, where there is no economic interchange of a scope grandiose enough to create a social class as its bearer, each village, townlet, valley and tribe becomes a microcosm of social activity.

This accounts for the myriads of political spokesmen for the Arab world, for the independent dignity of each petty chief and village elder. This is why it has become a cliché to speak of the disunity of the Arabs and their incapacity to coöperate with one another.

Of course, social patterns among the Arabs are manifold, and the degree of disunity varies greatly. In some countries, as in Egypt, it has been almost entirely replaced by a bourgeois society with well-defined political groups in a quasi-Western style. In others, such as Syria, it is exacerbated by religious and ethnic schisms. In still others, such as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, life is almost primordial. The more primitive communities in the Near East and Africa, in order to exist as political units, have generally crystallized around their own local bosses and wise men, sheiks and 'ulama. In the more civilized areas the tendency to split up is pushed further by the existence of the great families, who themselves constitute political units. These family fractions confront other, similar political units and compose a balance or imbalance of power around themselves. The clan, family and clique are the chief factors in the political arena.

As the increasing westernization of the region is imposed on this social fabric, these entities find themselves entering modern capitalist life and disintegrating

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under its impact, amalgamating with others and becoming "modernized" in varying degrees. In some cases the capital resources of an individual are supplemented by his membership in a large family, so the family as a whole is buttressed capitalistically precisely by reason of its feudal composition. By and large the family hampered the development of the requisite modern élite, but once the development was accomplished it continued existing as substantially the same entity in a strengthened position.

The recent creation of petty national states has provided another locus of concentration for the economic and political forces at work. However, these national states, tardy arrivals in a world dominated by the supra-national, cosmic interests of the Great Powers and subservient to their own backwardness as well as to these Powers, are permitted very little scope for a tendency so familiar to us. It is the infantile character of these states that provides one of the strongest drives for unity, precisely as it is, simultaneously, one of the obstacles to that unity.

In some ways the belatedness of the Arab national states has smoothed the path to national unification. For the fact is that the basic cultural discord prevailing between various strata of Arab society applies with far less force to a unitary Arab political organism than it does to the Arab world as it is now constituted. These cultural differences are found *within* every single Arab country; they were present during the efflorescence of Islam. However difficult the nomadic problem may be, it would be no more difficult for a unitary Arab state than it is for a handful of feeble, split-up dependent units. As a matter of fact, of course, the area of nomadism has been contracting rapidly during the past decades: the West has had its effect even on the Bedouin. The stronghold of Arabia itself has been passing under the spell of Europe. The Bedouin have been enmeshed in a relentless, organic process of settlement on the land, and even if the gap between the Desert and the Sown is never entirely eliminated it would be infinitely easier to deal with the complex relations of the Bedouin and the sedentary agriculturists within the framework of a unified governmental apparatus using similar methods than within five or six separate and often incompatible state policies.

The argument made from the enormous regional distinctions between various Arab communities and the absence of any genuine "national" consciousness in historic times merely exposes the capricious and artificial nature of most of the Arab states set up since the first World War. For while no one would deny that a man from Baghdad and a man from Mosul are Arabs, it is true that each may be more aware of his difference from the other than of their common citizenship in the whimsical and historically illegitimate 'Iraqi state. The argument from nomadism applies with even greater force here. What is artificial is not the concept of a unitary Arab state, which, regardless of the *material* obstacles to its realization, corresponds at any rate to the awareness of the Arabs of themselves as distinct from Europe, but the atomized states into which the Arabs are at present divided. The regional differences are much more potent between the sections of states already constituted than between the states themselves. Once again, that is, the argument against Arab union which is based on regional differences between Arabs is in reality more forceful when applied to small states than when applied to a larger union.

The problem of minorities is a well-known and basic question in the Near East, of great complexity and the source of much heat. Without venturing on

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prophecy, all that can be said here is that to the extent that the problems of minorities in the Arab world (particularly prevalent in Syria, 'Iraq, and perhaps Morocco) are based on religious schism and cultural particularism, they are bound to be ironed out with reasonable speed in the relatively near future. The integration of the people as a whole into a western system of government and education will no doubt bring the inevitable harvest of social similarity in its train. The fact is that the differences between the Arabs and the minorities living in their midst are generally exaggerated, not only by the foreign press, but by the Arabs and the minority leaders themselves. To a very large extent the minorities, insofar as they constitute a kink in the social fabric, are anachronisms, and in any case they are not numerically important enough to form a really serious obstacle to the unification of the Arabs as a whole. It must also be remembered that separatism is the stock-in-trade of the bulk of minority spokesmen, whose voices are the only ones heard abroad; they have a professional interest in schism.

As a matter of fact the principal obstacles to Arab unification do not lie in the profound disharmonies outlined above, but in the relatively superficial rivalries among the political élite of Arab society. In the more advanced Arab countries bordering on the Mediterranean this is a function of the character of the "Levantine" upper strata as a whole.

There is a special quality in Arabs who have been educated in a Western manner which strikes most observers at once. As an intellectual class they give the impression of being what the Germans call *Luftmenschen* — rootless, feverish people.

The gap between the old and the new in the Arab societies which have felt European influence most thoroughly is so enormous and the economic backwardness of the overwhelming bulk of the population is so extreme that a difference in schooling acquires an absolute value as a specifically differentiating characteristic: the people are steeped in such ignorance (at any rate from the point of view of the West, which sets the standards) that education automatically involves elevation to an upper class, regardless of the precise economic status, which may or may not lag behind the social prestige created by education. For this reason there is an unusually high percentage of unemployment among educated people in a semi-colonial capitalistic economy such as Egypt, which combines a relatively advanced European upper crust and an extremely backward (economically and otherwise) laboring mass: there are few economic occupations for them to be absorbed into. This accounts for the persistent Near Eastern phenomenon of a growing class of these educated *Luftmenschen*, who belong socially to the upper strata, but exist in an economy which is too meagre to have any interstices they might squeeze into by virtue of the education which is their principal economic qualification.

Clearly, their only refuge is in politics. But even here the arena is restricted: the masses are backward intellectually (from the point of view of the élite) as well as economically; they are not receptive to the abstractions of western political thought, which is one of the ornaments of the élite.

Accordingly, even in the political life which is the principal channel left open to these bottle-necked intelligentsia, they encounter precisely the same bottleneck: they are thrown back on themselves and on those members of the rising generation in the same position. The same gulf which separates the masses economically from the narrow apex of the élite also separates them in-

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tellectually: providing no vent for the energies of the intelligentsia and so throwing it back on political activity, it also constrains this political activity into an abnormally shrunken, sterile, and self-stultifying arena.

This is largely responsible for the hectic quality, the mélange of an extreme intransigeance of form and poverty of content which is characteristic of intellectual groups in quasi-colonial areas. This instability, added to the personal and party axe-grinding inherent in this intellectual overpopulation, conceals genuine social and political needs in a mist of intrigue, factionalism, and wire-pulling, and impedes the emergence of any program organically related to actual conditions.

This description has a familiar ring. It might be applied with few changes to the German postwar generation and our own youth of the thirties. It characterizes the thousands of young people who have been educated "above their station," by which is simply meant educated beyond the economic opportunities available.

But in Western Europe and America this phenomenon can be seen in perspective, since it is balanced by a certain stability in the educated classes as a whole. In the Near East, however, it comprises the ensemble of all those elements in society which are affected by the "new life;" it is the hallmark of the modern intelligentsia *per se*, and so acquires decisive importance as the intellectual matrix of contemporary Arab culture.

The political problem of Arab nationalism is complicated by the variety of programs to choose from. For unification in the abstract, while it undoubtedly corresponds to general Arab sentiment, is meaningless. Dissension begins on the threshold of detail. At one extreme there are the Pan-Arabists who yearn to humble the infidel by recreating the Arab Empire: at the other there are the Milquetoasts who scarcely dare suggest more than a customs union between Syria and Lebanon. The extremes are either chimerical or inadequate. Perhaps the most practicable program would revolve around a Near Eastern Federation (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, 'Iraq, Egypt, with or without Saudi-Arabia), in which the constituent states would be bound together for purposes of economy, education, defense and representation abroad, while largely retaining their internal autonomy. This would create an instrument both for the resumption of Arab integrity vis-à-vis the West and for the solution of the most pressing social problems. It would be the most effective first step forward on the road of unification. Only unity can give the Arabs an adult's stature in the world to emerge from the débris of the war.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

BETWEEN THE THUNDER AND THE SUN. By VINCENT SHEEAN. New York: Random House, 1943, 428 p. $3.00.

The author of "Personal History" records his impressions of events and persons, especially in the *haut monde*, during the last years of so-called peace. The scene shifts from Salzburg to the Côte d'Azur, to England (before and during the Blitz), to the Orient and finally back to America at the moment of Pearl Harbor. Mr. Sheean's perceptions are, as usual, sensitive and egocentric, and his interpretations often illuminating.

THE PEOPLES' PEACE. By REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. New York: Stewart, 1943, 271 p. $2.50.

Documents, addresses, statements and articles by representative leaders in a number of the United Nations, selected and arranged so as to illustrate the peace plans of those countries.

SUMMARY OF THE WORLD FEDERATION PLAN. By ELY CULBERTSON. Garden City: Garden City Publishing Co., 1943, 64 p. $1.00.

This "outline of a practical and detailed plan for world settlement" by a noted expert on contract bridge consists of a blueprint for the future government of the world. Among the features is the division of the world into eleven regional federations — a feat accomplished by the wholesale shifting of existing political alignments — and the creation of an international police force. The plan is certainly "detailed," but whether it is "practical" is another matter.

THE MACHIAVELLIANS: DEFENDERS OF FREEDOM. By JAMES BURNHAM. New York: Day, 1943, 270 p. $2.50.

The author of "The Managerial Revolution" sets forth the virtues of the "Machiavellian" political thinkers of modern times. In what he regards as their "realism" he finds the key to the preservation of our liberties.

WAR AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF PEACE. By WILLIAM BROWN. London: Black, 1942, 144 p. 7/6.

This is a new edition of the author's "War and Peace" with three additional chapters on psychological aspects of current international problems.

AMERICA, RUSSIA, AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE POSTWAR WORLD. By JOHN L. CHILDS AND GEORGE S. COUNTS. New York: Day, 1943, 92 p. $1.25.

This booklet is a publication of the Commission on Education and the Post War World of the American Federation of Teachers. In it, the authors seek a common-sense basis for a durable understanding between the two countries after the war. Among other things they suggest the wisdom of dissolving the American Communist Party.

BEHIND THE BATTLE. By JOHN DE COURCY. London: Eyre, 1942, 262 p. 10/6.

Interesting sidelights and opinionated reactions on some of the policies of Britain, France and other Powers during 1939. The author pretends to the possession of inside information.

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THE ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By C. Groves Haines and Ross J. S. Hoffman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 659 p. $4.25.

A factual history of the period between the two World Wars. The authors would be the last to suggest that theirs is a definitive work; yet within the limitations inherent in recording and appraising contemporary events, they have turned out a serviceable story of the descent into the abyss.

FANTASTIC INTERIM. By Henry Morton Robinson. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 341 p. $3.50.

Mr. Robinson recounts the tale of "American manners, morals and mistakes" during the two inter-war decades, and probes the reasons for the latter. An acute, challenging interpretation.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES: WAS IT JUST? By T. E. Jessop. London: Nelson, 1942, 167 p. 5/.

The author of this sane little book concludes that the treaty, in spite of shortcomings, was on the whole a just one.

WAR COMES TO US. Edited by John Paul Adams. New York: Bartholomew House, 1942, 96 p. $1.00.

A compilation of several hundred photographs illustrating the history of the inter-war period, with brief captions that are not always accurate or objective.

THE HERO IN HISTORY. By Sidney Hook. New York: Day, 1943, 273 p. $2.50.

Interesting and provocative chapters on the relative rôle of individuals and of general movements in history.

THE NEW LEVIATHAN; OR, MAN, SOCIETY, CIVILIZATION AND BARBARISM. By R. G. Collingwood. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 387 p. $6.00.

This rather extraordinary book represents an attempt by the author to bring Hobbes' "Leviathan" up to date.

THE FREEDOM TO BE FREE. By James Marshall. New York: Day, 1943, 277 p. $2.50.

A devout believer in the ethical and practical values of democracy stresses the importance of preserving the rights of the individual in any plans which seek to improve democratic institutions.

THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE. Volume I. By A. D. Lindsay. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 286 p. $3.75.

The first part of an important work on political philosophy in which the author, Master of Balliol College at Oxford, shows the inadequacy of the Hegelian state as an explanation for the development of modern European institutions.

CONFLICTS. By L. B. Namier. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 223 p. $2.50.

Interesting papers on various contemporary European problems, viewed from the perspective of the historian. Particular attention is given to Germany and the Jewish problem.

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS. By Walter Sulzbach. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943, 168 p. $3.00.

The author has studied the history and literature of nationalism for a number of years. In this volume he presents the distillation of his research and analysis.

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WORLD WAR II. By Martin Domke. New York: Central Book Co., 1943, 640 p. $10.00.

A documented treatise on the current law as revealed in legislation, administrative regulations and judicial cases in the British Commonwealth as well as in the United States. Extensive documentary appendices are included.

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A NEMZETKÖZI JOG EREDETE. By László Gajzágó. Budapest: Stephaneum, 1942, 433 p.

A learned treatise on the origins of international law by the outstanding Hungarian authority in that field.

THE STORY OF WEAPONS AND TACTICS. By Tom Wintringham. Boston: Houghton, 1943, 230 p. $2.25.

A veteran of the Loyalist Army in Spain and an expert in guerrilla tactics traces the history of warfare during the last 3,000 years.

DEFENSE. By Wilhelm von Leeb. Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1943, 159 p. $1.00.

A translation of a treatise on the strategy of defensive warfare, by a Nazi Field Marshal who has played a prominent part in the Russian campaign.

PARATROOPS. By F. O. Miksche. New York: Random House, 1943, 263 p. $2.50.

A scientific summary of the history and current practice of parachute warfare.

SCHOOL FOR WAR. By George Sava. London: Faber, 1942, 175 p. 6/.

An examination of the new psychological warfare, especially as employed by Germany.

AIRCRAFT CARRIER. By Robert A. Winston. New York: Harper, 1942, 88 p. $2.00.

A profusely illustrated account of the development and present tactical rôle of the aircraft carrier.

VOICES OF HISTORY, 1942–43. Edited by Franklin Watts and Barbara E. Leighton. New York: Gramercy Publishing Co., 1943, 759 p. $3.50.

The texts of more than a hundred significant addresses and official statements made during the year by the political leaders of both the Axis and the United Nations.

1943 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR. Edited by Walter Yust. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1943, 812 p. $10.00.

The current issue of an important annual compendium of information. There are numerous illustrations and statistical tables.

General: Economic and Social

POSTWAR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. Edited by Seymour E. Harris. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1943, 417 p. $3.50.

Contributions by some two dozen economists who, in addition to stating and analyzing the problems of reconstruction, make a number of concrete proposals.

ECONOMIC UNION AND DURABLE PEACE. By Otto Tod Mallery. New York: Harper, 1943, 183 p. $3.00.

A review of past mistakes and suggestions for the future conduct of international economic relations. Among other things the author comes out for a retention of the essential features of the Hull reciprocal trade agreement program.

TOWARDS AN ABIDING PEACE. By R. M. MacIver. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 195 p. $2.50.

A leading American sociologist has some pertinent things to say about the social and psychological bases necessary for real peace. Some may feel, however, that he is over optimistic in regard to the ease with which new international institutions can be created.

THE LEGACY OF NAZISM. By Frank Munk. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 288 p. $2.50.

An effort, by a refugee Czech economist, to foresee the economic and social consequences of Hitler's rule over Europe, and suggestions as to how we should prepare for the day of reconstruction.

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THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENT. By Carl Kreider. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, 270 p. $3.50.

A documented analysis of the nature and results of the agreement during the period 1934–39.

THE INTERNATIONAL STEEL CARTEL. By Ervin Hexner. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943, 339 p. $6.00.

An account of the organization of the cartel and of the manner in which it controlled the international trade in steel during the inter-war years.

WORLD TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. By Henry C. and Anne Dewees Taylor. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 286 p. $3.50.

An authoritative summary of international trade in the major agricultural products of the world with particular attention to the commercial problems of the major Powers. There are several maps and numerous statistical tables.

THE TRAGEDY OF EUROPEAN LABOR, 1918–1939. By Adolf Sturmthal. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 389 p. $3.50.

An examination of the failure of the labor movements and parties in Europe to accept and utilize political responsibility. This book is full of facts, set forth rather dully.

HOUSING ABROAD UP TO WORLD WAR II. By Stella K. Margold. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1942, 314 p. $2.00.

This monograph is a comparative study not only of European but of American practice. It is mimeographed but bound.

POPULATION PROBLEMS. By Warren S. Thompson. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1942, 471 p. $4.00.

A revised, up-to-date edition of a standard text, well illustrated with statistical material. There are chapters on the population problems of individual countries, population growth and international politics, and the like.

TREES AND TEST TUBES. By Charles Morrow Wilson. New York: Holt, 1943, 352 p. $3.50.

The story of rubber, told by the author of "Ambassadors in White." Mr. Wilson is at home in his discussion of the production of natural rubber, but is somewhat out of his depth in his treatment of synthetic rubber.

OVERCOMING ANTI-SEMITISM. By Solomon Andhil Fineberg. New York: Harper, 1943, 225 p. $2.00.

Concrete and sensible suggestions.

RACISME — ANTISÉMITISME, ANTICHRISTIANISME: DOCUMENTS ET CRITIQUE. By John M. Oesterreicher. New York: Maison Française, 1943, 245 p. $1.50.

An Austrian priest, now an exile in this country, points out that racialism is a threat not only to the Jews but to any minority or religious body.

The Second World War

JOURNEY AMONG WARRIORS. By Eve Curie. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 501 p. $3.50.

Between November 1941 and April 1942 Miss Curie covered 40,000 miles on a trip, largely by air, to the battlegrounds of this war in Africa, the Near East, Russia, China and India. She not only interviewed many of the leading personages in those countries but observed the thousand and one small but important things which, when reduced to vivid descriptive writing, give the reader an intimate picture of what this war means to the ordinary individual.

MEN IN MOTION. By Henry J. Taylor. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 306 p. $3.00.

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Mr. Taylor reports on his recent travels in Britain, North Africa and the Near East. He has several interesting revelations to make and a number of prejudices to put forward. He feels that much of the present talk about postwar coöperation between the United Nations — especially with Russia and China — is farfetched.

THE WAR IN MAPS. By Francis Brown and Emil Herlin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 167 p. $2.00.

A revised and enlarged edition of a handy reference book containing war maps reprinted from *The New York Times*.

BRIDGEHEAD TO VICTORY. By L. V. Randall. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 183 p. $2.00.

Relying in part on experience gained while an officer in the German Army during the last war, the author outlines a plan for a synchronized attack on the Continent at several points in the east, south and west.

THE FIGHTING FRENCH. By Raoul Aglion. New York: Holt, 1943, 315 p. $3.00.

One of the leaders of the Fighting French organization in the United States records the activities and appraises the historical significance of the De Gaullist movement.

COMBINED OPERATIONS. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 155 p. $2.00.

This is the official story of the heroic exploits of the British Commandos, told simply and with restraint by Hilary St. George Saunders, Assistant Librarian of the House of Commons. The foreword is by Lord Louis Mountbatten.

COASTAL COMMAND. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 143 p. $1.50.

The official "Air Ministry account of the part played by the Coastal Command in the Battle of the Seas, 1939–1942," written by H. St. G. Saunders and illustrated with 125 photographs.

WAR EAGLES. By Colonel James Saxon Childers. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 349 p. $3.75.

The story of the Eagle Squadron, composed largely of Americans who joined the R.A.F. before the United States got into the war.

FRONT LINE. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 159 p. $1.50.

The official, illustrated story of the effect of the aërial Blitz on the civilian life and defense of London. Profusely illustrated.

THROUGH HELL TO DUNKIRK. By Henry de la Falaise. Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1943, 166 p. $2.50.

A graphic account of the retreat to Dunkirk, by one of the survivors.

WE WERE FREE. By Constantin Joffé. New York: Smith and Durrell, 1943, 237 p. $2.75.

The story of the appalling misadventures of a Russian who fought in the French Army and was later taken to a German prison camp.

THEY WHO WAIT. By Robert Guerlain. New York: Crowell, 1943, 206 p. $2.00.

A French soldier, writing pseudonymously, records his experiences in a German prison camp where he spent over a year.

MOSCOW DATELINE 1941–1943. By Henry C. Cassidy. Boston: Houghton, 1943, 375 p. $3.00.

Mr. Cassidy has observed the war in Russia at close range as Moscow correspondent of the Associated Press. This report of his observations during the last two years constitutes one of the best of the recent books on the Soviet Union.

THERE GO THE SHIPS. By Robert Carse. New York: Morrow, 1942, 156 p. $2.00.

A vivid account of an Allied convoy to Murmansk, by a participant.

RUSSIAN GLORY. By Philip Jordan. London: Cresset, 1942, 181 p. 7/6.

A well-known English newspaperman who spent the last half of 1941 in Russia presents a favorable picture of the conduct of the Red Army and of the Russian people during the opening phases of the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union.

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SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON NAZI ATROCITIES. London: Hutchinson, 1942, 192 p. 5/.

Documents and some two hundred photographs illustrating Nazi barbarism. This book is issued by the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy in London.

BALKAN EXIT. By Flavia Kingscote. London: Bles, 1942, 180 p. 10/6.

Miss Kingscote lived in Jugoslavia for a number of years before the war, and stayed on in Zagreb and Dalmatia until driven out by the Nazi invasion. Her account of her flight into Bosnia, her internment in Italy and her eventual repatriation to England is dramatic and illuminating.

MIRACLE IN HELLAS: THE GREEKS FIGHT ON. By Betty Wason. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 263 p. $2.75.

A graphic story of Greek resistance against the aggression, first of Italy and then of Germany, during 1940–41, by a correspondent there at the time. The latter part of the book is an account of the desperate struggle waged by the Greek people against the Fascist and Nazi conquerors, based on information smuggled out of Greece.

DON'T BLAME THE GENERALS. By Alan Moorehead. New York: Harper, 1943, 312 p. $3.50.

This sequel to the author's "Mediterranean Front" records his observations, largely on the Libyan Desert during the unhappy year from August 1941 to August 1942. Moorehead confines himself chiefly to straight reporting.

ACTIVE SERVICE: WITH AUSTRALIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1941, 129 p. 7/6.

A popular illustrated account of the campaigns in Libya, Greece and Crete as seen through the eyes of Australian troops who participated in them. Other titles in this series are: "These Eagles: Story of the R.A.A.F. at War" (1942, 200 p.); "H.M.A.S." (1942, 200 p.); and "Soldiering On: The Australian Army at Home and Overseas" (1942, 200 p.).

TUNIS EXPEDITION. By Darryl Zanuck. New York: Random House, 1943, 160 p. $2.00.

The journal of an American movie producer who followed the early stages of the North African campaign with his camera.

SHORT CUT TO TOKYO. By Corey Ford. New York: Scribner, 1943, 141 p. $1.75.

First-hand information about the Aleutian Islands, their strategic importance and the heartbreaking struggle that the American forces have carried on there.

QUEENS DIE PROUDLY. By W. L. White. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 273 p. $2.50.

The author of "Journey for Margaret" and "They Were Expendable" gives a sincere and moving account of the adventures of a Flying Fortress and its crew during the Philippine and East Indies campaigns.

I WAS ON CORREGIDOR. By Amea Willoughby. New York: Harper, 1943, 249 p. $2.50.

An account of life on bombed and besieged Corregidor by one who was there.

SOUTH FROM CORREGIDOR. By Lieutenant Commander John Morrill and Pete Martin. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943, 252 p. $2.50.

The enthralling story of how a handful of Navy men escaped from falling Corregidor southward to Australia in a leaky 36-foot landing boat.

The United States

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY: SHIELD OF THE REPUBLIC. By Walter Lippmann. Boston: Little, 1943, 177 p. $1.50.

Both the expert and the layman will find in this little volume a great deal of wisdom. In particular, they will find Mr. Lippmann's interpretation of our foreign policy in the past to be free of preconceptions and full of sound sense. The second part of the book,

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in which he analyzes the present American position in the world and describes the bases upon which we must reconstruct our foreign policy if it is to serve its primary purpose, is more controversial. He is averse to trusting our fate to "collective security" and instead advocates an Anglo-Russo-American combination, with China participating if she emerges from the war as a real Power.

ONE WORLD. By Wendell L. Willkie. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943, 86 p. $1.00.

In August 1942 Mr. Willkie left the United States in an Army bomber to circle the globe, visiting en route Africa, the Near East, Russia, China and Siberia, and returning via Alaska and Canada. In this book he reports his observations and the ideas which they inspired. His book is thus much more than a record of his discoveries; it is a revelation from which his fellow Americans can discover a great deal about Mr. Willkie. His reactions to the war in Egypt, to the personality of Stalin and the wartime operation of the Communist régime, and to the heartbreaking handicaps under which China struggles, are forthright and sympathetic. Written simply and sincerely as a personal memoir, this little volume is one of the hardest blows ever struck against the intellectual and moral isolationism of the American people.

THE WORLD OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS. By Sumner Welles. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 121 p. $1.75.

Twelve important programmatic addresses delivered by the Under Secretary of State between 1939 and 1943 in which he lays down certain guiding principles of American foreign policy and also reveals some of his own opinions on postwar problems.

THE LATIN AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Samuel Flagg Bemis. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 470 p. $4.50.

A history, by one of America's leading diplomatic historians, intended for both student use and general reference.

WAY FOR AMERICA. By Alexander Laing. New York: Duell, 1943, 380 p. $3.00.

Mr. Laing is thoroughly disillusioned in the "experts" and political leaders of the democratic countries who through incompetence and lack of courage let their peoples down — into the tragic calamity of another world war. Salvation, he believes, will come through greater trust in the intelligence and sense of responsibility of the common man.

MOMENT OF TRUTH: A REALISTIC EXAMINATION OF OUR WAR SITUATION. By Charles Sweeny. New York: Scribner, 1943, 305 p. $2.75.

The author is a professional soldier, a veteran of a score of campaigns, and a onetime officer in the French Foreign Legion. He has a wide assortment of prejudices — especially against the mistakes of civilian leaders — and in stating them he lays about with vigor, sometimes justly, sometimes not.

A TIME TO ACT. By Archibald MacLeish. Boston: Houghton, 1943, 198 p. $2.50.

Selected addresses on America's part in the war, by the Librarian of Congress.

ROOSEVELT: WORLD STATESMAN. By Basil Woon. London: Davies, 1942, 192 p. 10/6.

This portrait of the President, intended primarily for English consumption, is on the whole a fair one.

ATLANTIC CHARTER. By Cecil King. New York: Studio, 1943, 232 p. $4.50.

An illustrated history of the United States Navy and its major exploits.

THE NAVY HAS WINGS. By Fletcher Pratt. New York: Harper, 1943, 224 p. $2.75.

A leading American commentator on naval affairs describes the history and techniques of our naval aviation.

WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE SIGNAL CORPS. By Harry M. Davis and F. G. Fassett, Jr. New York: Norton, 1943, 214 p. $2.50.

The latest volume in an informative series.

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HOW OUR ARMY GREW WINGS. By Charles deForest Chandler and Frank P. Lahm. New York: Ronald, 1943, 353 p. $3.75.

A circumstantial history of the origins of the United States Army Air Force and its development up to the First World War, by two American air officers.

MITCHELL: PIONEER OF THE AIR POWER. By Isaac Don Levine. New York: Duell, 1943, 420 p. $3.50.

A sober review of the entire career of General "Billy" Mitchell and of his crusade to get the Army and Navy to accept the implications of modern aviation science.

WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT SPIES AND SABOTEURS. By Will Irwin and Thomas Johnson. New York: Norton, 1943, 227 p. $2.50.

A popular description of the operations of the F.B.I. and the intelligence services of the Army and Navy.

PASSPORT TO TREASON. By Alan Hynd. New York: McBride, 1943, 306 p. $3.00.

This is the story of the work of the F.B.I. in dealing with Nazi spies and agents in this country. It is based on an examination of the official records.

BROTHERS UNDER THE SKIN. By Carey McWilliams. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943, 325 p. $3.00.

An exposé of the American record in regard to the "colored" races within our borders — Negroes, Mexicans, Indians, Orientals, etc. This is required reading for those who want to understand the background for present racial tensions in this country.

LABOR'S VOICE IN THE CABINET. By John Lombardi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 370 p. $3.50.

A scholarly history of the Department of Labor during the Wilson Administration.

AMERICAN AGRICULTURE, 1899–1939. By Harold Barger and Hans H. Landsberg. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1942, 440 p. $3.00.

A statistical analysis of our agricultural "output, employment and productivity."

THE FARMER CITIZEN AT WAR. By Howard R. Tolley. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 318 p. $2.50.

A high official in the Department of Agriculture describes the policies of that agency under the New Deal — policies which he believes have made it possible for the American farmer to do his part in the war effort.

THE CONSUMER GOES TO WAR. By Caroline F. Ware. New York: Funk, 1942, 300 p. $2.00.

This "Guide to Victory on the Home Front" contains a fund of useful information. In the concluding chapters the author seeks to look into the future.

YEARS OF THIS LAND. By Hermann R. Muelder and David M. Delo. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 243 p. $2.50.

American history interpreted as a response to our geographic environment.

ATLAS OF AMERICAN HISTORY. Edited by James Truslow Adams. New York: Scribner, 1943, 361 p. $10.00.

A useful reference work compiled by a group of experts.

THE CANADIAN BORN IN THE UNITED STATES. By Leon E. Truesdell. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943, 263 p. $3.00.

This "analysis of the statistics of the Canadian element in the population of the United States, 1850 to 1930," appears under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

WAR DISCOVERS ALASKA. By Joseph Driscoll. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943, 351 p. $3.00.

An enthusiastic account of the part Alaska is playing in the war, and of the prospects for her future development when peace is restored.

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Western Europe

LES FOSSOYEURS. By Pertinax. New York: Maison Française, 1943, 2 v. $3.50.

Here is the long-awaited story of the collapse of France as told by André Géraud, the master of European political and diplomatic commentators. Whatever may be the final verdict of history on Daladier, Reynaud, Gamelin, Pétain and the others who helped dig the grave of the Third Republic, the mass of information assembled and subjected to keen, merciless judgment in these volumes will constitute one of the prime sources of our knowledge of this depressing story. An English translation is promised shortly.

FRANCE. By Pierre Maillaud. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 138 p. $1.25.

This little volume, in the "World Today" series, seeks to present a panorama of French life and problems on the eve of the present war.

FRANCE IN TORMENT. By Madeleine Gex le Verrier. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1942, 167 p. 6/.

Testimony on affairs in both occupied and unoccupied France by a former editor of *L'Europe Nouvelle.*

DISCOURS ET MESSAGES DU GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE. London: Oxford University Press, 1942, 115 p. 3/6.

Programmatic speeches of the Free French leader between June 1940 and December 1941.

BELGIAN BANKING AND BANKING THEORY. By B. S. Chlepner. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1943, 224 p. $2.50.

A scholarly description of Belgian banking methods, with special attention to the rôle of the government.

THE FIGHT OF THE NORWEGIAN CHURCH AGAINST NAZISM. By Bjarne Höye and Trygve M. Ager. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 180 p. $1.75.

A circumstantial, documented story, by two Norwegian officials in exile, of the resistance being offered by the clergy and laity against the invader and his Quisling.

THE GOEBBELS EXPERIMENT. By Derrick Sington and Arthur Weidenfeld. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943, 194 p. $3.00.

A systematic, intelligent analysis of the Nazi propaganda apparatus — how it is set up, how it functions and what results it has obtained.

FLIGHT FROM TERROR. By Otto Strasser and Michael Stern. New York: McBride, 1943, 361 p. $3.00.

Strasser, one of the leaders of the Nazi movement in its early days, was forced out of the Party in 1930, primarily because of his "Socialist" leanings. Since then he has organized from abroad the "Black Front" Hitler. In this gruesome book he retells the story of his part in the Nazi Party during the twenties, of his motives in breaking with it, and of his activities in exile. It is clear that Strasser, like some others who have broken with Hitler, objects to the Führer's policies rather than his methods.

WHAT THE GERMAN NEEDS. By E. O. Lorimer. London: Allen and Unwin, 1942, 129 p. 5/.

Suggestions for "reëducating" a generation of Germans debased by Nazism.

THE GERMAN LEBENSRAUM. By Robert E. Dickinson. New York: Penguin, 1943, 223 p. 25 cents.

An English geographer, well-acquainted with German geopoliticians and their theories, first criticizes those theories and then proceeds to set forth the geographical realities of Central Europe.

SPAIN. By Salvador de Madariaga. London: Cape, 1942, 509 p. 25/.

The first part of this book, by the well-known Spanish writer and political figure,

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consists of his history of Spain published over a decade ago in the "Modern World" series. The latter part is a far from objective review of events in Spain since 1930.

TRY-OUT IN SPAIN. By Cedric Salter. New York: Harper, 1943, 291 p. $2.50.

An English Catholic journalist who reported the Civil War from the Loyalist side for over two and a half years, states his belief that the Spanish Republic deserved the support of the democratic Powers out of pure self-interest if for no other reason.

LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA ESPAÑOLA. By Luis Jiménez de Asua. Santiago de Chile: Ercilla, 1942, 123 p.

A leading Spanish jurist and one of the authors of the constitution of the late Republic traces its origins and explains its provisions.

Eastern Europe

MOTHER RUSSIA. By Maurice Hindus. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 395 p. $3.50.

Mr. Hindus is an American who for two decades has been visiting Soviet Russia and writing sympathetically about what he has seen. This time he reports on the Russian people at war, in the provinces as well as in Moscow.

LANDMARKS IN THE LIFE OF STALIN. By E. Yaroslavsky. London: Lawrence, 1942, 191 p. 5/.

This biography may be regarded as official since it was first published — in its English edition — in Moscow in 1940. It takes Stalin's career up to 1939.

THE RUSSIAN PEASANT AND OTHER STUDIES. By Sir John Maynard. London: Gollancz, 1942, 511 p. 15/.

A well-informed, comprehensive study of Soviet policies and achievements, wider in scope than is indicated by the title.

THE KEY TO THE RUSSIAN DOOR. By Eileen Bigland. London: Putnam, 1942, 254 p. 10/6.

A somewhat episodic account of the author's travels and observations in the Soviet Union, including the Caucasus and Siberia.

THE UNKNOWN ARMY. By Nikolaus Basseches. New York: Viking, 1943, 239 p. $2.50.

An account, informative but not too well organized, of the historical development of the Russian military system from early Tsarist days to the present.

OUTLINE OF POLISH HISTORY. By Olgierd Górka. London: Kolin, 1942, 111 p. 5/.

A sketch of Poland's history and a survey of her present condition.

O JEDENASTEJ — POWIADA AKTOR — SZTUKA JEST SKONCZONA. By Stanislaw Mackiewicz. London: Kolin, 1942, 172 p. 6/.

An attempt to rescue the foreign policy of Josef Beck from his detractors.

MASARYK IN ENGLAND. By R. W. Seton-Watson. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 206 p. $2.75.

In the opening chapter Professor Seton-Watson summarizes Czech history and Masaryk's rôle therein. Thereafter most of the text consists of illuminating letters and memoranda by the Czech statesman, written during the First World War. Their publication will enhance the stature of Masaryk as one of the great men of our times.

AS WE SAW IT IN PRAGUE. By O. Lechner. London: Allen and Unwin, 1942, 208 p. 7/6.

Events in Czechoslovakia during the last years of "peace" reflected in a series of conversations.

BALKAN FIREBRAND: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A REBEL, SOLDIER AND STATESMAN. By Kosta Todorov. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1943, 340 p. $3.50.

The author's amazing career progressed from Macedonian terrorist through various

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revolutionary and military phases to responsible positions in the Bulgarian diplomatic service. Today he is an exile in Canada, where he heads the Free Bulgarian Committee. This book is the highly readable record of his most active life.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE ENGLISH PEOPLE. By D. W. Brogan. New York: Knopf, 1943, 295 p. $3.00.

This brilliant explanation of important features of English life is intended for the American reader who is baffled by the peculiarities and apparent contradictions of many British institutions.

THE MAKING OF MODERN BRITAIN. By John Bartlett Brebner and Allan Nevins. New York: Norton, 1943, 243 p. $2.50.

A rapid survey by a Canadian and an American, both professors of history at Columbia University.

FROM BIRD CAGE TO BATTLE PLANE. By Ralph Michaelis. New York: Crowell, 1943, 248 p. $2.75.

An illustrated, popular history of the R.A.F., by one of its members.

WINGS OF DESTINY. By the Marquess of Londonderry. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 251 p. $3.50.

During most of the two inter-war decades Lord Londonderry was closely identified with the development of British military aviation, serving as Secretary of State for Air for three and a half years in the early thirties. This book is a record of his activities and a justification of the policies he upheld.

FROM MANY ANGLES. By Major-General the Right Honourable Sir Frederick Sykes. London: Harrap, 1942, 592 p. 25/.

An autobiography of one of the pioneers in establishing military aviation in Britain, who later became a Member of Parliament and Governor of Bombay.

ENGLAND'S ROAD TO SOCIAL SECURITY. By Karl de Schweinitz. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943, 281 p. $3.00.

A scholarly survey of an important phase of British social history.

THE BURDEN OF BRITISH TAXATION. By G. Findlay Shirras and L. Rostas. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 240 p. $3.00.

A statistical analysis based on the incidence of taxation in 1937–38 and 1941–42.

THE BRITISH WAR ECONOMY, 1939–1943. By Mary E. Murphy. New York: Professional and Technical Press, 1943, 403 p. $2.50.

A comprehensive, factual survey of how Britain's war economy operates and how it has altered the British mode of living.

A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS UNDER INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM. VOLUME I: GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EMPIRE, 1750 TO THE PRESENT DAY. By Jürgen Kuczynski. London: Muller, 1942, 272 p. 12/6.

A scholar with Leftist tendencies concludes that on the whole the condition of the working class, in India and the Dominions as well as in Britain, has deteriorated.

DOWNING STREET AND THE COLONIES. London: Allen and Unwin, 1942, 100 p. 2/.

A report in which several members of the Fabian Colonial Bureau criticize British colonial policy and administration, and offer suggestions for reform.

RECONSTRUCTION IN CANADA. Edited by C. A. Ashley. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943, 148 p. $1.00.

Lectures on a variety of economic and social questions.

THE AMERICAN-BORN IN CANADA: A STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION. By R. H. Coats and M. C. Maclean. Toronto: Ryerson, 1943, 176 p. $3.75.

A new addition to the authoritative series on American-Canadian relations edited by James T. Shotwell.

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INDIA'S FATEFUL HOUR. By Sir William Barton. London: Murray (Forest Hills: Transatlantic Arts), 1942, 157 p. $1.50.

A factual review of India's major problems and a level-headed analysis of the present situation. On the whole, Sir William defends British policy.

THE PROBLEM OF INDIA. By R. Palme Dutt. New York: International Publishers, 1943, 224 p. $2.00.

A Communist writer comes out for independence *now*.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY FOR INDIA. By N. Gangulee. London: Allen and Unwin, 1942, 304 p. 16/.

A statement, logical if not entirely reasonable, of the point of view of the Congress Party, by a former professor at the University of Calcutta.

INDEPENDENCE FOR INDIA? Compiled by Julia Johnsen. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1943, 292 p. $1.25.

Selected material illustrating both sides of the argument.

INDIA ARMS FOR VICTORY. By G. W. Tyson. Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1943, 245 p. $2.50.

This important book contains a description of India's rapidly growing and highly significant contribution to the Allied industrial war effort. The author is editor of the Calcutta *Capital*, leading economic review of India.

The Near East

THE ARABS: A SHORT HISTORY. By Philip K. Hitti. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, 224 p. $2.00.

This is a careful and well-proportioned condensation of Hitti's authoritative two-volume "History of the Arabs" published in 1937.

LETTERS FROM SYRIA. By Freya Stark. London: Murray, 1942, 194 p. 9/.

More sidelights on Arab life by a noted traveler in the Near East.

THE JEWISH STRUGGLE. By Jeremiah Ben-Jacob. London: Allen and Unwin, 1942, 232 p. 7/6.

A Zionist interpretation in which the author holds out for a Jewish state in Palestine — preferably one from which the Arab population has been largely eliminated.

THE WAR AND THE JEW. By Vladimir Jabotinsky. New York: Dial Press, 1942, 252 p. $2.50.

This posthumous work by the late leader of Revisionist Zionism consists of writings in which he sought to show that the evacuation of the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe to Palestine was the only way to prevent their extermination. He also pleads for the creation of a Jewish Army to fight as one of the Allies against the Axis.

MAX NORDAU. By Anna and Maxa Nordau. New York: Nordau Committee, 1943, 440 p. $3.75.

The biography of one of the founders and leaders of the Zionist movement.

TOLDOT HITEISHVUT HAZIONIT METKUFAT HERZL VAD YAMANU. By Alexander Bein. Jerusalem: Masada, 1942, 448 p.

A history of Zionist colonization in recent decades.

TRAVELS IN AFGHANISTAN, 1937–38. By Ernest F. Fox. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 285 p. $4.00.

The author, an American geologist, covered a good deal of the country while exploring its mineral resources. His book is an illuminating picture of life in that little-known land.

Africa

AFRICA: FACTS AND FORECASTS. By Albert Q. Maisel. New York: Duell, 1943, 307 p. $2.75.

The author has attempted to do two things in one volume: fit Africa into the general

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strategy of the war, and summarize the main facts concerning the geography, history, economics, population, etc., of the continent's forty-odd political divisions.

NORTH AFRICA. By Alan Houghton Brodrick. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 98 p. $1.25.

A well-informed, concise little manual of information about the geography, history, economics and political organization of Libya and French North Africa.

THE GOVERNMENT OF FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICA. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press and University Museum, 1943, 130 p. $1.50.

A brief factual survey, the first in a series of "African Handbooks" to be prepared for the newly-formed African Studies Group at the University of Pennsylvania.

THE ITALIANIZATION OF AFRICAN NATIVES. By Roland R. De Marco. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 150 p. $2.35.

The author has diligently examined and appraised the available literature dealing with the Italian Government's educational system and policies in its colonies during the last half century. As Dr. De Marco is the first to concede, his conclusions might in some cases have been modified by a visit to Libya and East Africa.

SOUTH OF THE CONGO. By Selwyn James. New York: Random House, 1943, 347 p. $3.00.

A young journalist probes into some of the less pleasant aspects of life in South Africa — particularly the native problem — and comes out with this forthright report on what he found. Much of it does not make for cheerful reading and it will cause anguish among Boer Nationalists; but its revelations are too circumstantial to be dismissed or ignored.

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. By Lewis Sowden. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 271 p. $3.00.

This volume is less personal, more comprehensive and more judicial in temperament than the book by James. It stresses general political trends and the promising industrial future of South Africa.

The Far East

AMERICA'S ROLE IN ASIA. By Harry Paxton Howard. New York: Howell, Soskin, 1943, 463 p. $3.00.

An American with a quarter century of experience in the Orient and a deep faith in democratic institutions shows how important it is for us to assist the popular and liberal forces in East Asia if there is to be peace and orderly progress in that part of the world.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE FAR EAST: 1941. Compiled by K. C. Li. New York: K. C. Li, 1942, 503 p. $3.00.

A compilation of the official press releases of the State Department dealing with Far Eastern affairs arranged in a rough chronological order.

WAR AND PEACE IN THE PACIFIC. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943, 164 p. $1.25.

A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Wartime and Post-War Coöperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, which met at Mont Tremblant (Quebec), December 4–14, 1942.

JAPAN'S MILITARY MASTER. By Hillis Lory. New York: Viking, 1943, 256 p. $2.50.

A valuable analysis of the Japanese Army and of the degree to which it has become integrated into the life of the Japanese people. The author lived in Japan for a number of years and studied his subject at close hand.

WHY JAPAN WAS STRONG. By John Patric. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 313 p. $2.50.

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Japan's strength interpreted in terms of the frugality and energy of its people — a combination which the author believes is going to be hard for us to beat.

BEHIND THE FACE OF JAPAN. By Upton Close. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 427 p. $4.00.

An inadequately revised edition of a volume originally published in 1934.

A GAZETTEER OF JAPANESE PLACE NAMES. Compiled by Stanley Gerr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942, 498 p. $4.50.

In the first half of the book the places are given in Chinese characters, in the second half they appear in Rōmaji script. In both cases the transliterated name is given, along with the latitude and longitude of each place.

BUSHIDO. By Alexander Pernikoff. New York: Liveright, 1943, 284 p. $2.75.

A lurid but ostensibly authentic tale of the horrors of Japanese rule in Manchuria.

IS CHINA A DEMOCRACY? By Creighton Lacy. New York: Day, 1943, 154 p. $1.50.

According to the author, China has been a democracy for several thousand years, in the sense that the Chinese people are suffused with the democratic spirit. The problem thus seems to be one of fashioning institutions that will give expression to this spirit.

RESISTANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION. By Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. New York: Harper, 1943, 322 p. $3.50.

Selected addresses and statements by the Generalissimo during the last six years.

LITTLE CHINA: THE ANNAMESE LANDS. By Alan Houghton Brodrick. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 332 p. $5.50.

A readable description of the country, its inhabitants, their history and institutions.

EAST OF SINGAPORE. By Marjorie Appleton. London: Hurst, 1942, 172 p. 7/6.

An interesting account of a journey, made just before the war, through many of the islands of the South Pacific (*e.g.* New Guinea) that later became battlegrounds in the defense of Australia.

THE MAKING OF MODERN NEW GUINEA. By Stephen Winsor Reed. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1943, 326 p. $4.00.

This scholarly study on New Guinea deals especially with the problems of culture contact. It is issued in coöperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

THE PAPUAN ACHIEVEMENT. By Lewis Lett. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in association with Oxford University Press, 1942, 204 p. 10/6.

The story of how Britain and Australia have discharged their colonial responsibilities in southeastern New Guinea.

ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC. By Hawthorne Daniel. New York: Putnam, 1943, 228 p. $2.50.

A compendium of useful information concerning the geography, peoples, history and institutions of the smaller islands in the Pacific Ocean.

Latin America

FREE MEN OF AMERICA. By Ezquiel Padilla. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1943, 173 p. $2.50.

The Foreign Minister of Mexico gives forceful reasons for basing Inter-American solidarity on democratic régimes within the various republics and on democratic relations between them.

NEW WORLD GUIDES TO THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS. Edited by Earl Parker Hanson. New York: Duell, 1943, 2 v. $5.00.

These volumes are intended to serve as guidebooks for American businessmen and

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travelers in Latin America. They were prepared for the Office of the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs by a group of recognized experts. Volume I deals with Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean islands; Volume II with South America.

INTER-AMERICAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1942. Edited by Raul C. Migone. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 1066 p. $10.00.

The second issue of an important compendium of statistical information covering all of the 21 American republics. The editor is an official of the Argentine Foreign Office.

HANDBOOK OF HISPANIC SOURCE MATERIALS AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. Edited by Ronald Hilton. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1942, 411 p. $3.75.

The descriptive material is arranged geographically by states and covers ethnology, geography, biology, art and literature as well as history.

SOUTH AMERICAN JOURNEY. By Waldo Frank. New York: Duell, 1943, 403 p. $3.00.

An American essayist and political writer records the impressions with which he returned from a recent trip through South America. Mr. Frank was given an enthusiastic welcome by the democratic elements in the countries he visited.

HALF A HEMISPHERE: THE STORY OF LATIN AMERICA. By Delia Goetz. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 278 p. $2.50.

The historical development of Latin America told as a story.

THE JAPANESE IN SOUTH AMERICA. By J. F. Normano and Antonello Gerbi. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943, 135 p. $1.75.

This latest addition to the "International Research Series" of the Institute is devoted primarily to the status of the Japanese in Brazil and Peru.

BRAZIL IN THE MAKING. By José Jobim. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 318 p. $3.50.

A sound analysis of Brazil's economy — natural resources, finances, trade, industries, etc. — by a prominent Brazilian economist.

THE AMAZON. By Caryl Parker Haskins. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 415 p. $4.00.

A factual survey of the geography, history and politics of the six countries in the Amazon basin.

ECUADOR, PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE. By Albert B. Franklin. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 326 p. $3.50.

A sound, up-to-date and informative conspectus of the country, its people, their history and institutions.

CHILE: A GEOGRAPHIC EXTRAVAGANZA. By Benjamin Subercaseaux. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 255 p. $3.00.

Somewhat impressionistic word pictures of the Chilean landscape.

THE BATTLE FOR BUENOS AIRES. By Sax Bradford. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 307 p. $2.50.

An exposé of the extent to which the Nazi-Fascist-Falangist combination has penetrated into the political and economic life of Argentina.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

Aeronautics

American air transport. Office of War Information. Washington, 1943. 29 p.

Air transport services; arrangement between the United States of America and Canada, continuing in effect the arrangement of November 29 and December 2, 1940, giving effect to article III of the arrangement signed August 18, 1939, effected by the exchange of notes signed at Washington, March 4, 1943, effective March 4, 1943. Washington, 1943. 2 p. (Executive Agreement Series 314.) 5¢.

Civil aeronautics act of 1938. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 1012. February 2–12, 1943. Washington, 1943. 453 p. 65¢.

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Colonies

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Development and welfare in the West Indies, 1940–1942. Report by Sir Frank Stockdale. London, 1943. 93 p. (Colonial No. 184.) 1s. 6d.

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Trade relations between free-market and controlled economies. Geneva, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, League of Nations, 1943. 92 p. (1943. II. A. 4.) $1.00.

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PRINCIPLES applying to the provision of aid to the armed forces of the United States; supplementary agreement between United States of America and Belgium, effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington January 30, 1943. Washington, 1943. 3 p. (Executive Agreement Series 313.) 5¢.

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